How to make e-cash with non-repudiation and anonymity

Current e-cash systems enable anonymity services to protect users ' privacy, but most of them do not provide the non-repudiation service such that many problems exist in the systems like denying, losing, misusing, stealing, and double-spending, etc. This paper proposes an e-cash system in which a one-time public key is embedded in the partial blind signature to provide the non-repudiation service against the above attacks. The article also demonstrates that the combination of the partial blind digital signature and anonymous digital signature makes the e-cash systems more robust and fair than before. 1

The offline digital currency puzzle solved by a local blockchain

A major drawback in deploying central bank digital currencies (CDBC) is the offline puzzle, which requires that a CBDC must keep the provision given by cash, and, simultaneously, avoid double-spending, counterfeiting, and other issues. The puzzle is solved by minting the coins in serials, which are stored on a local blockchain (e.g. smartphone). The local blockchain is secured by keys embedded in the hardware and can be continuously mined by the wallet to enhance security. The coins can be either minted as hot coins, which can be retrieved in case of loss, or minted as cold coins, like physical cash.Comment: 20 pages, 2 tables and 2 figure

Individual Risk Management for Digital Payment Systems

Despite existing security standards and security technologies, such as secure hardware, gaps between users’ demand for security and the security offered by a payment system can still remain. These security gaps imply risks for users. In this paper, we introduce a framework for the management of those risks. As a result, we present an instrument enabling users to evaluate eventual risks related with digital payment systems and to handle these risks with technical and economic instruments.Payment Systems, Digital Money

Privacy-Preserving Electronic Ticket Scheme with Attribute-based Credentials

Electronic tickets (e-tickets) are electronic versions of paper tickets, which enable users to access intended services and improve services' efficiency. However, privacy may be a concern of e-ticket users. In this paper, a privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme with attribute-based credentials is proposed to protect users' privacy and facilitate ticketing based on a user's attributes. Our proposed scheme makes the following contributions: (1) users can buy different tickets from ticket sellers without releasing their exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the same user cannot be linked; (3) a ticket cannot be transferred to another user; (4) a ticket cannot be double spent; (5) the security of the proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced to well known (q-strong Diffie-Hellman) complexity assumption; (6) the scheme has been implemented and its performance empirically evaluated. To the best of our knowledge, our privacy-preserving attribute-based e-ticket scheme is the first one providing these five features. Application areas of our scheme include event or transport tickets where users must convince ticket sellers that their attributes (e.g. age, profession, location) satisfy the ticket price policies to buy discounted tickets. More generally, our scheme can be used in any system where access to services is only dependent on a user's attributes (or entitlements) but not their identities.Comment: 18pages, 6 figures, 2 table

A Novel Blind Signature Scheme Based On Discrete Logarithm Problem With Un-traceability

Blind Signatures are a special type of digital signatures which possess two special properties of blindness and untraceability, which are important for today’s real world applications that require authentication , integrity , security , anonymity and privacy. David Chaum[2] was the first to propose the concept of blind signatures. The scheme's security was based on the difficulty of solving the factoring problem [3, 4]. Two properties that are important for a blind signature scheme in order to be used in various modern applications are blindness and untraceability[2, 5, 6] . Blindness means that the signer is not able to know the contents of the message while signing it, which is achieved by disguising (or blinding) the message through various methods. Untraceability refers to preventing the signer from linking the blinded message it signs to a later unblinded version that it may be called upon to verify. Blind signatures based on discrete logarithm problem are still an area with much scope for research. We aim to propose a novel blind signature scheme with untraceability , based on the discrete logarithm problem

Offline e-cash system

The e-cash scheme and the digital content transactions are the need of the hour. In the coming years, all these digital transactions will grow tremendously. So, a secure e-cash scheme is of utmost requirement. e-cash scheme, which is untraceable and maintains the security features, make it possible for the customers and the merchants to exchange the e-cash and the merchandise with privacy. So, there is a need to design an e-cash scheme with strong cryptosystem and algorithms in order to facilitate efficient digital transactions. There are two types of e-cash systems: Offine e-cash systems and online e-cash systems. Offine e-cash systems make it possible for the customer to pay the e-coin to the merchant without any involvement of bank. In online schemes, we require the involvement of the bank. The two most fundamental security features associated with offine scheme is the anonymity and the double spending detection. The proposed scheme maintains both the above features along with unforgeability. Besides, the E-coins have their expiration date so that the bank faces no hassles and can manage its database efficiently. This feature also ensures portability as the coins can be transferred to storage devices through the networks