Winning Hearts and Minds: Tactics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Early Roman Empire

The most common strategy for Romanizing a province was through developing connections with elites in the indigenous society coupled with (in many cases) the inclusion of regional gods into the Roman pantheon. These ties were cemented as Romans adopted the provincial religious deities and the sons of prominent locals were sent to Rome for the finest education of the day. This system allowed for relative stability in the provinces, particularly when the Roman provincial governor was sensitive to local customs. What about those indigenous people whose goals conflicted with those of Rome? How does one combat a monolithic power with the most formidable army yet seen? This paper will examine three different revolts- all with varying outcomes- in the first few years of the Imperial Period to analyze the tactical and strategic successes and failures of the insurgents and how they were combated by the Empire. These specific examples are chosen for their differing outcomes and their approximate relation in time (All three were fought within 60 years). In analyzing these the answer of how to successfully rebel against the early Roman Empire will be deduced, as well as how to defeat an insurgency, something many modern countries still grapple with

Account of Operations in the Boulogne Area

Account by Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Anderson, Officer Commanding, North Shore Regiment, Given to Historical Officer, 27 September 1944

Grazing to Gravy: Faunal Remains and Indications of Genízaro Foodways on the Spanish Colonial Frontier of New Mexico

Understanding identity aspects of those labeled Genízaro during the late Spanish Colonial period of New Mexico benefits from finer-grained perspectives on what ranges and mixtures of practices persons bearing this casta designation may have performed while preparing cuisine. Materials from the northern frontier site of Casitas Viejas (LA 917) suggest that the closely related households of this fortified plaza may have departed from the less expansive culinary practices of colonial elites while drawing from their multiple social relationships at the various stages of production and consumption of foods. In other words, at different temporal and spatial scales, behaviors reflected in the material record refute historical notions about a creolized community that tried to diminish identity difference within the village. The goal of this work is to explore through the study of faunal remains some of the relationships between foodways and cultural identity in a manner that might assist in some disentangling of the sticky problems archaeologists face in interpreting traces of dynamic past situations of identity from a static material record recovered today

The Canadian Role in Operation “Charnwood,” 8 July 1944: A Case Study in Tank/Infantry Doctrine and Practice

On the morning of 8 July 1944, soldiers of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (9 CIB) left their startlines near the Norman village of Vieux Cairon heading for Buron and Gruchy; two villages nearly 2,000 yards across open ground to the south. Their advance was part of Operation “Charnwood,” British I Corps’ final assault on Caen. By the end of the day most objectives were secured, and on 9 July Caen north of the Orne River and Canal was captured. General Dempsey, General Officer Commanding (GOC) British 2nd Army expressed his satisfaction, saying that the operations of 8 and 9 July were “well and cleanly carried out.” Troops of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (3 CID) and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade (2 CAB) shared in the victory no less than the British divisions that took part. “Charnwood” stands apart from other Canadian operations in Normandy because it was the only operation of its type undertaken by 3 CID and 2 CAB as complete formations. After “Charnwood” II Canadian Corps became operational, and the scale, tempo and expectations of operations altered considerably. The capture of Caen, therefore, affords insights into tactical doctrine that are obscured by later large-scale operations with more ambitious objectives. In particular, in this operation the Canadian armour and infantry defeated the Germans by employing tanks as direct-fire closesupport weapons. In fact, such intimate support had not been a part of Canadian tank/infantry doctrine since the introduction of the Sherman tank in 1943. Instead, since the fall of 1943 armoured units were told specifically to work to the enemy’s flanks and support by fire, not by participating in the close infantry battle. The fighting on 8 July indicates that in this instance at least, Canadian troops won in spite of the prevailing doctrine and not because of it

French Colonial Counter-Insurgency: General Bugeaud and the Conquest of Algeria, 1840-47

This article explores the practice of counter-insurgency carried out by the French under General Bugeaud during the war of conquest of Algeria. By analysing different dimensions of colonial counter-insurgency in Algeria, it will demonstrate that, far from being an incomplete form of counterinsurgency characterised by irregular warfare tactics and racialised brutality of a 'population-centric approach', French counter-insurgency in Algeria under Bugeaud represented the very beginning of a more modern, complete and inclusive form of counter-insurgency that combined force and conciliation

Building as propaganda: a palimpsest of faith and power in the Maghreb

[Excerpt] Portugal held overseas possessions in Africa, South America and Asia from the beginning of the fifteenth century till very recently. This empire was the result of conquests of cities that belonged to other kingdoms, such as in the Maghreb or India, the establishment of commercial outposts in key points of the maritime routes along the Atlantic and Indian oceans coasts, or the creation of colonies in newfound lands, such as some Atlantic archipelagos or Brazil. The Moroccan project was a fundamental part of this overseas expansion.1 Amidst several motivations, the Crusader spirit was certainly one of the most important drives for the Portuguese to assault Northern Africa from the early 1400s to 1500s. The Portuguese presence in the region lasted from 1415, when King João i (1385–1433) started what would become a series of conquests, to 1769. This last date represents the epilogue of a political, military, and commercial investment in the Maghreb, when the evacuation of the last stronghold was decided in Lisbon. For more than three and a half centuries, the Portuguese main expression of its territorial expansion consisted in isolated enclaves along the Strait of Gibraltar and Atlantic coasts, which corresponds today to a long seashore stretch in the Kingdom of Morocco, with exception of the Spanish city of Ceuta. This territory was never understood as a full colony by the Crown, with autonomous jurisdiction. It was rather based on the conquest and occupation of pre-existing Arab and Muslim cities, resulting in a network of isolated possessions directly ruled by the king through local captains and governors. [...](undefined)info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Fortification and Frontier: The Project Drawn up by Juan Martín Zermeño for Puebla de Sanabria in 1766

Following the death of engineer General Jorge Próspero de Verboom in 1744 and after a few years of transition in the management of Spanish fortifications, Juan Martín Zermeño took on the role, initially with a temporary mandate, but then definitively during a second period that ran from 1766 until his death in 1772. He began this second period with a certain amount of concern because of what had taken place during the last period of conflict. The Seven Years War (1756–1763) which had brought Spain into conflict with Portugal and England in the Caribbean had also lead to conflict episodes along the Spanish–Portuguese border. Zermeño’s efforts as a planner and general engineer gave priority to the northern part of the Spanish–Portuguese border. After studying the territory and the existing fortifications on both sides of the border, Zermeño drew up three important projects in 1766. The outposts that needed to be reinforced were located, from north to south, at Puebla de Sanabria, Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, which is where he is believed to have come from. This latter township already had a modern installation built immediately after the war of the Spanish Succession and reinforced with the Fort of La Concepción. However, Zamora and Puebla de Sanabria had some obsolete fortifications that needed modernising. Since the middle of the 15th century Puebla de Sanabria had had a modern castle with rounded turrets, that of the counts of benavente. During the 16th and 17th centuries it had also been equipped with a walled enclosure with small bastions. During the war of the Spanish Succession the Portuguese had enlarged the enclosure and had erected a tentative offshoot to the west. In order to draw up the ambitious Puebla de Sanabria project Zermeño had the aid of some previous reports and projects, such as those by the count of robelin in 1722, the one by Antonio de Gaver in 1752, and Pedro Moreau’s report dated June 1755. This study includes a technical analysis of Zermeño’s project and its strategic position within the system of fortifications along the Spanish–Portuguese border