Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent money laundering, Part I.B describes the role of the private sector, which is to identify customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions to see if they conform to their profile, examine further any unusual transactions, and report to the government any suspicious transactions. Part I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by describing the government\u27s role, which is to assist the private sector in identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to determine those that should be investigated. Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D discusses successes and failures in the private sector\u27s role. Borrowing from theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unfunded mandates, this Part reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with informing the private sector how best to detect launderers and terrorists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such information fall into the wrong hands. Part I.D discusses how financial institutions do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might be addressed. Part I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the public sector\u27s role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on client identification and transactions. It also discusses how financial intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of criminal activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private and public roles together. Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Part II first discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax administrators with information, comparing this to the far greater role the private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Part turns to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically addressed by borrowing from the experience of tax administration. Part II concludes with a short summary and analysis that relates these conclusions to the preventive measures system. Referring to the analyses in Parts I and II, Part III suggests changes to the current preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and terrorism financing. The private sector\u27s role should be restricted to identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to financial intelligence units

Aligning anti-money laundering, combating of financing of terror and financial inclusion : Questions to consider when FATF standards are clarified

Purpose &ndash; The purpose of this paper is to identify key questions that should be addressed to enable the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to provide guidance regarding the alignment of anti-money laundering, combating of financing of terror and financial inclusion objectives.Design/methodology/approach &ndash; The paper draws on relevant research and documents of the FATF to identify questions that are relevant to consider when it formulates guidance regarding the alignment between financial integrity and financial inclusion objectives.Findings &ndash; The FATF advises that its risk-based approach enables countries and institutions to further financial inclusion. It is, however, not clear what the FATF means when its uses the terms &ldquo;risk&rdquo; and &ldquo;low risk&rdquo;. It is also unclear whether current proposals for financial inclusion regulatory models will necessarily limit money laundering (ML) aswell as terror financing risks to levels that can be described as &ldquo;low&rdquo;. The FATF will need to clarify its own thinking regarding low money laundering and low terror financing risk before it will be able to provide clear guidance to national regulators and financial institutions.Originality/value &ndash; This paper was drafted to inform current FATF discussions regarding guidance on financial inclusion. The questions are relevant to all stakeholders in financial regulation.<br /

The economics of payment finality

Payment finality is critical to decentralized exchange. By specifying how the transfer of one type of claim extinguishes another, the rules governing finality minimize opportunities for default along credit chains and allocate other risks. ; The authors provide a basic analysis of finality and its role in facilitating exchange. They first present a simple, historically based model of transferable debt and finality. The discussion demonstrates the desirability of transferable debt and why rules governing payment finality are needed to sort out who will bear the losses in the event of default. Over time, the introduction of such rules helped establish the concept of negotiability, which greatly increased the efficiency of trade. ; A second model shows how a more modern payment system works. The large volume and scope of payments in modern systems have resulted in disparate sets of finality rules. For example, the finality of check payments is generally tentative, and the risks are often concentrated on a single party. Credit and debit card payments are generally more final, and the liability for potential losses tends to be shared among participants. Choosing the degree of finality for a given situation involves a trade-off between the benefits of finality and the costs of an erroneous or fraudulent transfer. The introduction of new technologies for payments may improve these trade-offs, but finality will remain the essential service provided.Payment systems ; Credit cards ; Checks

Risky business: managing electronic payments in the 21st Century

On June 20 and 21, 2005, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, in conjunction with the Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA), hosted a day-and-a-half forum, “Risky Business: Managing Electronic Payments in the 21st Century.” The Center and EFTA invited participants from the financial services and processing sectors, law enforcement, academia, and policymakers to explore key topics associated with the challenge of effectively managing risk in a payments environment that is increasingly electronic. The meeting’s goal was to identify areas of potential risk and explore interindustry solutions. This paper provides highlights from the forum presentations and ensuing conversations.

