If At First You Don't Succeed: Extended Monitorability through Multiple Executions

This paper investigates the observational capabilities of monitors that can observe a system over multiple runs. We study how the augmented monitoring setup affect the class of properties that can be verified at runtime, focussing on branching-time properties expressed in the modal mu-calculus. Our results show that the setup can be used to systematically extend previously established monitorability limits. We also prove bounds that capture the correspondence between the syntactic structure of a branching-time property and the number of system runs required to conduct the verification

If at First You Don't Succeed: Budgeting by a Sequence of Referenda

An econometric model, based on the Romer-Rosenthal model of agenda control by budget-maximizing bureaucracies is used to analyze the budgetary and voting outcomes of referenda in a cross-section of Oregon school districts. In addition to estimates of the effects of agenda control, the model permits estimation of the spending effects of voter failure to perceive the .availability of lump-sum intergovernmental grants. Budgets are set via referenda. In the event of a failed referendum, a limited number of additional votes may be taken. The model permits estimation of the degree to which the agenda setter (e.g., the school superintendent) learns about voter preferences from the outcomes of failed referenda. The endogenous variables in the model are the budget proposals and voting outcomes of each referendum in the sequence of referenda held in each school district. The effects of proposals on voting behavior and the effects of learning appear via structural parameters in the error structure. The model is estimated by non-linear maximum likelihood. The results (1) support the theoretical model of agenda control and the effect of the setter's proposals on voting behavior; (2) indicate that voter failure to perceive state grants leads to important increases in spending; (3) fail to indicate any learning by the setter

If at first you don't succeed: suing corporations for climate change

This paper discusses the history and the future prospects of private climate litigation, which seeks to hold private entities legally accountable for climate change-related damage or threats of damage. It argues that, following failed attempts to clear judicial thresholds with regard to standing, proof of harm and causation, a new wave of private climate change lawsuits can be identified, and it is by no means doomed to failure. This is because climate change litigation takes place in a rapidly evolving scientific, discursive and constitutional context, which generates new opportunities for judges to rethink the interpretation of existing legal and evidentiary requirements and apply them in a way that will enhance the accountability of major private carbon producers. Moreover, even unsuccessful cases can contribute to articulating climate change as a legal and financial risk, which may help to guide climate change responsive adjudication in the longer term

If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions.Corporations - Finance ; Game theory

If at First You Don't Succeed: Budgeting by a Sequence of Referenda

An econometric model, based on the Romer-Rosenthal model of agenda control by budget-maximizing bureaucracies is used to analyze the budgetary and voting outcomes of referenda in a cross-section of Oregon school districts. In addition to estimates of the effects of agenda control, the model permits estimation of the spending effects of voter failure to perceive the .availability of lump-sum intergovernmental grants. Budgets are set via referenda. In the event of a failed referendum, a limited number of additional votes may be taken. The model permits estimation of the degree to which the agenda setter (e.g., the school superintendent) learns about voter preferences from the outcomes of failed referenda. The endogenous variables in the model are the budget proposals and voting outcomes of each referendum in the sequence of referenda held in each school district. The effects of proposals on voting behavior and the effects of learning appear via structural parameters in the error structure. The model is estimated by non-linear maximum likelihood. The results (1) support the theoretical model of agenda control and the effect of the setter's proposals on voting behavior; (2) indicate that voter failure to perceive state grants leads to important increases in spending; (3) fail to indicate any learning by the setter

If at First You Don't Succeed...: Profits, Prices and Market Structure in a Model of Quality with Unknowable Consumer Heterogeneity

Why are higher quality niches seen as intrinsically more profitable in business circles? Why do high quality products sometimes have a low real price, while it is unusual to see low quality products with high real prices? Can markets have quality differentiation as well as quality bunching? In this paper we develop a new model of quality which explains such phenomena. Our model builds on the idea that even if a customer chooses to purchase a product, it may fail to deliver'. If a product fails to deliver, the customer may wish to choose some other product. A higher quality product has a higher probability of delivering. We model this as a three stage game where firms first choose whether to enter or not, then in the second stage choose their quality and in the last stage, their price. Our model has a number of interesting predictions. First, it suggests that in equilibrium, a wider range of price per unit of quality is to be found for high quality goods than for low quality ones. Second, it provides a theoretical reason for why high quality niches may be more profitable, supporting the common business school idea that the money is at the high end.' Third, it suggests that the nature of the fixed costs of establishing quality plays a critical role in determining when free entry could be consistent with the existence of profits and result in natural oligopolies' and when it would tend to eliminate all profits.

If At First You Don't Try, Don't Expect Others To Help You Succeed: How Effort and Excuses Influence Reactions To Poorly Performing Teamamtes

This lab experiment using psychology undergraduate students as participants investigated how the timing of low effort behaviors and excuses influence the attributions, emotions, and behavioral intentions a teammate makes towards a poor performer. Whereas most research has focused on internal causes of poor performance, this study empirically examined how teammates respond when an external cause of poor performance, task difficulty, exists. The temporal nature of the effort construct was also tested to see how two different reasons for reducing effort, low motivation and helplessness, influence teammate reactions. Results revealed the importance of displaying effort, even when faced with a seemingly impossible task. Effort directly influenced attributions, emotions, and behavioral intentions with teammates reacting more favorably when poor performers displayed adequate effort rather than low effort. The timing of low effort also mattered with teammates reacting more negatively to poor performers demonstrating low motivation, who always displayed low effort, compared to helpless poor performers, who reduced effort only when the difficulty of the task was realized. Excuses reduced negative teammate reactions. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed in terms of the importance of psychological safety and prosocial behaviors to team-based work environments

If at first you don't succeed : older consumers and hospital food & beverage packaging – a matter of try, try and try again!

‘Openability’ of food and beverage packaging has been shown to be problematic for older consumers. Pressure on resources has seen the use of packaged food and beverages increase in Hospitals within the NSW region of Australia. Studies at the University of Wollongong have shown that not only is Hospital food & beverage packaging problematic, difficulty opening it was identified as a barrier to nutritional intake. Given the serious nature of the problem, a series of studies have been undertaken by the University of Wollongong and Sheffield Hallam University, to evaluate the issues surrounding the ‘openability’ of this packaging in an attempt to understand in detail the issues leading to difficulty in use. Amongst the poor performing packs were seen to be water bottles, drink cartons and cheese portions. Whilst issues surrounding strength were seen to be linked to accessed to bottled water, all other pack types were significantly affected by dexterity and in particular the fine control needed to pinch and peel tabs or remove drinking straws. Sound ergonomics indicates that products should be designed for the user population, yet the experience of our consumers indicates that this is not necessarily the case. Work is ongoing to understand in more detail the effects of ageing such a reduced dexterity on packaging ‘openability’ as well as the effects of age and posture. The eventual aim of this work is to collaborate with packaging designers, manufacturers and brand owners to develop and produce effective and reliable packaging for both the healthcare and retail environments