Detecting Community Structure in Dynamic Social Networks Using the Concept of Leadership

Detecting community structure in social networks is a fundamental problem empowering us to identify groups of actors with similar interests. There have been extensive works focusing on finding communities in static networks, however, in reality, due to dynamic nature of social networks, they are evolving continuously. Ignoring the dynamic aspect of social networks, neither allows us to capture evolutionary behavior of the network nor to predict the future status of individuals. Aside from being dynamic, another significant characteristic of real-world social networks is the presence of leaders, i.e. nodes with high degree centrality having a high attraction to absorb other members and hence to form a local community. In this paper, we devised an efficient method to incrementally detect communities in highly dynamic social networks using the intuitive idea of importance and persistence of community leaders over time. Our proposed method is able to find new communities based on the previous structure of the network without recomputing them from scratch. This unique feature, enables us to efficiently detect and track communities over time rapidly. Experimental results on the synthetic and real-world social networks demonstrate that our method is both effective and efficient in discovering communities in dynamic social networks

Exploring cooperative game mechanisms of scientific coauthorship networks

Scientific coauthorship, generated by collaborations and competitions among researchers, reflects effective organizations of human resources. Researchers, their expected benefits through collaborations, and their cooperative costs constitute the elements of a game. Hence we propose a cooperative game model to explore the evolution mechanisms of scientific coauthorship networks. The model generates geometric hypergraphs, where the costs are modelled by space distances, and the benefits are expressed by node reputations, i. e. geometric zones that depend on node position in space and time. Modelled cooperative strategies conditioned on positive benefit-minus-cost reflect the spatial reciprocity principle in collaborations, and generate high clustering and degree assortativity, two typical features of coauthorship networks. Modelled reputations generate the generalized Poisson parts and fat tails appeared in specific distributions of empirical data, e. g. paper team size distribution. The combined effect of modelled costs and reputations reproduces the transitions emerged in degree distribution, in the correlation between degree and local clustering coefficient, etc. The model provides an example of how individual strategies induce network complexity, as well as an application of game theory to social affiliation networks