Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Micro- and Macro-Level Validation in Agent-Based Simulation: Reproduction of Human-Like Behaviors and Thinking in a Sequential Bargaining Game

This paper addresses both micro- and macro-level validation in agent-based simulation (ABS) to explore validated agents that can reproduce not only human-like behaviors externally but also human-like thinking internally. For this purpose, we employ the sequential bargaining game, which can investigate a change in humans' behaviors and thinking longer than the ultimatum game (i.e., one-time bargaining game), and compare simulation results of Q-learning agents employing any type of the three types of action selections (i.e., the ε-greedy, roulette, and Boltzmann distribution selections) in the game. Intensive simulations have revealed the following implications: (1) Q-learning agents with any type of three action selections can reproduce human-like behaviors but not human-like thinking, which means that they are validated from the macro-level viewpoint but not from the micro-level viewpoint; and (2) Q-learning agents employing Boltzmann distribution selection with changing the random parameter can reproduce both human-like behaviors and thinking, which means that they are validated from both micro- and macro-level viewpoints.Micro- and Macro-Level Validation, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent Modeling, Sequential Bargaining Game, Reinforcement Learning

A Rule-driven Approach for Defining the Behavior of Negotiating Software Agents

One problem with existing agent-mediated negotiation systems is that they rely on ad hoc, static, non-adaptive, and hardcoded schemes to represent the behaviour of agents. This limitation is probably due to the complexity of the negotiation task itself. Indeed, while negotiating, software (human) agents face tough decisions. These decisions are based not only on the information made available by the negotiation server, but on the behaviour of the other participants in the negotiation process as well. The information and the behaviour in question are constantly changing and highly uncertain. In the first part of the paper, we propose a rule-driven approach to represent, manage and explore negotiation strategies and coordination information. For that, we divide the behaviour of negotiating agents into protocols, strategies and coordination. Among the many advantages of the proposed solution, we can cite the high level of abstraction, the closeness to human understanding, the versatility, and the possibility to modify the agents' behaviour during the negotiation process. To validate our solution, we ran many agent tournaments, and used the rule-driven approach to implement bidding strategies that are common in the English and Dutch auctions. We also implemented simple coordination schemes across several auctions. The ongoing validation work is detailed and discussed in the second part of the paper. Un des inconvénients qu'on retrouve fréquemment dans les systèmes de négociation par agents est qu'ils reposent sur des schémas ad-hoc, non adaptatifs et figés dans le code pour représenter le comportement des agents. Cette limitation est probablement due à la complexité de l'activité de négociation elle-même. En effet, au cours de la négociation, les agents logiciels (humains) ont des décisions difficiles à prendre. Ces décisions ne sont pas seulement basées sur l'information disponible sur le serveur de négociation, mais aussi sur le comportement des autres participants durant le processus de négociation. L'information et le comportement en question changent constamment et sont très incertains. Dans la première partie de l'article, nous proposons une approche à base de règles pour représenter, gérer et explorer les stratégies de négociation ainsi que l'information de coordination. Parmi les nombreux avantages de la solution proposée, on peut citer le haut niveau d'abstraction, la proximité avec la compréhension humaine, la souplesse d'utilisation et la possibilité de modifier le comportement des agents durant le processus de négociation. Pour valider notre solution, nous avons effectué plusieurs tournois entre agents et utilisé l'approche à base de règles pour implémenter des stratégies simples applicables à l'enchère anglaise et à l'enchère hollandaise. Nous avons aussi implémenté des schémas simples de coordination impliquant plusieurs enchères. Le travail de validation, en cours, est détaillé et discuté dans la seconde partie de l'article.e-negotiation, online auction, software agent, negotiation strategy, coordination, rule-based system, rule engine, Négociation électronique, enchères en ligne, agents logiciels, stratégie de négociation, coordination, système à base de règles, moteur de règles

Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Water, Agreeements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders

Variable time scales, agent-based models, and role-playing games: The PIEPLUE river basin management game

This article presents a specific association of a role-playing game (RPG) and an agent-based model (ABM) aimed at dealing with a large range of time scales. Applications to the field of natural resource management lead one to consider the short time scale of resource use in practice at the same time as the longer ones related to resource dynamics or actors' investments. In their daily practice, stakeholders are translating their long-term strategies, a translation that is contextualized and combined with some cooccurring events. Long-term thinking is required for sustainable use of natural resources, but it should take into account its necessary adaptation on a short time scale. This raises the necessity for tools able to tackle jointly these various time scales. The similarity of architecture between computerized ABMs and RPGs makes them easy to associate in a hybrid tool, targeted at meeting this requirement. The proposition of this article is to allocate the representation of short time scales to computerized ABMs and the long ones to RPGs, while keeping the same static structural conceptual model, shared as a common root by both. This synergy is illustrated with PIEPLUE, an interactive setting tackling water-sharing issues.GESTION DE L'EAU;BASSIN VERSANT;RESSOURCE NATURELLE;MODELE;JEU DE ROLE;SYSTEME MULTIAGENTS;AGENT-BASED MODEL;CASE STUDY OF WATER SHARING;CONCEPTUAL MODEL;HYBRID TOOL;INVESTMENTS;LONG-TERM ISSUES;NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;PIEPLUE;PARTICIPATORY MODELING;RESOURCE DYNAMICS;RESOURCE USE;ROLE-PLAYING GAME;STAKEHOLDERS;SUSTAINABLE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES;TIME-SCALE DIVERSITY;VARIABLE TIME SCALES;WATER MANAGEMENT

Individual Tariffs for Mobile Communication Services

This paper introduces a conceptual framework and a computational model for individual tariffs for mobile communication services. The purpose is to provide guidance for implementation by communication service suppliers or user groups alike. The paper first examines the sociological and economic incentives for personalized services and individual tariffs. Then it introduces a framework for individual tariffs which is centered on user and supplier behaviours. The user, instead of being fully rational, has "bounded rationality" and his behaviours are subject to economic constraints and influenced by social needs. The supplier can belong to different types of entities such as firms and communities; each has his own goals which lead to different behaviors. Individual tariffs are decided through interactions between the user and the supplier and can be analyzed in a structured way using game theory. A numerical case in mobile music training is developed to illustrate the concepts.risks;mobile communication services;Individual tariffs;computational games

Individual Tariffs for Mobile Services: Theoretical Framework and a Computational Case in Mobile Music

This paper introduces individual tariffs at service and content bundle level in mobile communications. It gives a theoretical framework (economic, sociological) as well as a computational game solution method. The user can be an individual or a community. Individual tariffs are decided through interactions between the user and the supplier. A numerical example from mobile music illustrates the concepts.risks;mobile communication services;Individual tariffs;computational games

Coordination and allocation on land markets under increasing scale economies and heterogeneous actors - An experimental study

Economies of scale and scope are often not exploited in Western agriculture. A general reason is probably that various types of transaction costs limit coordination among farmers. A more specific explanation is that coordination on land markets or machinery cooperation is difficult to achieve when farmers are heterogeneous as some kind of price differentiation is necessary for a Pareto-superior solution. This paper investigates experimentally such a coordination game with heterogeneous agents using an example inspired by agricultural land markets. The experimental findings suggest that a Pareto-optimal solution may not be found when agents are heterogeneous. The findings provide evidence for market failures and cooperation deficits as reasons for unexploited economies of scale in agriculture. Our findings are consistent with coordination failures that appear to be driven by behavioural factors such as anchoring-and-adjustment, inequity aversion, and a reverse form of winner’s curse.Land Markets, Coordination and Allocation, Experimental Economics, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management, Land Economics/Use,