24 research outputs found
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with
respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an
election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the
outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that
performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is
a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple
variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter.
We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control
resistances among natural voting systems
Manipulation and Control Complexity of Schulze Voting
Schulze voting is a recently introduced voting system enjoying unusual
popularity and a high degree of real-world use, with users including the
Wikimedia foundation, several branches of the Pirate Party, and MTV. It is a
Condorcet voting system that determines the winners of an election using
information about paths in a graph representation of the election. We resolve
the complexity of many electoral control cases for Schulze voting. We find that
it falls short of the best known voting systems in terms of control resistance,
demonstrating vulnerabilities of concern to some prospective users of the
system