On centralized bargaining in a symmetric oligopolistic industry

In this paper we study interactions between labor and product markets, in an imperfectly competitive industry with centralized wage bargaining. Firms jointly bargain with the union over wages and then compete in prices or quantities. We show that the negotiated wage is independent of the number of firms, the degree of substitutability of firms' products, and the type of market competition, in a broad c1ass of industry specifications, including the standard syrnmetric linear demand system-linear one factor (labor) technology. This result is robust to various union objectives. Thus, unions are better-off as the market becomes more competitive because aggregate! employment increases. Finally,. motivated by the wage independence property, we propose that the bargained wage in a Bertrand homogenous market be taken as the limit of that of a differentiated market as the degree of substitutability goes to one

Endogenous Market Structure and the Business Cycle

We introduce endogenous strategic interactions under competition in quantities and in prices together with endogenous entry in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with flexible prices. The endogenous mark ups depend on the form of competition and on the degree of substitutability between goods, and they vary countercylically while profits are procyclical. Positive temporary shocks to productivity and government spending attract entry. Entry strengthens competition between firms, which temporary reduces mark ups and prices: this creates an intertemporal substitution effect which provides an extra boost to consumption. The model outperforms the standard RBC framework in matching impulse response functions and second moments for US data.Endogenous Market Structure, Firms?Entry, Business Cycle

'Don’t leave me this way!' Drivers of parental hostility and employee spin-offs’ performance

Many entrepreneurs commercialize an idea they initially developed as employees of an incumbent firm. While some face retaliatory reactions from their (former) employer, others are left alone or even supported. It is not clear, however, why some employee spin-offs face parental hostility while others do not, and to what extent this parental hostility affects employee spin-offs’ performance. Integrating the resource-based view with insights on competition and retaliation, we propose that parental hostility increases with the (perceived) competitive threat posed by an employee spin-off. Specifically, we advance employee spin-offs’ initial strategic actions (offering substitute products, hiring employees of the parent, and attempting to first develop the idea inside the parent) as key drivers of parental hostility and consequent spin-off performance. Results from a pooled dataset of 1083 employee spin-offs in Germany confirm that these initial strategic actions trigger parental hostility, which in turn, and contrary to expectations, positively affects employee spin-offs’ innovation and economic performance. These results advance the literature on employee spin-offs in several ways and have important practical implications

Innovation, competition and incentives for R&D

This paper analyses the relationship between past innovation output, competition, and future innovation input in a dynamic econometric setting. We distinguish two dimensions of competition that correspond to the concepts of product substitutability and entry barriers due to fixed costs. Based on firm-level panel data for Germany and Switzerland we obtain consistent results for both countries. Innovation output in t-1 as measured by the sales share of innovative products is positively related to the degree of product obsolescence in t, and negatively to the degree of substitutability in t in both countries. Further, we find that rapid product obsolescence provides positive incentives for higher - primarily product-oriented - R&D investments in t+1, while high substitutability exerts negative incentives for future R&D investment. --Innovation,R&D,Competition

Standards and Related Regulations in International Trade: A Modeling Approach

Standards and technical regulations which govern the admissibility of imported goods into an economy raise costs of exporters entering new markets, and may have a particularly high impact on firms seeking to export from developing countries. Yet standards may also have a positive side, such as certifying product quality and safety for the consumer. This paper suggests approaches to modeling standards and technical regulations, with a particular concern that these approaches are at least potentially implementable in an applied general-equilibrium model with real data.

Endogenous Market Structures and Labor Market Dynamics

We propose a flexible prices model where endogenous market structures and search and matching frictions in the labor market interact endogenously. The interplay between firms endogenous entry, strategic interactions among producers and labor market frictions represents a strong amplification channel of technology shocks on labor market variables, and helps addressing the unemployment-volatility puzzle. Consistently with U.S. evidence, new firms create a large fraction of new jobs and grow faster than more mature firms, net firms’ entry is procyclical and the price mark up is countercyclical.Endogenous Market Structures, Firms’ Entry, Search and Matching Frictions

On centralized bargaining in a symmetric oligopolistic industry.

In this paper we study interactions between labor and product markets, in an imperfectly competitive industry with centralized wage bargaining. Firms jointly bargain with the union over wages and then compete in prices or quantities. We show that the negotiated wage is independent of the number of firms, the degree of substitutability of firms' products, and the type of market competition, in a broad c1ass of industry specifications, including the standard syrnmetric linear demand system-linear one factor (labor) technology. This result is robust to various union objectives. Thus, unions are better-off as the market becomes more competitive because aggregate! employment increases. Finally,. motivated by the wage independence property, we propose that the bargained wage in a Bertrand homogenous market be taken as the limit of that of a differentiated market as the degree of substitutability goes to one.Oligopoly; Trade Unions; Centralized Bargaining; Wage Structure;

Elasticity optimism

Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign varieties are small in macroeconomic data, and substantially larger in disaggregated studies. This may be an artifact of heterogeneity. We use disaggregated multilateral trade data to structurally identify elasticities of substitution in US goods. We spell out a partial equilibrium model to aggregate them adequately at the country level. We compare aggregate elasticities that impose equality across sectors, to estimates allowing for heterogeneity. The former are similar in value to conventional macroeconomic estimates; but they are more than twice larger -up to 7- with heterogeneity. The parameter is central to calibrated models in most of international economics. We discuss the difference our corrected estimate makes in various areas of international economics, including the dynamics of external balances, the international transmission of shocks, international portfolio choice and optimal monetary policy.Trade Elasticities, Aggregation, Calibration, Global Imbalances, International Transmission, International Portfolio, Monetary Policy.

The Endogenous Market Structures Approach. A Technical Survey with Applications to the Theory of Business Cycles, Trade and Growth

The EMSs approach to macroeconomics introduces strategic interactions and en- dogenous entry decisions in the analysis of aggregate phenomena. This approach departs from the perfectly competitive environment, in the sense that rms do not take prices as given, but they do choose their entry and production strategies and they interact strategically. In general equilibrium, this leads to novel implications for the mechanism of propagation of aggregate shocks, for the theory of the gains from trade and for the sources of the growth process. We introduce this emerging literature and discuss some of its implications.