Effect of a Health Shock on Working Hours and Health Care Usage: The role of Financial Inclusion

This study explores the role of financial inclusion in the mitigation of the effects of a health shock at the household level. To that end, we examine empirically the effect of financial inclusion on household working hours and health care utilization, using round six of the Ghana Living Standard Survey data. We find that a health shock does decrease household working hours and increase the likelihood of health care utilization. This suggests that households in Ghana are not able to fully insure themselves against a health shock. However, we find that, faced with a health shock, households who are financially excluded see their working hours reduce more than those who enjoy full financial inclusion. Also, financial inclusion increases the likelihood of health care utilization when households experience a health shock. We find evidence that loan acquisition (borrowing) is one of the main mechanisms by which households can insure themselves against a health shock. Generally, our findings support the financial inclusion agenda of policymakers in Ghana and many other countries. Thus, efforts to ensure full financial inclusion will increase the probability of households using the financial sector as a means of insulating themselves against the effects of health shocks.JEL Classification Codes: O12, I10, G21, J22http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/leon_gonzalez_roberto

"The Asian Disease: Plausible Diagnoses, Possible Remedies"

The Asian crisis is a textbook case of the "financial instability hypothesis" first expressed in 1966 by the late Hyman Minsky. Minsky's "hypothesis" was proposed to explain instability in a large, insulated, developed economy. Despite its intuitive appeal, it was not widely accepted among financial economists (Charles Kindleberger being a notable exception) because, they said, they could not find historical illustrations to fit the theory. The financial economist's machine runs smoothly in the best of all possible worlds. What makes trouble in the financial economist's world is the exogenous shock that affects everyone (war, oil prices) or government error (fiscal imbalance, monetary policy). "Financial distress," Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes write in their study of sovereign debt rescheduling, "normally results from a real shock or bad policies." But Asia presents a cumulation of apparently rational decisions that are precisely those Minsky predicted.

The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives

This Note examines credit derivatives, hedge funds, and the increase in systemic risk that results from the combination of the two. The issues considered include what method of regulation--entity, transaction, or self-regulation--provides the form and amount of disclosure that best addresses the risk that the markets as a whole will be affected by a financial shock. Emphasizing the role of traders and efficient capital markets, this Note proposes that a system of disclosure for derivatives similar to the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine, or TRACE, system for corporate bonds would prevent rapid repricings that have the potential to shock the financial system

Macroeconomic Evolution after a Production Shock: the Role for Financial Intermediation

Financial intermediaries may increase economic efficiency through intertemporal risk smoothing. However without an adequate regulation, intermediation may fail to do this. This paper studies the effects of a production shock in a closed economy and compares abilities of market-based and bank-based financial systems in processing the shock. Unregulated banking system may collapse in absence of a proper regulation. The paper studies several types of regulatory interventions, which may improve the performance of the banking system.Financial intermediation, overlapping generations, general equilibrium, intertemporal smoothing

Chained Credit Contracts and Financial Accelerators

Based on the financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999), we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model for a chain of credit contracts in which financial intermediaries (hereafter FIs) as well as entrepreneurs are subject to credit constraints. Financial intermediation takes place through chained-credit contracts, lending from the market to FIs, and from FIs to entrepreneurs. Calibrated to U.S. data, our model shows that the chained credit contracts enhance the financial accelerator effect, depending on the net worth distribution across sectors: (1) our model reinforces the effects of the net worth shock and the technology shock, compared with a model that omits the FIs' credit friction a la Bernanke et al. (1999); (2) the sectoral shock to FIs has a greater impact than the sectoral shock to entrepreneurs; and (3) the redistribution of net worth from entrepreneurs to FIs reduces the amplification of the technology shock. The key features of the results arise from the asymmetry of the two borrowing sectors: smaller net worth and larger bankruptcy costs of FIs relative to those of entrepreneurs.Chain of Credit Contracts, Net Worth of Financial Intermediaries, Cross-sectional Net Worth Distribution, Financial Accelerator effect

Financial structure and the transmission of monetary shocks: preliminary evidence for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

The paper analyses the financial structure of the private sector in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and assesses its implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. The financial accounts of these countries provide a picture of a private sector which is predictably financially less mature than the EU average: the corporate sector relies significantly on non-market financial liabilities (such as trade credits and non-traded shares) and bears a substantial exchange rate risk; the household sector is less sophisticated both in terms of financial assets, whose composition is tilted towards bank deposits, and liabilities, the volume of which is still negligible. VAR system estimates conducted separately on each acceding country suggest that, despite the inferior financial development of these countries, the co-movement of macroeconomic variables conditional on a monetary policy shock is similar across countries and not dissimilar to what is found in the more advanced economies.Financial structure, identified VAR, monetary policy shock, price puzzle.

De-leveraging and the financial accelerator: how Wall Street can shock main street

The severity of the recent economic downturn raises questions about the role of financial markets in modern market economies. Why did rising defaults in a relatively small portion of the U.S. housing market cause a financial crisis? Why do financial crises have outsized adverse effects on the rest of the economy? As a general rule, a decline in economic activity in the nonfinancial sector, such as occurs during a typical recession, induces greater restraint on the part of the financial sector and that restraint - manifested usually in a pullback of credit and funding - in turn causes further setbacks to the nonfinancial sector. In the academic literature, this feedback effect is called the financial accelerator. In "De-Leveraging and the Financial Accelerator: How Wall Street Can Shock Main Street," Satyajit Chatterjee looks at what underlay the financial shock that emanated from Wall Street in the fall of 2007. Then he focuses on the channels through which the financial accelerator works and how the accelerator can turn a financial market disruption into a deep recession.Financial crises ; Recessions

Can financial frictions help explain the performance of the us fed?.

This paper analyzes the contribution of additional factors, apart from monetary policy, to the stabilization of the economy observed in the US since the 1980s. I estimate a limited participation model with financial frictions, allowing for changes in the interest rate rule, financial frictions, and shock processes. The results confirm the well-known differences in the interest rate rules between subsamples. However, when monitoring costs are considered, these differences are much smaller. A comparison of fit across several specifications finds that a decrease in financial frictions was more important than changed monetary policy or changed shock processes in stabilizing the economy. These results highlight the important differences in the effects of shocks and policies between limited participation and sticky price models.