The Trinity and Extended Simples

In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended simples that supports a Latin approach to the Trinity. The theoretical tools developed to discuss and debate extended simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, can help us make useful conceptual distinctions in attempts to understand what it could be for God to be Triune. Furthermore, the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity might surprise some who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other incoherent

Contingent composition as identity

When the necessity of identity is combined with composition as identity, the contingency of composition is at risk. In the extant literature, either NI is seen as the basis for a refutation of CAI or CAI is associated with a theory of modality, such that: either NI is renounced ; or CC is renounced. In this paper, we investigate the prospects of a new variety of CAI, which aims to preserve both NI and CC. This new variety of CAI is the quite natural product of the attempt to make sense of CAI on the background of a broadly Kripkean view of modality, such that one and the same entity is allowed to exist at more than one possible world. CCAI introduces a world-relative kind of identity, which is different from standard identity, and claims that composition is this kind of world-relative identity. CCAI manages to preserve NI and CC. We compare CCAI with Gibbard’s and Gallois’ doctrines of contingent identity and we show that CCAI can be sensibly interpreted as a form of Weak CAI, that is of the thesis that composition is not standard identity, yet is significantly similar to it

The Univalence Principle

The Univalence Principle is the statement that equivalent mathematical structures are indistinguishable. We prove a general version of this principle that applies to all set-based, categorical, and higher-categorical structures defined in a non-algebraic and space-based style, as well as models of higher-order theories such as topological spaces. In particular, we formulate a general definition of indiscernibility for objects of any such structure, and a corresponding univalence condition that generalizes Rezk's completeness condition for Segal spaces and ensures that all equivalences of structures are levelwise equivalences. Our work builds on Makkai's First-Order Logic with Dependent Sorts, but is expressed in Voevodsky's Univalent Foundations (UF), extending previous work on the Structure Identity Principle and univalent categories in UF. This enables indistinguishability to be expressed simply as identification, and yields a formal theory that is interpretable in classical homotopy theory, but also in other higher topos models. It follows that Univalent Foundations is a fully equivalence-invariant foundation for higher-categorical mathematics, as intended by Voevodsky.Comment: A short version of this book is available as arXiv:2004.06572. v2: added references and some details on morphisms of premonoidal categorie

Composition and Relative Counting

According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative counting requires the relativization either of quantifiers, or of identity, or of the is one of relation. However, some of these relativizations do not deliver the expected results, and others rely on problematic assumptions. In another broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about concepts or sets. The most promising development of this approach is prima facie connected with a violation of the so-called Coreferentiality Constraint, according to which an identity statement is true only if its terms have the same referent. Moreover - even provided that the problem with coreferentiality can be fixed - the resulting analysis of cardinality ascriptions meets several difficulties