Detecting and Tracking the Spread of Astroturf Memes in Microblog Streams

Online social media are complementing and in some cases replacing person-to-person social interaction and redefining the diffusion of information. In particular, microblogs have become crucial grounds on which public relations, marketing, and political battles are fought. We introduce an extensible framework that will enable the real-time analysis of meme diffusion in social media by mining, visualizing, mapping, classifying, and modeling massive streams of public microblogging events. We describe a Web service that leverages this framework to track political memes in Twitter and help detect astroturfing, smear campaigns, and other misinformation in the context of U.S. political elections. We present some cases of abusive behaviors uncovered by our service. Finally, we discuss promising preliminary results on the detection of suspicious memes via supervised learning based on features extracted from the topology of the diffusion networks, sentiment analysis, and crowdsourced annotations

Topic-Based Influence Computation in Social Networks under Resource Constraints

As social networks are constantly changing and evolving, methods to analyze dynamic social networks are becoming more important in understanding social trends. However, due to the restrictions imposed by the social network service providers, the resources available to fetch the entire contents of a social network are typically very limited. As a result, analysis of dynamic social network data requires maintaining an approximate copy of the social network for each time period, locally. In this paper, we study the problem of dynamic network and text fetching with limited probing capacities, for identifying and maintaining influential users as the social network evolves. We propose an algorithm to probe the relationships (required for global influence computation) as well as posts (required for topic-based influence computation) of a limited number of users during each probing period, based on the influence trends and activities of the users. We infer the current network based on the newly probed user data and the last known version of the network maintained locally. Additionally, we propose to use link prediction methods to further increase the accuracy of our network inference. We employ PageRank as the metric for influence computation. We illustrate how the proposed solution maintains accurate PageRank scores for computing global influence, and topic-sensitive weighted PageRank scores for topic-based influence. The latter relies on a topic-based network constructed via weights determined by semantic analysis of posts and their sharing statistics. We evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithms by comparing them with the true influence scores of the full and up-to-date version of the network, using data from the micro-blogging service Twitter. Results show that our techniques significantly outperform baseline methods and are superior to state-of-the-art techniques from the literature

Crises and collective socio-economic phenomena: simple models and challenges

Financial and economic history is strewn with bubbles and crashes, booms and busts, crises and upheavals of all sorts. Understanding the origin of these events is arguably one of the most important problems in economic theory. In this paper, we review recent efforts to include heterogeneities and interactions in models of decision. We argue that the Random Field Ising model (RFIM) indeed provides a unifying framework to account for many collective socio-economic phenomena that lead to sudden ruptures and crises. We discuss different models that can capture potentially destabilising self-referential feedback loops, induced either by herding, i.e. reference to peers, or trending, i.e. reference to the past, and account for some of the phenomenology missing in the standard models. We discuss some empirically testable predictions of these models, for example robust signatures of RFIM-like herding effects, or the logarithmic decay of spatial correlations of voting patterns. One of the most striking result, inspired by statistical physics methods, is that Adam Smith's invisible hand can badly fail at solving simple coordination problems. We also insist on the issue of time-scales, that can be extremely long in some cases, and prevent socially optimal equilibria to be reached. As a theoretical challenge, the study of so-called "detailed-balance" violating decision rules is needed to decide whether conclusions based on current models (that all assume detailed-balance) are indeed robust and generic.Comment: Review paper accepted for a special issue of J Stat Phys; several minor improvements along reviewers' comment

Sociological and Communication-Theoretical Perspectives on the Commercialization of the Sciences

Both self-organization and organization are important for the further development of the sciences: the two dynamics condition and enable each other. Commercial and public considerations can interact and "interpenetrate" in historical organization; different codes of communication are then "recombined." However, self-organization in the symbolically generalized codes of communication can be expected to operate at the global level. The Triple Helix model allows for both a neo-institutional appreciation in terms of historical networks of university-industry-government relations and a neo-evolutionary interpretation in terms of three functions: (i) novelty production, (i) wealth generation, and (iii) political control. Using this model, one can appreciate both subdynamics. The mutual information in three dimensions enables us to measure the trade-off between organization and self-organization as a possible synergy. The question of optimization between commercial and public interests in the different sciences can thus be made empirical.Comment: Science & Education (forthcoming

Mechanism Choice

This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research. Document is the author\u27s manuscrip

Mechanism Choice

Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as “an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568). In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough: the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures, matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue areas, governance systems, and time. Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures, executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying, campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the ones that best pursue the public interest. This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design. It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called public choice, political economy, or positive politics. This positive literature explores how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal. The positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves.

Memory for prices and the euro cash changeover: An analysis for cinema prices in Italy

The question addressed by this study is whether consumers remember past prices correctly. We test Italian citizensÂ’ memory for cinema prices with questionnaires distributed to moviegoers. The analysis concentrates on the memory of pre-euro prices, but the recall for a more recent period is also investigated. The results show that only a small percentage of respondents recalled the correct price, and that the average prices recalled were much lower than the actual pre-euro prices and dated back to years before the changeover. Price recall is less accurate for the respondents who perceive higher and more persistent inflation; it is also worse for the older respondents and for the less frequent movie-goers.prices, memory, perceptions, euro

To What Extent do Investors in a Financial Market Anchor Their Judgments? Evidence from the Hong Kong Horserace Betting Market

This paper explores the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by decision makers in a financial market; in particular, the degree to which horserace bettors anchor their probability judgments on the advantage afforded by a horse‟s barrier-position. The results suggest that under certain conditions bettors anchor on barrier-position information revealed at previous race meetings, but not on the most recent race outcomes. In fact, bettors appear to use the most recent race outcomes appropriately when forming probability estimates; but only when the results are in line with their mental model of barrier-position advantage. Bettors with varying levels of expertise are shown to be subject to anchoring, although greater expertise is generally associated with less anchoring. The paper concludes that the manner and degree of anchoring in real world environ.