2 research outputs found
Security and Privacy Aspects in MapReduce on Clouds: A Survey
MapReduce is a programming system for distributed processing large-scale data
in an efficient and fault tolerant manner on a private, public, or hybrid
cloud. MapReduce is extensively used daily around the world as an efficient
distributed computation tool for a large class of problems, e.g., search,
clustering, log analysis, different types of join operations, matrix
multiplication, pattern matching, and analysis of social networks. Security and
privacy of data and MapReduce computations are essential concerns when a
MapReduce computation is executed in public or hybrid clouds. In order to
execute a MapReduce job in public and hybrid clouds, authentication of
mappers-reducers, confidentiality of data-computations, integrity of
data-computations, and correctness-freshness of the outputs are required.
Satisfying these requirements shield the operation from several types of
attacks on data and MapReduce computations. In this paper, we investigate and
discuss security and privacy challenges and requirements, considering a variety
of adversarial capabilities, and characteristics in the scope of MapReduce. We
also provide a review of existing security and privacy protocols for MapReduce
and discuss their overhead issues.Comment: Accepted in Elsevier Computer Science Revie
Extremal Set Theory and LWE Based Access Structure Hiding Verifiable Secret Sharing with Malicious-Majority and Free Verification
Secret sharing allows distributing a secret among several parties such that
only authorized subsets, specified by an access structure, can reconstruct the
secret. Sehrawat and Desmedt (COCOON 2020) introduced hidden access structures,
that remain secret until some authorized subset of parties collaborate.
However, their scheme assumes semi-honest parties and supports only restricted
access structures. We address these shortcomings by constructing an access
structure hiding verifiable secret sharing scheme that supports all monotone
access structures. It is the first secret sharing scheme to support cheater
identification and share verifiability in malicious-majority settings. The
verification procedure of our scheme incurs no communication overhead. As the
building blocks of our scheme, we introduce and construct: (i) a set-system
with subsets of a set
of elements. Our set-system, , is defined over ,
where is a non-prime-power. The size of each set in is
divisible by but the sizes of their pairwise intersections are not, unless
one set is a subset of another, (ii) a new variant of the learning with errors
(LWE) problem, called PRIM-LWE, wherein the secret matrix is sampled such that
its determinant is a generator of , where is the LWE
modulus. The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the LWE problem,
and its share size is where is
a constant and is the total number of parties. We also provide
directions for future work to reduce the share size to
Comment: Preprin