Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist Legal Theory

Women’s entry into the legal academy in significant numbers—first as students, then as faculty—was a 1970s and 1980s phenomenon. During those decades, women in law schools struggled: first, for admission and inclusion as individual students on a formally equal footing with male students; then for parity in their numbers in classes and on faculties; and, eventually, for some measure of substantive equality across various parameters, including their performance and evaluation both in and in front of the classroom, as well as in the quality of their experiences as students and faculty members and in the benefits to be reaped from their tenure. This part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s—a story of attempted admission, then inclusion, then integration and assimilation, and then, finally, equality—is now a familiar one, at least in broad outline. It is not, in its entirety, an uplifting story. According to a raft of articles produced by women law students in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, women law students during those decades participated less in the classroom, were called on and responded to differently when they did participate, suffered from more law-school-induced anxiety disorders and other mental health issues, graduated with lower GPAs and less law review experience, published fewer notes and filled fewer editorial positions on those journals, held fewer leadership positions overall while in law school, and had far more difficulties connecting with mentors, teachers, and would-be recommenders among the faculty than male students. Women law professors during those decades were tenured at significantly lower rates than men and, particularly at high prestige schools and at schools with fewer female faculty among the tenured ranks, were hired at lower rates that did not reflect their number in the pool of qualified applicants, had trouble asserting or maintaining authority in the classroom or being perceived as having authority, taught lower-prestige courses and received low teaching evaluations, and, like their students, were published far less frequently in the major and most prestigious law reviews. Much of this, albeit not all, has not changed much for either students or faculty. As women in law schools enter the posttenure and midcareer phase, many of the old problems persist while new ones appear: women faculty are invited to participate on panels less often than men, and both women students and faculty are underrepresented as authors in law reviews. Although gender-neutral parental leave is now available to faculty at most law schools, many such policies are still ad hoc. There is considerable worry, although no hard evidence, over whether men disproportionately use the time off to write rather than care for children. Women are still disproportionately overrepresented in some fields and underrepresented or unrepresented in others, and those fields correlate in unsurprising ways with levels of prestige: the more women in a field, the less prestigious. As elsewhere in the workforce, women faculty in legal education suffer from sexual harassment, most of which is unremedied. Women still suffer a pay gap in law schools that remains unaddressed at most universities, as it does elsewhere in academia. There is a sizeable literature on these depressing phenomena that stubbornly do not seem to abate. In these comments, however, I want to focus on another, less appreciated, part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s: the emergence of a body of scholarship—sometimes called feminist legal theory—produced by some of these women legal scholars over the same time period. The story I want to focus on, in other words, is not that of second- or third-wave women’s struggles within the academy, either for admission, acceptance, assimilation, or equality in law schools. Rather, this Article focuses on the story of the scholarship some of those second-wave assimilated women produced once they got there. Feminist jurisprudence, understood largely as scholarship on issues pertaining to gender equality, was launched in the 1970s, endures today, and continues to shape debates. Feminist legal theory, however, was in effect a subfield within feminist jurisprudence and, as its name implies, was an attempt to fashion a broad- based theoretical account of the relationship of law in liberal legal regimes to women’s subordination, patriarchy, and gender and sexual inequality— particularly in a post–civil rights era, when women enjoyed broad access to rights of formal equality, reproductive liberty, and liberal antidiscrimination law. Feminist legal theory so understood—a body of scholarship in search of a theoretical understanding of the relation of law to women’s subordination or, more simply, of law and patriarchy—was birthed in the 1970s, nurtured in the 1980s, and matured in the 1990s. I suggest in this Article that it is now seemingly in decline, and may soon disappear altogether. The reasons for this trajectory, I believe, are to date unexplored. Some reasons are fairly self-evident. Feminist legal theory was a product of three time-specific factors peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s: it reflected the political and the legal struggles of second-wave feminism. The critical theory schools were, to varying degrees, present or thriving in the academy in the 1970s and 1980s, within which feminist legal theory was birthed, grew, and then coexisted with critical theory, albeit at times very uneasily; and this feminist theory reflected second-wave women faculty and students’ mixed experiences of assimilation, success, and alienation in law schools themselves, as briefly recited above. Those three factors—the background politics, the presence of critical theory in law schools, and the differences in women’s experience of those schools—are all themselves either disappearing or dissipating in felt urgency, albeit in different ways and at different speeds, and that dissipation clearly is a part of the story of feminist legal theory’s decline. There are other reasons for its decline as well, however. Some are internal to feminism and feminist theory, and some pertain to the changing nature of legal scholarship from the 1980s to the present. I explore these reasons in Part II below. The story of the development of a distinctively feminist legal theory during the 1970s through the 1990s, and the story of its decline in the 2000s, is of obvious relevance to the history of second- and third-wave feminism. It should also be of interest for what it reveals about the nature of legal scholarship as it was understood, received, and produced in those decades. Its decline likewise reveals something about the changing nature of legal scholarship and the legal academy today. Thus, one conclusion I draw is that the feminist legal theory of the 1970s through the 1990s—regardless of the truth or lasting power of its claims—stands as an example of a type of legal scholarship that was somewhat distinctive to those decades. That form of legal scholarship, furthermore, likely can only emanate from the legal academy. For a host of reasons, we are currently in danger of losing this entire genre of intellectual work, which would be the polity’s loss, not just feminism’s or the legal academy’s

