Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty

The last decade has seen an increasing application of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008), where the market is described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments

Impact of Equipment Failures and Wind Correlation on Generation Expansion Planning

Generation expansion planning has become a complex problem within a deregulated electricity market environment due to all the uncertainties affecting the profitability of a given investment. Current expansion models usually overlook some of these uncertainties in order to reduce the computational burden. In this paper, we raise a flag on the importance of both equipment failures (units and lines) and wind power correlation on generation expansion decisions. For this purpose, we use a bilevel stochastic optimization problem, which models the sequential and noncooperative game between the generating company (GENCO) and the system operator. The upper-level problem maximizes the GENCO's expected profit, while the lower-level problem simulates an hourly market-clearing procedure, through which LMPs are determined. The uncertainty pertaining to failures and wind power correlation are characterized by a scenario set, and their impact on generation expansion decisions are quantified and discussed for a 24-bus power system

Impact of Forecast Errors on Expansion Planning of Power Systems with a Renewables Target

This paper analyzes the impact of production forecast errors on the expansion planning of a power system and investigates the influence of market design to facilitate the integration of renewable generation. For this purpose, we propose a stochastic programming modeling framework to determine the expansion plan that minimizes system-wide investment and operating costs, while ensuring a given share of renewable generation in the electricity supply. Unlike existing ones, this framework includes both a day-ahead and a balancing market so as to capture the impact of both production forecasts and the associated prediction errors. Within this framework, we consider two paradigmatic market designs that essentially differ in whether the day-ahead generation schedule and the subsequent balancing re-dispatch are co-optimized or not. The main features and results of the model set-ups are discussed using an illustrative four-node example and a more realistic 24-node case study

European natural gas markets: resource constraints and market power

We analyze long-run scenarios for the European natural gas markets in a model, NATGAS, that explicitly includes both resource constraints and producers’ market power. Europa wordt geconfronteerd met afnemende eigen aardgasvoorraden, met name in de van oudsher grote producenten het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Nederland. De Europese afhankelijkheid van een beperkt aantal grote aardgasleveranciers zal toenemen. Daarmee groeit ook de marktmacht van deze producerende landen. We bekijken de invloed van de beschikbaarheid van vloeibaar aardgas, LNG, op de marktaandelen van producenten en de snelheid van uitputting van Europese voorraden. We bestuderen in het bijzonder hoe in de verschilende scenario's de schaduwprijzen van eindige voorraden de productiebeslissingen beïnvloeden. The European natural gas market is characterized by declining indigenous resources, particularly in the UK and the Netherlands, and a growing dependence on a small number of large exporters who, as a consequence, see their market power increasing. We analyze the impact of conditions on the global LNG market on market shares of pipeline gas suppliers, as well as on the speed of depletion of indigenous European resources. We focus on how shadow prices of resource constraints affect substitution patterns in the various scenarios.

Modeling Electricity Markets as Two-Stage Capacity Constrained Price Competition Games under Uncertainty

The last decade has seen an increasing application of game theoretic tools in the analysis of electricity markets and the strategic behavior of market players. This paper focuses on the model examined by Fabra et al. (2008), where the market is described by a two-stage game with the firms choosing their capacity in the first stage and then competing in prices in the second stage. By allowing the firms to endogenously determine their capacity, through the capacity investment stage of the game, they can greatly affect competition in the subsequent pricing stage. Extending this model to the demand uncertainty case gives a very good candidate for modeling the strategic aspect of the investment decisions in an electricity market. After investigating the required assumptions for applying the model in electricity markets, we present some numerical examples of the model on the resulting equilibrium capacities, prices and profits of the firms. We then proceed with two results on the minimum value of price caps and the minimum required revenue from capacity mechanisms in order to induce adequate investments.Capacity Constraints; Electricity Markets; Regulatory Policy; Strategic Behaviour;

Equilibrium Predictions in Wholesale Electricity Markets

We review supply function equilibrium models and their predictions on market outcomes in the wholesale electricity auctions. We discuss how observable market characteristics such as capacity constraints, number of power suppliers, load distribution and auction format affect the behavior of suppliers and performance of the market. We specifically focus on the possible market power exerted by pivotal suppliers and the comparison between discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. We also describe capacity investment behavior of electricity producers in the restructured industry.Electricity markets; Supply function equilibrium; Markov perfect equilibrium; electricity auctions; pivotal suppliers; capacity investment.

Restructuring Electricity Markets when Demand is Uncertain: Effects on Capacity Investments, Prices and Welfare

We examine the effects of restructuring electricity markets on capacity investments, retail prices and welfare when demand is uncertain. We study the following market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade. Assuming that wholesale prices can react to changes in retail prices (but not vice versa), we find that generators install sufficient capacity to serve retail demand in each market configuration, thus avoiding blackouts. Furthermore, aggregate capacity levels and retail prices are such that the separated (integrated) duopoly with wholesale trade performs best (worst) in terms of welfare.electricity; investments; generating capacities; vertical integration; monopoly and competition

Multiple openings of forward markets: experimental evidence

We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with multiple forward markets. Using random matching, we test two versions of forward markets with finite (Allaz and Vila, 1993) and indefinite number of periods. We find that the results for the Allaz and Vila (1993) model are remarkably close to the predicted theoretical results for both duopolies and quadropolies. We then test a version of the model to allow for indefinitely many periods. There are multiple equilibria in this theoretical model, including both the competitive and collusive outcomes. We find that the initial "collusive hypothesis" is not ratified, and that outcomes are nearly competitive. Sales take place mostly in the first few openings of futures markets. Again, these results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions

Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions.Market power, Electricity, Networks, Numeric models, Model comparison