4 research outputs found
Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the
computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic
attacker model. Our contributions are: i) To design (and prove sound) axioms
reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF); ii) To
formalize computational unlinkability in the model; iii) To illustrate the
method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols,
in the computational model
The 5G-AKA Authentication Protocol Privacy
International audienceWe study the 5G-AKA authentication protocol described in the 5G mobile communication standards. This version of AKA tries to achieve a better privacy than the 3G and 4G versions through the use of asymmetric randomized encryption. Nonetheless, we show that except for the IMSI-catcher attack, all known attacks against 5G-AKA privacy still apply. Next, we modify the 5G-AKA protocol to prevent these attacks, while satisfying 5G-AKA efficiency constraints as much as possible. We then formally prove that our protocol is σunlinkable. This is a new security notion, which allows for a fine-grained quantification of a protocol privacy. Our security proof is carried out in the Bana-Comon indistinguishability logic. We also prove mutual authentication as a secondary result
The 5G-AKA Authentication Protocol Privacy
We study the 5G-AKA authentication protocol described in the 5G mobile
communication standards. This version of AKA tries to achieve a better privacy
than the 3G and 4G versions through the use of asymmetric randomized
encryption. Nonetheless, we show that except for the IMSI-catcher attack, all
known attacks against 5G-AKA privacy still apply.
Next, we modify the 5G-AKA protocol to prevent these attacks, while
satisfying the cost and efficiency constraints of the 5G-AKA protocol. We then
formally prove that our protocol is sigma-unlinkable. This is a new security
notion, which allows for a fine-grained quantification of a protocol privacy.
Our security proof is carried out in the Bana-Comon indistinguishability logic.
We also prove mutual authentication as a secondary result.Comment: Changes: - added details when describing some attacks. - added a
constant message in the AKA+ protoco