A Formal Model of Rational Exchange and Its Application to the Analysis of Syverson's Protocol

We propose a formal model of rational exchange and exchange protocols in general, which is based on game theory. In this model, an exchange protocol is represented as a set of strategies in a game that is played by the protocol parties and the network that they use to communicate with each other. Within this model, we give a formal definition for rational exchange and various other properties of exchange protocols, including fairness. In particular, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium in the protocol game. We also study the relationship between rational and fair exchange, and prove that fairness implies rationality, but not vice versa. Finally, we illustrate the usage of our formal model for the analysis of existing rational exchange protocols by analyzing a protocol proposed by Syverson. We show that the protocol is rational only under the assumption that the network is reliable

A Survey on Popularity Bias in Recommender Systems

Recommender systems help people find relevant content in a personalized way. One main promise of such systems is that they are able to increase the visibility of items in the long tail, i.e., the lesser-known items in a catalogue. Existing research, however, suggests that in many situations today's recommendation algorithms instead exhibit a popularity bias, meaning that they often focus on rather popular items in their recommendations. Such a bias may not only lead to limited value of the recommendations for consumers and providers in the short run, but it may also cause undesired reinforcement effects over time. In this paper, we discuss the potential reasons for popularity bias and we review existing approaches to detect, quantify and mitigate popularity bias in recommender systems. Our survey therefore includes both an overview of the computational metrics used in the literature as well as a review of the main technical approaches to reduce the bias. We furthermore critically discuss today's literature, where we observe that the research is almost entirely based on computational experiments and on certain assumptions regarding the practical effects of including long-tail items in the recommendations.Comment: Under review, submitted to UMUA

Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics

We use ideas from distributed computing to study dynamic environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, follow adaptive heuristics (Hart 2005), i.e., simple and unsophisticated rules of behavior, e.g., repeatedly "best replying" to others' actions, and minimizing "regret", that have been extensively studied in game theory and economics. We explore when convergence of such simple dynamics to an equilibrium is guaranteed in asynchronous computational environments, where nodes can act at any time. Our research agenda, distributed computing with adaptive heuristics, lies on the borderline of computer science (including distributed computing and learning) and game theory (including game dynamics and adaptive heuristics). We exhibit a general non-termination result for a broad class of heuristics with bounded recall---that is, simple rules of behavior that depend only on recent history of interaction between nodes. We consider implications of our result across a wide variety of interesting and timely applications: game theory, circuit design, social networks, routing and congestion control. We also study the computational and communication complexity of asynchronous dynamics and present some basic observations regarding the effects of asynchrony on no-regret dynamics. We believe that our work opens a new avenue for research in both distributed computing and game theory.Comment: 36 pages, four figures. Expands both technical results and discussion of v1. Revised version will appear in the proceedings of Innovations in Computer Science 201

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

State-of-the-art on evolution and reactivity

This report starts by, in Chapter 1, outlining aspects of querying and updating resources on the Web and on the Semantic Web, including the development of query and update languages to be carried out within the Rewerse project. From this outline, it becomes clear that several existing research areas and topics are of interest for this work in Rewerse. In the remainder of this report we further present state of the art surveys in a selection of such areas and topics. More precisely: in Chapter 2 we give an overview of logics for reasoning about state change and updates; Chapter 3 is devoted to briefly describing existing update languages for the Web, and also for updating logic programs; in Chapter 4 event-condition-action rules, both in the context of active database systems and in the context of semistructured data, are surveyed; in Chapter 5 we give an overview of some relevant rule-based agents frameworks

The Prom Problem: Fair and Privacy-Enhanced Matchmaking with Identity Linked Wishes

In the Prom Problem (TPP), Alice wishes to attend a school dance with Bob and needs a risk-free, privacy preserving way to find out whether Bob shares that same wish. If not, no one should know that she inquired about it, not even Bob. TPP represents a special class of matchmaking challenges, augmenting the properties of privacy-enhanced matchmaking, further requiring fairness and support for identity linked wishes (ILW) – wishes involving specific identities that are only valid if all involved parties have those same wishes. The Horne-Nair (HN) protocol was proposed as a solution to TPP along with a sample pseudo-code embodiment leveraging an untrusted matchmaker. Neither identities nor pseudo-identities are included in any messages or stored in the matchmaker’s database. Privacy relevant data stay within user control. A security analysis and proof-of-concept implementation validated the approach, fairness was quantified, and a feasibility analysis demonstrated practicality in real-world networks and systems, thereby bounding risk prior to incurring the full costs of development. The SecretMatch™ Prom app leverages one embodiment of the patented HN protocol to achieve privacy-enhanced and fair matchmaking with ILW. The endeavor led to practical lessons learned and recommendations for privacy engineering in an era of rapidly evolving privacy legislation. Next steps include design of SecretMatch™ apps for contexts like voting negotiations in legislative bodies and executive recruiting. The roadmap toward a quantum resistant SecretMatch™ began with design of a Hybrid Post-Quantum Horne-Nair (HPQHN) protocol. Future directions include enhancements to HPQHN, a fully Post Quantum HN protocol, and more

Multi-attribute demand characterization and layered service pricing

As cloud computing gains popularity, understanding the pattern and structure of its workload is increasingly important in order to drive effective resource allocation and pricing decisions. In the cloud model, virtual machines (VMs), each consisting of a bundle of computing resources, are presented to users for purchase. Thus, the cloud context requires multi-attribute models of demand. While most of the available studies have focused on one specific attribute of a virtual request such as CPU or memory, to the best of our knowledge there is no work on the joint distribution of resource usage. In the first part of this dissertation, we develop a joint distribution model that captures the relationship among multiple resources by fitting the marginal distribution of each resource type as well as the non-linear structure of their correlation via a copula distribution. We validate our models using a public data set of Google data center usage. Constructing the demand model is essential for provisioning revenue-optimal configuration for VMs or quality of service (QoS) offered by a provider. In the second part of the dissertation, we turn to the service pricing problem in a multi-provider setting: given service configurations (qualities) offered by different providers, choose a proper price for each offered service to undercut competitors and attract customers. With the rise of layered service-oriented architectures there is a need for more advanced solutions that manage the interactions among service providers at multiple levels. Brokers, as the intermediaries between customers and lower-level providers, play a key role in improving the efficiency of service-oriented structures by matching the demands of customers to the services of providers. We analyze a layered market in which service brokers and service providers compete in a Bertrand game at different levels in an oligopoly market while they offer different QoS. We examine the interaction among players and the effect of price competition on their market shares. We also study the market with partial cooperation, where a subset of players optimizes their total revenue instead of maximizing their own profit independently. We analyze the impact of this cooperation on the market and customers' social welfare