2 research outputs found
Heterogeneous Facility Location Games
We study heterogeneous -facility location games. In this model there are
facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the
preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is
to design strategy proof mechanisms that place the facilities in a way to
maximize the minimum utility among the agents. For , if the agents'
locations are known, we prove that the mechanism that places the facility on an
optimal location is strategy proof. For , we prove that there is no
optimal strategy proof mechanism, deterministic or randomized, even when
there are only two agents with known locations, and the facilities have to be
placed on a line segment. We derive inapproximability bounds for deterministic
and randomized strategy proof mechanisms. Finally, we focus on the line segment
and provide strategy proof mechanisms that achieve constant approximation. All
of our mechanisms are simple and communication efficient. As a byproduct we
show that some of our mechanisms can be used to achieve constant factor
approximations for other objectives as the social welfare and the happiness
Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with
optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could
be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within
his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents
while achieving strategyproofness. We design a deterministic strategyproof
mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 2.75, improving upon the
earlier best ratio of n/2+1