Gender equality and legal mobilization in the United Kingdom: using rights for lobbying, litigation, defense and attack

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Finding Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Generation in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory

This article explores the ways in which current feminist frameworks are dividing the women’s movement along generational lines, thereby inhibiting progress in the struggle for gender equality. Third-wave feminists, or the generation of feminists that came of age in the 1990s and continues today, have been criticized for focusing on personal stories of oppression and failing to influence feminist legal theory. Yet this critique presupposes that third-wave feminism is fundamentally different from the feminism of past generations. In contrast, this article argues that third-wave feminism is rooted in the feminist legal theory developed in the prior generation. This article demonstrates that the third-wave appears to be failing to influence feminist legal theory not because it is theoretically different, but because third-wave feminists approach activism in such a different way. For example, third-wavers envision “women’s issues” broadly, and rely on new tactics such as online organizing. Using the case study of Spark, a nonprofit organization employing third-wave activism to support global grassroots women’s organizations, this article provides a model of this new brand of feminism in practice. This article proposes the adoption of social justice feminism, which advocates casting a broader feminist net to capture those who have been traditionally neglected by the women’s movement, such as low-income women and women of color. Social justice feminism is a way to broaden the focus from a rights-based approach to an examination of the dynamics of power and privilege that continue to shape women’s lives even when legal rights to equality have been won. Adopting social justice feminism can be a way to bridge second- and third-wave feminism and create a more robust and unified feminist movement, thereby mending the divisions that currently prevent unification in the women’s movement

The Importance of Scholarship to Law School Excellence

As we have learned from Dan Coquillette, Bob Kaczorowski, and John Sexton, access to substantial funding is undoubtedly a prerequisite for a law school to enjoy excellence. Funding, that is, is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for excellence. Something else—intellectual vision—is also required

From Comparison to Collaboration: Experiments with a New Scholarly and Political Form

Society and the workplace are two factors that are important for the individual's health status. It is important that the individuals has the right skills to take care of their health. For organizations, it is important to strive for the welfare of their employees. This has proven to have a positive impact on work performance, reduced absenteeism and reduced costs for rehabilitation. In 2007, the local authorities in Umeå implemented a wellness offering for all employees working in the municipality administration. They later saw a need to assist employees who needed help getting started with new exercise habits. This study aims to examine how the participants in the "Get Started Programme", succeeded in creating lasting exercise habits , 3-4 years after completing the program. Research questions are: How have the participants increased their knowledge practically and theoretically after the programme has finished? How have the participants succeeded in creating the content of the programme in their daily lives? How do the participants assess their health compared to before they participated in the programme? Are there any beneficial factors highlighted by the participants as during the program? The study was conducted on the basis of semi-structured interviews with eight voluntary participants who previously participated in the Get Started Programme. The results show that six of the eight participants succeeded to get started with the goals for behavioral change, and still maintain a sufficient physical activity level today. Participants who do not consider themselves to have succeeded in reaching the goals they set up in the beginning of the program, point out that they have the tools needed to go on and continue the behavioral change they strive for

