Predicting Human Cooperation

The Prisoner's Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner's Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner's Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational model of human behavior in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The computational model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is extremely successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. We demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.Comment: Added references. New inline citation style. Added small portions of text. Re-compiled Rmarkdown file with updated ggplot2 so small aesthetic changes to plot

Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

The existence of cooperation and social order among genetically unrelated individuals is a fundamental problem in the behavioural sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour— unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice. Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is, however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self- interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These findings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions, and they are probably relevant in all domains in which voluntary compliance matters—in relations between spouses, in the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.Detrimental effects, sanctions, human altruism

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically

Anticipation in Human-Robot Cooperation: A Recurrent Neural Network Approach for Multiple Action Sequences Prediction

Close human-robot cooperation is a key enabler for new developments in advanced manufacturing and assistive applications. Close cooperation require robots that can predict human actions and intent, and understand human non-verbal cues. Recent approaches based on neural networks have led to encouraging results in the human action prediction problem both in continuous and discrete spaces. Our approach extends the research in this direction. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we validate the use of gaze and body pose cues as a means of predicting human action through a feature selection method. Next, we address two shortcomings of existing literature: predicting multiple and variable-length action sequences. This is achieved by introducing an encoder-decoder recurrent neural network topology in the discrete action prediction problem. In addition, we theoretically demonstrate the importance of predicting multiple action sequences as a means of estimating the stochastic reward in a human robot cooperation scenario. Finally, we show the ability to effectively train the prediction model on a action prediction dataset, involving human motion data, and explore the influence of the model's parameters on its performance. Source code repository: https://github.com/pschydlo/ActionAnticipationComment: IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA) 2018, Accepte

Democracy and Human Rights in the European-Asian Dialogue: A Clash of Cooperation Cultures?

Whereas the European Union (EU) favors a formal, binding, output-oriented, and to some extent supranational approach to cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is based on informal, non-binding, process-oriented intergovernmental forms of cooperation. This article addresses the question of whether these differences between European and Asian cooperation norms or cultures can account for interregional cooperation problems in the areas of democracy and human rights within the institutional context of EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The author argues that a clash of cooperation cultures basically occurs in both forms of interregional collaboration between Asia and Europe, with slight differences due to the institutional context: while disagreements over the question of democracy and human rights between the EU and ASEAN have led to a temporary and then a complete standstill in cooperation, the flexible institutional mechanisms of ASEM seem, at first glance, to mitigate the disruptive effects of such dialogues. Yet informality does not remove the issues from the agenda, as the recurrent disputes over Myanmar’s participation and the nonintervention norm favored by the Asian side of ASEM clearly indicate. Antagonistic cooperation cultures thus play a significant role in explaining the obstructive nature of the interregional human rights and democracy dialogue between Asia and Europe.cooperation culture, human rights, democracy, Myanmar, EU-ASEAN, ASEM

The robustness of the "Raise-The-Stakes" strategy - Coping with exploitation in noisy Prisoner's Dilemma Games.

Recent models of altruism point out the success of a strategy called 'Raise-The- Stakes' (RTS) in situations allowing variability in cooperation. In theory, RTS is difficult to exploit because it begins with a small investment in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. When its cooperation is reciprocated, RTS increases its generosity, thereby taking advantage of cooperative opportunities. Previous research has shown that human subjects indeed adopt RTS but start out moderately cooperative rather than with a minimal investment. This raises the question how robust RTS is against exploitation, certainly in a noisy situation. In a behavioral experiment we investigate whether human subjects vary their cooperation in interaction with reciprocators and cheaters in an iterated non-discrete version of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. When confronted with a strategy that matches the investment of the subject on the previous round, we find that subjects are likely to increase cooperation. However, cooperation gradually breaks down in interaction with a strategy that undercuts the level of cooperation of the subjects, indicating the robustness of RTS. In line with RTS modeling studies, but in contrast with the cheater detection literature, we find that human subjects are less willing to increase cooperation when the perceived likelihood of mistakes increases.Cheating; Evolution of cooperation; Noise; Prisoner's dilemma; Reciprocal altruism;

Master assisted cooperative control of human and robot

A cooperative control approach between human and robot takes an important role to carry out various tasks in hazardous environments or space. In this case, a robot is operated based on the cooperation between direct human control and autonomous robot control. In this study, a neural network is introduced for cooperating process between human control and robot control in order to optimize the degree of cooperation of human and robot. The degree of participation of human operator into the control is determined based on a reference cooperative model which expresses desired human and robot cooperative form. The experiment has executed the contacting tasks for the various object walls using a two-degrees of freedom Cartesian robot. The results indicate the availability of the proposed cooperating method for the cooperative control of human and robot </p

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism