6 research outputs found

    Layered security for IEEE 1687 using a Bimodal Physically Unclonable Function

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    In this paper, a layered security mechanism for IEEE 1687 is proposed using a new class of physically unclonable function (PUF) called Bimodal PUF. It moves beyond the conventional single-challenge single-response PUF by introducing a second response to the PUF gained from the same single challenge. As an advantage, a double-response PUF forms two-layer security solution, one at the hardware layer by limiting the access to the embedded instrument and the second one for the data layer by securing the output data that needs to be transmitted. Experiments conducted with FPGA show that such advantages come in place at a small silicon area overhead, up to 1.4%, for a 64-bit security key. This is known to be sufficient enough to resist brute-force and machine learning attack

    Securing IEEE P1687 On-chip Instrumentation Access Using PUF

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    As the complexity of VLSI designs grows, the amount of embedded instrumentation in system-on-a-chip designs increases at an exponential rate. Such structures serve various purposes throughout the life-cycle of VLSI circuits, e.g. in post-silicon validation and debug, production test and diagnosis, as well as during in-field test and maintenance. Reliable access mechanisms for embedded instruments are therefore key to rapid chip development and secure system maintenance. Reconfigurable scan networks defined by IEEE Std. P1687 emerge as a scalable and cost-effective access medium for on-chip instrumentation. The accessibility offered by reconfigurable scan networks contradicts security and safety requirements for embedded instrumentation. Embedded instrumentation is an integral system component that remains functional throughout the lifetime of a chip. To prevent harmful activities, such as tampering with safety-critical systems, and reduce the risk of intellectual property infringement, the access to embedded instrumentation requires protection. This thesis provides a novel, Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) based secure access method for on-chip instruments which enhances the security of IJTAG network at low hardware cost and with less routing congestion

    A Survey on Security Threats and Countermeasures in IEEE Test Standards

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    International audienceEditor's note: Test infrastructure has been shown to be a portal for hackers. This article reviews the threats and countermeasures for IEEE test infrastructure standards

    Design of hardware-orientated security towards trusted electronics.

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    While the Internet of Things (IoT) becomes one of the critical components in the cyber-physical system of industry 4.0, its root of trust still lacks consideration. The purpose of this thesis was to increase the root of trust in electronic devices by enhance the reliability, testability, and security of the bottom layer of the IoT system, which is the Very Large-Scale Integration (VLSI) device. This was achieved by implement a new class of security primitive to secure the IJTAG network as an access point for testing and programming. The proposed security primitive expands the properties of a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) to generate two different responses from a single challenge. The development of such feature was done using the ring counter circuit as the source of randomness of the PUF to increase the efficiency of the proposed PUF. The efficiency of the newly developed PUF was measured by comparing its properties with the properties of a legacy PUF. The randomness test done for the PUF shows that it has a limitation when implemented in sub-nm devices. However, when it was implemented in current 28nm silicon technology, it increases the sensitivity of the PUF as a sensor to detect malicious modification to the FPGA configuration file. Moreover, the efficiency of the developed bimodal PUF increases by 20.4% compared to the legacy PUF. This shows that the proposed security primitive proves to be more dependable and trustworthy than the previously proposed approach.Samie, Mohammad (Associate)PhD in Transport System

    New techniques for functional testing of microprocessor based systems

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    Electronic devices may be affected by failures, for example due to physical defects. These defects may be introduced during the manufacturing process, as well as during the normal operating life of the device due to aging. How to detect all these defects is not a trivial task, especially in complex systems such as processor cores. Nevertheless, safety-critical applications do not tolerate failures, this is the reason why testing such devices is needed so to guarantee a correct behavior at any time. Moreover, testing is a key parameter for assessing the quality of a manufactured product. Consolidated testing techniques are based on special Design for Testability (DfT) features added in the original design to facilitate test effectiveness. Design, integration, and usage of the available DfT for testing purposes are fully supported by commercial EDA tools, hence approaches based on DfT are the standard solutions adopted by silicon vendors for testing their devices. Tests exploiting the available DfT such as scan-chains manipulate the internal state of the system, differently to the normal functional mode, passing through unreachable configurations. Alternative solutions that do not violate such functional mode are defined as functional tests. In microprocessor based systems, functional testing techniques include software-based self-test (SBST), i.e., a piece of software (referred to as test program) which is uploaded in the system available memory and executed, with the purpose of exciting a specific part of the system and observing the effects of possible defects affecting it. SBST has been widely-studies by the research community for years, but its adoption by the industry is quite recent. My research activities have been mainly focused on the industrial perspective of SBST. The problem of providing an effective development flow and guidelines for integrating SBST in the available operating systems have been tackled and results have been provided on microprocessor based systems for the automotive domain. Remarkably, new algorithms have been also introduced with respect to state-of-the-art approaches, which can be systematically implemented to enrich SBST suites of test programs for modern microprocessor based systems. The proposed development flow and algorithms are being currently employed in real electronic control units for automotive products. Moreover, a special hardware infrastructure purposely embedded in modern devices for interconnecting the numerous on-board instruments has been interest of my research as well. This solution is known as reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs) and its practical adoption is growing fast as new standards have been created. Test and diagnosis methodologies have been proposed targeting specific RSN features, aimed at checking whether the reconfigurability of such networks has not been corrupted by defects and, in this case, at identifying the defective elements of the network. The contribution of my work in this field has also been included in the first suite of public-domain benchmark networks