Legal feminism and insolvency theory: A woman's touch

The impact of women’s lives and experiences on the law forms an essential part of the feminist legal movement. This article evaluates the existence of feminist ideologies in a hitherto unexplored area of the law, namely insolvency law and more specifically insolvency theory. Some main ideologies of the feminist movement are identified and contrasted with the views of the main insolvency theories. It aims to establish whether insolvency theories may also be categorised in relation to ideologies expressed in feminist legal theory

Using Feminist Theory to Advance Equal Justice Under Law

This essay provides an overview of the purposes, themes and scholarly methodologies evidenced at the October 2016 conference, The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project: Writing the Law, Rewriting the Future, a two-day conference hosted by the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law. This essay provides some of the background to the development of the path-breaking book, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (Cambridge University Press, 2016). It also focuses attention on the importance of diversity on the bench, with a particular need for judges who understand or experience the intersecting relationships among race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, physical abilities and many other factors. The authors argue that one theoretical foundation of Feminist Judgments Projects in the U.S. and globally is the belief that judges with feminist perspectives – broadly construed – will pay more attention to facts, context and a broad range of authorities, thus advancing equal justice under the law. The essay concludes by identifying further questions about the relationship between feminist perspectives and the judicial role, including how feminism can disrupt default judicial positions that otherwise make it more difficult to realize fully the law’s promise of equalit

Teaching with Feminist Judgments: A Global Conversation

This conversational-style essay is an exchange among fourteen professors—representing thirteen universities across five countries—with experience teaching with feminist judgments. Feminist judgments are ‘shadow’ court decisions rewritten from a feminist perspective, using only the precedent in effect and the facts known at the time of the original decision. Scholars in Canada, England, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, Ireland, India, and Mexico have published (or are currently producing) written collections of feminist judgments that demonstrate how feminist perspectives could have changed the legal reasoning or outcome (or both) in important legal cases. This essay begins to explore the vast pedagogical potential of feminist judgments. The contributors to this conversation describe how they use feminist judgments in the classroom; how students have responded to the judgments; how the professors achieve specific learning objectives through teaching with feminist judgments; and how working with feminist judgments—whether studying them, writing them, or both—can help students excavate the multiple social, political, economic, and even personal factors that influence the development of legal rules, structures, and institutions. The primary takeaway of the essay is that feminist judgments are a uniquely enriching pedagogical tool that can broaden the learning experience. Feminist judgments invite future lawyers, and indeed any reader, to re-imagine what the law is, what the law can be, and how to make the law more responsive to the needs of all people

Women's Ijtihad and Lady Amin's Islamic ethics on womanhood and motherhood

Women's position, identity, and value in Islam have been affected by androcentric interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith throughout Islamic history. Women's roles in society, as well as their position vis-a-vis Islamic sources and authority, have been shaped by these interpretations. In Shi'a Islam, due to the majority male clergy's resistance, women have rarely reached the highest loci of Shi'i authority and jurisprudence. However, there have been women scholars who have transgressed these normative frameworks. Lady Amin, who was one of the most prominent Iranian theologians of the 19th and 20th centuries, is a notable example. Lady Amin had great knowledge of jurisprudence and gained the status of mujtahida at the age of forty. Her scholarly work addressed not only interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith, but also women's issues and gender politics of her time. This study addresses women's ijtihad in Shi'a Islam and investigates Lady Amin's teachings on the topics of womanhood and motherhood. This study focuses on Lady Amin's book of Islamic ethics, titled Ways of Happiness: Suggestions for Faithful Sisters, written as a Shi'i source of guidance with a specific focus on women and gender in Shi'a Islam