Human Dignity, Humiliation, and Torture

Modern human rights instruments ground human rights in the concept of human dignity, without providing an underlying theory of human dignity. This paper examines the central importance of human dignity, understood as not humiliating people, in traditional Jewish ethics. It employs this conception of human dignity to examine and criticize U.S. use of humiliation tactics and torture in the interrogation of terrorism suspects

Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren\u27t Busy Assaulting It)

David Luban argues in this lecture that the moral foundation of the lawyer\u27s profession lies in the defense of human dignity-and the chief moral danger facing the profession arises when lawyers assault human dignity rather than defend it. The concept of human dignity has a rich philosophical tradition, with some philosophers identifying human dignity as a metaphysical property of individuals-a property such as having a soul, or possessing autonomy. Luban argues instead that human dignity is a relational property of the dignifier and the dignified, emphasizing that assaulting human dignity humiliates the victim. Lawyers honor the human dignity of others by protecting them against humiliations, and defile that dignity by subjecting them to humiliations. The lecture develops these ideas through four traditional issues in legal ethics: the right of criminal defendants to an advocate, the duty of confidentiality, paternalism of attorneys toward their clients, and pro bono service

Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes

It is often argued that internationally recognized human rights are common to all cultural traditions and adaptable to a great variety of social structures and political regimes. Such arguments confuse human rights with human dignity. All societies possess conceptions of human dignity, but the conception of human dignity underlying international human rights standards requires a particular type of “liberal” regime. This conclusion is reached through a comparison of the social structures of ideal type liberal, minimal, traditional, communist, corporatist and developmental regimes and their impact on autonomy, equality, privacy, social conflict, and the definition of societal membership

Will You Look Me in the Eye? The Embrace and Denial of Human Dignity on Marquette Campus

With a foundation in Levinas\u27 pseudo-ethical philosophy of the Phenomena of the Face, this project provided a definition of human dignity and considered whether or not the Marquette University community practices a common respect for human dignity in everyday interactions on the streets of Marquette campus -- focusing in on Wisconsin Avenue due to its constant traffic of both Marquette University students and faculty and Milwaukee community members. This project observed typical day to day interactions that occur while walking around Marquette University\u27s campus with a specific emphasis on how people affiliated with Marquette University react to other Marquette community members as well as members of the Milwaukee community on campus. Ultimately, the research sought to consider the level of awareness Marquette affiliates have upon the subject of human dignity and calls for we as a university to raise awareness about the necessity and nuances of human dignity in everyday interactions.https://epublications.marquette.edu/english_3210ur/1019/thumbnail.jp

Liberalism, Human Rights, and Human Dignity

Do international standards regarding human rights require the existence of a liberal regime? This was the thrust of Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly’s essay in the September 1986 issue of this Review. Neil Mitchell takes vigorous issue with this contention, arguing first and foremost that Howard and Donnelly have not defined liberalism satisfactorily. Howard and Donnelly present a spirited rejoinder

Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity

Human rights sound a lot like moral rights: rights that we have because we are human. Many philosophers think it follows that the list of international human rights must therefore be founded on some philosophical account of moral rights or of human dignity. More recently, other philosophers have rejected this foundationalist picture of international human rights (“foundationalist” meaning that moral rights are the foundation of international human rights). These critics argue that international human rights need no philosophical foundation; instead, we should look to the actual practices of human rights: the practices of international institutions, tribunals, NGOs, monitors, and activists. I call this approach “human rights pragmatism.” It is pragmatism in that it puts practice rather than theory in the driver’s seat, and denies the need for theoretical foundations for international legal human rights. In “Why International Legal Human Rights?” Allen Buchanan offers a forceful pragmatist critique of foundationalism, which he calls the “Mirroring View”: that international legal human rights must mirror moral rights. Buchanan demonstrates that there are reasons for establishing a regime of international legal human rights that have nothing to do with the Mirroring View. My paper is a response to Buchanan’s. I agree with Buchanan’s pragmatist critique of foundationalism, but I argue that without some connection between international legal human rights and moral rights grounded in human dignity, a regime of international legal human rights will fail on its own terms. The paper explores what that connection is, and explains why focusing on human dignity is essential on pragmatist, anti-foundationalist grounds

The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’s Canons

Lon Fuller offered an analysis of the rule of law in the form of eight ‘canons’ of lawmaking. He argued (1) that these canons constitute a ‘procedural natural law’, as distinct from traditional ‘substantive’ natural law; but also (2) that lawmaking conforming to the canons will enhance human dignity—a ‘substantive’ result. This paper argues the following points: first, that Fuller mischaracterized his eight canons, which are substantive rather than procedural; second, that there is an important sense in which they enhance human dignity; third, that they fail to enhance human dignity to the fullest extent because they understand it in an overly libertarian fashion; and fourth, that Fuller’s overall approach to jurisprudence, in which the standpoint of practicing lawyers (not judges, legislators, or citizens) predominates, offers important insights into achieving congruence between the law ‘in books’ and law’s enforcement. However, to succeed such an account must emphasize the lawyer’s counseling role and access to legal services, which Fuller neglects