Innovation and market concentration with asymmetric firms

This paper considers a theoretical model of n asymmetric firms that reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities. In accordance with Schumpeterian hypotheses we obtain that more efficient (bigger) firms spend more in R&D and this leads to a more concentrated market structure. We also find a positive relationship between innovation and market concentration. This calls for a corrective tax on R&D activities to curtail strategic incentives to over-invest in R&D trying to achieve a higher market share. Klassifikation: L11, L52, O31 . February, 2004

Economic integration, intensity of competition and R&D incentives

A two-country differentiated duopoly model is set out in which economic integration increases firms' incentives to invest in R&D, purely through the effect of increased intensity of competition between firms. The model is extended to incorporate knowledge spillovers, which, if related to the degree of integration, give rise to an inverted u-shaped relationship between R&D incentives and integration. The model is also extended to the n-firm general equilibrium case in which integration stimulates economic growth through intensity of competition. As such, the model suggests a positive growth effect of economic integration that does not rely on the usual scale effects

Endogenous R&D Investment and Market Structure: A Case Study of the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry

Over the past three decades, the agricultural biotechnology sector has been characterized by rapid innovation, market consolidation, and a more exhaustive definition of property rights. The industry attributes consistently identified by the literature and important to this analysis include: (i) endogenous sunk costs in the form of expenditures on R&D; (ii) seed and agricultural chemical technologies that potentially act as complements within firms and substitutes across firms; and (iii) property rights governing plant and seed varieties that have become more clearly defined since the 1970s. This paper adds to the stylized facts of the agricultural biotechnology industry to include the ability of firms to license technology, a phenomenon observed only recently in the market as licensing was previously precluded by high transactions costs and “anti-stacking” provisions. We extend Sutton's theoretical framework of endogenous sunk costs and market structure to incorporate the ability of firms to license technology under well-defined property rights, an observed characteristic not captured in previous analyses of the sector. Our model implies that technology licensing leads to lower levels of industry concentration then what would be found under Sutton's model, but that industry concentration remains bounded away from perfect competition as market size becomes large.licensing, market structure, R&D, agricultural biotechnology, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, L22, L24, Q16,

Economic integration, intensity of competition and R&D incentives

A two-country differentiated duopoly model is set out in which economic integration increases firms' incentives to invest in R&D, purely through the effect of increased intensity of competition between firms. The model is extended to incorporate knowledge spillovers, which, if related to the degree of integration, give rise to an inverted u-shaped relationship between R&D incentives and integration. The model is also extended to the n-firm general equilibrium case in which integration stimulates economic growth through intensity of competition. As such, the model suggests a positive growth effect of economic integration that does not rely on the usual scale effects.

Knowledge diffusion under patent with asymmetric firms

We show that if patent protection and trade secrecy generate asymmetric market structure, an innovator may prefer patent protection than trade secrecy even if the diffusion probability is higher under the former but it increases market concentration by preventing some imitators. So, whether an innovator prefers patent protection or trade secrecy depends on the trade-off between the diffusion probability and market concentration.

Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and innovation. In an empirical examination of compensation contracts of S&P 400, 500, and 600 firms we find that long-term incentives in the form of options are positively related to patents and citations to patents. In addition, convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. We also find no relationship between pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) with patents and citations to patents while we did discover a positive relationship between these and golden parachutes. Finally, we show that subsequent to project failure managers’ compensation contracts are reset favourably. We provide support for the theory that compensation contracts that offer long-term commitment and protection from failure are more suitable for innovation.CEO compensation; innovation and incentives

Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation: The Role of Governments, Private Actors and Banks in Corporate Responsibility.

In considering why practices which stimulate incentives for private agents to exert corporate control should be encouraged, this paper highlights criticisms attributed to government control of banks. However the theory relating to the “helping hand” view of government is advanced as having a fundamental role in the regulation and supervision of banks. Furthermore, governments have a vital role to play in corporate responsibility and regulation given the fact that banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being principally attributed to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the ability to supervise banks. Through its supervision of banks, governments also assume an important role where matters related to the fostering of accountability are concerned – not only because banks may have the power to affect firm performance, but also because some private agents are not able to afford internal monitoring mechanisms. Through the Enforced Self Regulation model, the paper attempts to highlight the role played by government in the direct monitoring of firms. In proposing the Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation model, it attempts to draw attention to the fact that although such a model is based on a combination of already existing models and theories, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms will restrict the maximisation potential of such a model. The primary theme of the paper relates to how corporate responsibility and accountability could be fostered through monitoring and the involvement of governments in the regulation of firms. It illustrates how structures which operate in various systems, namely, stock market economies and universal banking systems, function (and attempt) to address gaps which may arise as a result of lack of adequate mechanisms of accountability. Furthermore it draws attention to the impact of asymmetric information (generally and in these systems), on levels of monitoring procedures and how conflicts of interests which could arise between banks and their shareholders, or between governments and those firms being regulated by the regulator, could be addressed

Innovation in Business Groups

Using novel data on European firms, this paper examines the effect of business group affiliation on innovation. We find that business groups foster the scale and novelty of corporate innovation. Group affiliation is particularly important in industries that rely more on external finance and have a higher degree of information asymmetry. We also find that the innovation of affiliates is less sensitive to operating cash flows. We interpret our results as supporting the 'bright side' of business group internal capital markets and explain how legal boundaries between group affiliates mitigate the inefficiencies found in internal capital markets of US conglomerates.business groups, innovation, internal capital markets

Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective Analysis

The study of innovation and technological change is an increasing field of economic enquire because innovation can be considered a major engine of growth. This paper is concerned with the determinants of innovation and technological change. Different theoretical approaches present in the literature are systematically considered. The aim of this work is to offer an overview of contributions emerging from different perspectives trying to place them in their proper theoretical framework. The paper will be divided in different subsections in which each determinant is individually treated through the presentation of the most relevant results achieved by the literature on the specific issue. Policy considerations and hints for further research are also provided.Determinants of innovation, Innovation and knowledge, National systems of innovation, Intellectual property rights, Technology policy

VERTICAL R&D SPILLOVERS, COOPERATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND INNOVATION

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.Vertical R&D spillovers, Market structure, Innovation, Vertical R&D cooperation, R&D policy