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    Graphical Exchange Mechanisms

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    Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts diversified offers of various commodities and redistributes everything it receives. We impose certain conditions of fairness and convenience on such a mechanism and show that it admits unique prices, which equalize the value of offers and returns for each individual. We next define the complexity of a mechanism in terms of certain integers Ο„ij,Ο€ij\tau_{ij},\pi_{ij} and kik_{i} that represent the time required to exchange ii for jj, the difficulty in determining the exchange ratio, and the dimension of the message space. We show that there are a finite number of minimally complex mechanisms, in each of which all trade is conducted through markets for commodity pairs. Finally we consider minimal mechanisms with smallest worst-case complexities Ο„=max⁑τij\tau=\max\tau_{ij} and Ο€=max⁑πij\pi=\max\pi_{ij}. For m>3m>3 commodities, there are precisely three such mechanisms, one of which has a distinguished commodity -- the money -- that serves as the sole medium of exchange. As mβ†’βˆžm\rightarrow \infty the money mechanism is the only one with bounded (Ο€,Ο„)\left( \pi ,\tau\right) .Comment: 26 page
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