Modelling Learning as Modelling

Economists tend to represent learning as a procedure for estimating the parameters of the "correct" econometric model. We extend this approach by assuming that agents specify as well as estimate models. Learning thus takes the form of a dynamic process of developing models using an internal language of representation where expectations are formed by forecasting with the best current model. This introduces a distinction between the form and content of the internal models which is particularly relevant for boundedly rational agents. We propose a framework for such model development which use a combination of measures: the error with respect to past data, the complexity of the model, the cost of finding the model and a measure of the model's specificity The agent has to make various trade-offs between them. A utility learning agent is given as an example

Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?

Hohwy et al.’s (2008) model of binocular rivalry (BR) is taken as a classic illustration of predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and show that it cannot explain the role of reward in BR. I then consider a more recent version of Bayesian model averaging, which recasts the role of reward in (BR) in terms of optimism bias. If we accept this account, however, then we must reconsider our conception of perception. On this latter view, I argue, organisms engage in what amounts to policy-driven, motivated perception