Financial liberalization and capital adequacy in models of financial crises

We characterize the effects of financial liberalization indices on OECD banking crises, controlling for the standard macro prudential variables that prevail in the current literature. We use the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World database. This yields a variable that captures credit market regulations which broadly measures the restrictions under which banks operate. We then test for the direct impacts of some of its components, deposit interest rate regulations and private sector credit controls, on crisis probabilities and their indirect effects via capital adequacy. Over the period 1980 – 2012, we find that less regulated markets are associated with a lower crisis frequency, and it appears that the channel comes through strengthening the defence that capital provides. Deposit interest rate liberalisation adds to the strength of capital in protecting against crises. However, private sector credit liberalisation, appears to increase the probability of having a crisis, albeit not significantly. If policy makers are concerned about the costs of low risk events, they may wish to control private sector credit even if it has a probability of affecting significantly crises of between 10 and 20 per cent

Models of Financial System Fragility

This survey analyses two types of models: 1. Models based on assumptions of monetary and financial market equilibrium disturbance, in line with mainstream thinking according to which if there is a self-regulating market the units would have rational expectations, and the crisis would be a temporary phenomenon caused by exogenous shocks. Here are the main objectives and features characteristic of three generations of models; 2. Models based on financial instability hypothesis, taking into account the dynamics of financial market, as well as the role of uncertainty, interdependency and dynamic complexity. We present here Minsky’s concept of financial instability and then analyse the content of some simplified models.instability, model generations, balance sheet, hedge units, speculative units, Ponzi units, cyclical fluctuations, complexity

Survey of Research on Financial Sector Modeling within DSGE Models: What Central Banks Can Learn from It

This survey gives insight into the ongoing research in financial frictions modeling. The recent financial turmoil has fueled interest in operationalizing financial frictions concepts and introducing them into tools for policy makers. The rapid growth of the literature on these issues is the motivation for our review of the presented approaches. The empirical facts that motivate the inclusion of financial frictions are surveyed. This survey provides a description of the basic approaches for introducing financial frictions into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. The significance and empirical identification of the financial accelerator effect is then discussed. The role of financial frictions models in CNB monetary and macroprudential policy is also described. It is concluded that given the heterogeneity of the approaches to financial frictions it is beneficial for the conduct of monetary policy to focus on the development of satellite approaches. The role of financial frictions in DSGE models for macroprudential policy is also discussed, as these models can be used to generate stress-testing scenarios. It can be concluded that DSGE models with financial frictions could complement current stress-testing practice, but are not able to replace stress tests.DSGE models, financial accelerator, financial frictions.

Models of Financial Markets with Extensive Participation Incentives

We consider models of financial markets in which all parties involved find incentives to participate. Strategies are evaluated directly by their virtual wealths. By tuning the price sensitivity and market impact, a phase diagram with several attractor behaviors resembling those of real markets emerge, reflecting the roles played by the arbitrageurs and trendsetters, and including a phase with irregular price trends and positive sums. The positive-sumness of the players' wealths provides participation incentives for them. Evolution and the bid-ask spread provide mechanisms for the gain in wealth of both the players and market-makers. New players survive in the market if the evolutionary rate is sufficiently slow. We test the applicability of the model on real Hang Seng Index data over 20 years. Comparisons with other models show that our model has a superior average performance when applied to real financial data.Comment: 17 pages, 16 figure