Responding to organised crime through intervention in recruitment pathways

Foreword: A multifaceted strategy is required to effectively combat organised crime. A key element of preventing and responding to organised criminal activity is to target how individuals become involved in illicit activities and to develop effective methods of preventing their recruitment. Using prior research into the methods used by organised crime groups to identify potential targets or confederates, and individuals’ motivations to seek or agree to participate in criminal activity, a framework is presented that identified key recruitment pathways together with some strategies that would make recruitment and engagement less effective

Money Laundering: Some Facts

The term "Money Laundering" originates from the US describing the Mafia's attempt to "launder" illegal money via cash-intensive washing salons, which where controlled by company acquisitions or business formations. Estimated two to five per cent of the global gross domestic product stems from illicit sources. A great deal of the money derives from drug-dealing, with a total revenue of 810 Billion USD in 2003. In 2005 the Austrian Police secured drugs worth 49266800 Euro (drug seizures in terms of street prices), in total 25.892 persons were charged for violation of the Austrian Narcotics Act. Most of all illegal transactions are processed by cash since there is the smallest risk to leave one's mark; nevertheless there exists an obvious tendency to misuse the internet in order to undertake illicit transactions in form of Online- Banking, Cyber money and Electronic Purse.

Semi-Annual Report to Congress for the Period of April 1, 2009 to September 30, 2009

[Excerpt] I am pleased to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress, which highlights the most significant activities and accomplishments of the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General (DOL-OIG), for the six-month period ending September 30, 2009. During this reporting period, our investigative work led to 214 indictments, 221 convictions, and $123.1 million in monetary accomplishments. In addition, we issued 22 audit and other reports. OIG audits and investigations continue to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and integrity of DOL’s programs and operations. We also continue to investigate labor racketeering and/or organized crime influence against unions, employee benefit plans, and workers. From an audit perspective, the OIG is highly engaged in ensuring the integrity of DOL activities related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funding. During this reporting period, we issued five reports to that end. Among our findings are that DOL implemented procedures for the accounting of Recovery Act financial activity, acted quickly to implement the premium-assistance provisions for workers who temporarily maintain their health insurance at group rates after losing their jobs, and effectively implemented the temporary program for additional unemployment compensation for eligible recipients. We also identified areas for improvement related to financial and performance reporting and programmatic coordination with states. An audit found shortcomings with DOL’s new iCert system, which is designed to identify inaccuracies in H-1B labor condition applications (LCAs) for foreign workers. We found that, because of missing electronic checks, manual reviews of the LCAs by analysts are necessary. However, increases in the volume of applications may result in analysts not being able to perform a 100 percent review. This increases the risk of LCAs being improperly certified. Our audits also continue to reveal that some Job Corps centers do not comply with requirements for reporting performance for student attendance and accountability. We also found that, at three centers, a contractor had not ensured compliance with procedures to address student misconduct. An audit of the handling of injured Federal employees’ reemployment status at two Federal workers’ compensation district offices found that the Department did not ensure that consistent intervention actions were taken toward removing cases from the periodic roll. This increased the risk of claimants continuing to receive full Federal Employee’s Compensation Act benefits after they were able to return to work or after their compensation could have been reduced. Our investigations continue to combat organized crime and/or labor racketeering involving the monies in union- sponsored benefit plans, internal union corruption, and labor-management relations. A major OIG investigation disclosed more than 30 years of organized crime control of the International Longshoremen’s Association Local 1235, which represents port workers in New Jersey. In another investigation, the business manager for the Electrical Workers Local Union No. 3, who was a former New York State assemblyman, was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on racketeering, bank fraud, and false statement charges involving a number of schemes carried out for personal gain. OIG investigations also identified vulnerabilities and fraud in DOL programs, such as the foreign labor certification (FLC) program. One OIG investigation led to the recent sentencing of Viktar Krus and his co-conspirators to various periods of incarceration for fraudulently obtaining visas for more than 3,800 foreign nationals and defrauding the government of$7.4 million in payroll taxes. Because of our investigative expertise, the OIG is a member of the International Organized Crime (IOC) strategy headed by the U.S. Attorney General. The IOC is committed to combating crime by international organized groups. Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to former DOL Inspector General Gordon S. Heddell, who is now serving as the Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Defense. During his leadership of more than eight years, the DOL-OIG consistently achieved significant results similar to those presented in this report. As Acting Inspector General, I look forward to continuing to work with the Secretary of Labor and her management team in ensuring the effectiveness of DOL in delivering services and protecting the rights and benefits of American workers and retirees

Crimes against property & ownership

The most primeval crimes in all countries are crimes against property such as: Burglary, Larceny, Arson, Embezzlement, False pretenses, Extortion, forgery, fraud, robbery, and etc these crimes engender when ownership existed. Lord can do any possession in his/her property .If anyone trespasses to another one ownership prevailing law punishment him/her. Also we define these crimes in Islamic criminal law; because Islamic rules are strange and prober must study very hard to understand the principle of Islamic rules because most of them don't have reasonable source hence our definitions are so epitome because reader must study jurisprudence.