Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets

In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a state agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through auctions. We show that these hierarchical markets do not result in a socially efficient spectrum allocation which is aimed by the agency, due to lack of coordination among the entities in different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives, we propose an incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy and the actions of the POs with the objective of the agency, and thus leads to system performance improvement in terms of social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method for hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the proposed incentive mechanism is a novel auction scheme which enables POs to allocate their spectrum by balancing their derived revenue and the welfare of the SOs.Comment: 9 page

A New Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility

LBJ School of Public Affair

Pricing differentiated brokered internet services

Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players at each level, compete in a Bertrand game, while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical examples demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.http://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/sdp2016.pdfAccepted manuscrip

The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services

Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084

Optimal Provisioning and Pricing of Differentiated Services Using QoS Class Promotion

This paper introduces a new method for optimally provisioning and pricing di#erentiated services, that maximizes profit and maintains a small blocking probability. Resources are provisioned per Quality of Service (QoS) class over the long-term (service level agreement duration), then priced based on user demand over the short-term. Unique to this method is the ability to dynamically promote tra#c from one QoS class to a higher QoS class, based on estimated demand statistics. This additional flexibility encourages better short-term utilization of the classes, resulting in higher profits while maintaining a low blocking probability. Experimental results will demonstrate QoS class promotion can obtain higher profits, as compared to other provisioning and allocation methods

Can we Consider as Being „Miraculous” the Solutions Suggested by the Laureates of Nobel Prize in Order to Stop the World Economical Crisis

Today we are in a global economic crisis. It is not an economic crisis because of scale, for the worst case there was a recession of a few percent of GDP, but rather because it was consistently induced. The best strategies have been proposed so far are essentially neo-Keynesian, as private demand fell, public expenditure can change aggregate demand to provide a stimulus to the economy. At best, this can provide the necessary infrastructure for positive externalities through network effects, at worst, will only serve as a delay tactic, leading to a greater crisis in the near future. Nobel prizes were created by scientist and businessman Alfred Nobel (1833 - 1896), inventor (1867), which, in his will asked that his immense wealth income are offered each year „awards as the which, in the previous year, brought the greatest service of humanity”. Thus, by the will left by Alfred Nobel, Nobel prizes are awarded to institutions: - Swedish Royal Academy of Science: Nobel Prize in Physics, Chemistry Nobel Prize Nobel Prize in Economics; - Carolina Institute in Stockholm: Nobel Prize for Medicine; - Swedish Academy: Nobel Prize for Literature; - Committee composed of five persons of Parliament of Norway: Nobel Peace Prize Nobel prizes are awarded, so in 1901, except for economics, established in 1968 by the Central Bank of Sweden to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the founding of this institution. More specifically, Nobel Prizes have been awarded since December 10, 1901, after their author's death. They consist of: a medal, a diploma and a sum of money, which at first was worth U.S. $40,000, then increased to$ 1,000,000. Nobel Prize in cash value increased slightly since 1950, according to the Foundation website. Should mention that The Nobel Foundation has awarded prizes during World War or during World War II. Given these great discoveries of illustrious researchers could find solutions to global economic crisis. If so intense study should find practical solutions and not pure theory which seem to be medalists. Are they able to implement scientifically proven theory?global economic crisis, Nobel Prize, Elinor Ostrom, recesssion

Reinventing the Utility for DERs: A Proposal for a DSO-Centric Retail Electricity Market

The increasing penetration of intermittent renewables, storage devices, and flexible loads is introducing operational challenges in distribution grids. The proper coordination and scheduling of these resources using a distributed approach is warranted, and can only be achieved through local retail markets employing transactive energy schemes. To this end, we propose a distribution-level retail market operated by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), which schedules DERs and determines the real-time distribution-level Locational Marginal Price (d-LPM). The retail market is built using a distributed Proximal Atomic Coordination (PAC) algorithm, which solves the optimal power flow model while accounting for network physics, rendering locationally and temporally varying d-LMPs. A numerical study of the market structure is carried out via simulations of the IEEE-123 node network using data from ISO-NE and Eversource in Massachusetts, US. The market performance is compared to existing retail practices, including demand response (DR) with no-export rules and net metering. The DSO-centric market increases DER utilization, permits continual market participation for DR, lowers electricity rates for customers, and eliminates the subsidies inherent to net metering programs. The resulting lower revenue stream for the DSO highlights the evolving business model of the modern utility, moving from commoditized markets towards performance-based ratemaking

Transactive energy system

The rising of distributed energy resource (DER) e.g. rooftop PV solar system, wind system and energy storage system, and load demand response bring both opportunities and challenges to the power grid. Coordinating decentralised DERs is important. The purpose of transactive energy (TE) system is to coordinate DERs at the distribution level and encourage consumers and prosumers to participate in electricity market by providing economic incentives. TE system enables customers and prosumers to sell the surplus energy to their neighbours. This thesis represents research on TE system in aspects of structure, technology, economics and participants. The impact of TE system in Australia’s electrical standard and electricity business mode is also explored. Moreover, based on research findings, a TE system model for Australia is proposed. The key findings of this project are: • TE System is a method to relieve electricity congestion. • The power flow (distribution level) and transaction in TE system are bidirectional. • TE system is customer-oriented and offers more choices to customers/prosumers. • The new distribution system operator (DSO) plays a key role in coordinating DERs and end-users. • Undertaking a TE system demonstration project in Australia is suggested