A Secure and Fair Resource Sharing Model for Community Clouds

Cloud computing has gained a lot of importance and has been one of the most discussed segment of today\u27s IT industry. As enterprises explore the idea of using clouds, concerns have emerged related to cloud security and standardization. This thesis explores whether the Community Cloud Deployment Model can provide solutions to some of the concerns associated with cloud computing. A secure framework based on trust negotiations for resource sharing within the community is developed as a means to provide standardization and security while building trust during resource sharing within the community. Additionally, a model for fair sharing of resources is developed which makes the resource availability and usage transparent to the community so that members can make informed decisions about their own resource requirements based on the resource usage and availability within the community. Furthermore, the fair-share model discusses methods that can be employed to address situations when the demand for a resource is higher than the resource availability in the resource pool. Various methods that include reduction in the requested amount of resource, early release of the resources and taxing members have been studied, Based on comparisons of these methods along with the advantages and disadvantages of each model outlined, a hybrid method that only taxes members for unused resources is developed. All these methods have been studied through simulations

Exchange of Services in Networks: Competition, Cooperation, and Fairness

Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental questions regarding their properties and efficiency remain unanswered. We consider such a service exchange model and analyze the users' interactions under three different approaches. First, we study a centrally designed service allocation policy that yields the fair total service each user should receive based on the service it others to the others. Accordingly, we consider a competitive market where each user determines selfishly its allocation policy so as to maximize the service it receives in return, and a coalitional game model where users are allowed to coordinate their policies. We prove that there is a unique equilibrium exchange allocation for both game theoretic formulations, which also coincides with the central fair service allocation. Furthermore, we characterize its properties in terms of the coalitions that emerge and the equilibrium allocations, and analyze its dependency on the underlying network graph. That servicing policy is the natural reference point to the various mechanisms that are currently proposed to incentivize user participation and improve the efficiency of such networked service (or, resource) exchange markets.Comment: to appear in ACM Sigmetrics 201

Store-Forward and its implications for Proportional Scheduling

The Proportional Scheduler was recently proposed as a scheduling algorithm for multi-hop switch networks. For these networks, the BackPressure scheduler is the classical benchmark. For networks with fixed routing, the Proportional Scheduler is maximum stable, myopic and, furthermore, will alleviate certain scaling issued found in BackPressure for large networks. Nonetheless, the equilibrium and delay properties of the Proportional Scheduler has not been fully characterized. In this article, we postulate on the equilibrium behaviour of the Proportional Scheduler though the analysis of an analogous rule called the Store-Forward allocation. It has been shown that Store-Forward has asymptotically allocates according to the Proportional Scheduler. Further, for Store-Forward networks, numerous equilibrium quantities are explicitly calculable. For FIFO networks under Store-Forward, we calculate the policies stationary distribution and end-to-end route delay. We discuss network topologies when the stationary distribution is product-form, a phenomenon which we call \emph{product form resource pooling}. We extend this product form notion to independent set scheduling on perfect graphs, where we show that non-neighbouring queues are statistically independent. Finally, we analyse the large deviations behaviour of the equilibrium distribution of Store-Forward networks in order to construct Lyapunov functions for FIFO switch networks

Non-centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical Insight

This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems.Generalitat de Catalunya FI 2014Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2016-76493-C3-3-RMinisterio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2008-05818Proyecto europeo FP7-ICT DYMASO