    SCAN CHAIN BASED HARDWARE SECURITY

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    Hardware has become a popular target for attackers to hack into any computing and communication system. Starting from the legendary power analysis attacks discovered 20 years ago to the recent Intel Spectre and Meltdown attacks, security vulnerabilities in hardware design have been exploited for malicious purposes. With the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications, where the IoT devices are extremely resource constrained, many proven secure but computational expensive cryptography protocols cannot be applied on such devices. Thus there is an urgent need to understand the hardware vulnerabilities and develop cost effective mitigation methods. One established field in the semiconductor and integrated circuit (IC) industry, known as IC test, has the goal of ensuring that fabricated ICs are free of manufacturing defects and perform the required functionalities. Testing is essential to isolate faulty chips from good ones. The concept of design for test (DFT) has been integrated in the commercial IC design and fabrication process for several decades. Scan chain, which provides test engineer access to all the flip flops in the chip through the scan in (SI) and scan out (SO) ports, is the backbone of industrial testing methods and can be found in almost all the modern designs. In addition to IC testing, scan chain has found applications in intellectual property (IP) protection and IC identification. However, attackers can also leverage the controllability and observability of scan chain as a side channel to break systems such as cryptographic chips. This dissertation addresses these two important security problems by proposing (1) a practical scan chain based security primitive for IP protection and (2) a partial scan chain framework that can mitigate all the existing scan based attacks. First, we observe the fact that each D-flip-flop has two output ports, Q and Q’, designed to simplify the logic and has been used to reduce the power consumption for IC test. The availability of both Q and Q’ ports provide the opportunity for IP protection. More specifically, we can generate a digital fingerprint by selecting different connection styles between adjacent scan cells during the design of scan chain. This method has two major advantages: fingerprints are created as a post-silicon procedure and therefore there will be little fabrication overhead; altering the connection style requires the modification of test vectors for each fingerprinted IP and thus enables a non-intrusive fingerprint verification method. This addresses the overhead and detectability problems, two of the most challenging problems of designing practical IP fingerprinting techniques in the past two decades. Combined with the recently developed reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs) that are popular for embedded and IoT devices, we design an IC identification (ID) scheme utilizing the different connection styles. We perform experiments on standard benchmarks to demonstrate that our approach has low design overhead. We also conduct security analysis to show that such fingerprints and IC IDs are robust against various attacks. In the second part of this dissertation, we consider the scan chain side channel attack, which has been reported as one of the most severe side channel attacks to modern secure systems. We argue that the current countermeasures are restricted to the requirement of providing direct SI and SO for testing and thus suffers the vulnerability of leaving this side channel open to the attackers as well. Therefore, we propose a novel public-private partial scan chain based approach with the basic idea of removing the flip flops that store sensitive information from the scan chain. This will eliminate the scan chain side channel, but it also limits IC test. The key contribution in our proposed public-private partial scan chain design is that it can keep the full test coverage while providing security to the scan chain. This is achieved by chaining the removed flip flops into one or more private partial scan chains and adding protections to the SI and SO ports of such chains. Unlike the traditional partial scan design which not only fails to provide full fault coverage, but also incur huge overhead in test time and test vector generation time, we propose a set of techniques to ensure that the desired test vectors can be entered into the system efficiently. These techniques include test vector reordering, test vector reusing, and test vector generation based on a novel finite state machine (FSM) structure we have invented. On the other hand, to enable the test engineers the ability to observe the test output to diagnose the chip while not leaking information to the attackers, we propose two lightweight mechanisms, one based on linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and the other one based on configurable physical unclonable function (PUF). Finally, we discuss a protocol on how in-field test can be realized using our public-private partial scan chain. We conduct experiments with industrial scan design tools to demonstrate that the required hardware in our approach has negligible area overhead and gives full test coverage with reduced test time and does not need to re-generate test vectors. In sum, this dissertation focuses on the role of scan chain, a conventional design for test facility, in hardware security. We show that scan chain features can be leveraged to create practical IP protection techniques including IP watermarking and fingerprinting as well as IC identification and authentication. We also propose a novel public-private partial scan design principle to close the scan chain side channel to the attackers. Through this dissertation work, we demonstrate that it is possible to develop highly practical scan chain based techniques that can benefit both the community of IC test and hardware security
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