Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates

This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented below, (i) unlike the three-valued, consistent fixed-point models defined in Kripke (1975), are able to differentiate between paradoxical and pathological-but-unparadoxical sentences, and (ii) unlike the four-valued, paraconsistent fixed-point models first studied in Visser (1984) and Woodruff (1984), preserve consistency and groundedness of truth. Keywords:  Semantic Paradoxes · Fixed-point semantics · Many-valued logic · Kripke’s theory oftrut

Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates

This paper introduces a new kind of fixed-point semantics, filling a gap within approaches to Liar-like paradoxes involving fixed-point models à la Kripke (1975). The four-valued models presented below, (i) unlike the three-valued, consistent fixed-point models defined in Kripke (1975), are able to differentiate between paradoxical and pathological-but-unparadoxical sentences, and (ii) unlike the four-valued, paraconsistent fixed-point models first studied in Visser (1984) and Woodruff (1984), preserve consistency and groundedness of truth. Keywords:  Semantic Paradoxes · Fixed-point semantics · Many-valued logic · Kripke’s theory oftrut

Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics

Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems

A Declarative Semantics for CLP with Qualification and Proximity

Uncertainty in Logic Programming has been investigated during the last decades, dealing with various extensions of the classical LP paradigm and different applications. Existing proposals rely on different approaches, such as clause annotations based on uncertain truth values, qualification values as a generalization of uncertain truth values, and unification based on proximity relations. On the other hand, the CLP scheme has established itself as a powerful extension of LP that supports efficient computation over specialized domains while keeping a clean declarative semantics. In this paper we propose a new scheme SQCLP designed as an extension of CLP that supports qualification values and proximity relations. We show that several previous proposals can be viewed as particular cases of the new scheme, obtained by partial instantiation. We present a declarative semantics for SQCLP that is based on observables, providing fixpoint and proof-theoretical characterizations of least program models as well as an implementation-independent notion of goal solutions.Comment: 17 pages, 26th Int'l. Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP'10

THE LOGIC OF THE CATUSKOTI

In early Buddhist logic, it was standard to assume that for any state of affairs there were four possibilities: that it held, that it did not, both, or neither. This is the catuskoti (or tetralemma). Classical logicians have had a hard time making sense of this, but it makes perfectly good sense in the semantics of various paraconsistent logics, such as First Degree Entailment. Matters are more complicated for later Buddhist thinkers, such as Nagarjuna, who appear to suggest that none of these options, or more than one, may hold. The point of this paper is to examine the matter, including the formal logical machinery that may be appropriate

The Modal Logics of Kripke-Feferman Truth

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results