Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation

This Article examines zero-price regulation, the major distinguishing feature of many modern "network neutrality" proposals. A zero-price rule prohibits a broadband Internet access provider from charging an application or content provider (collectively, "content provider") to send information to consumers. The Article differentiates two access provider strategies thought to justify a zero-price rule. Exclusion is anticompetitive behavior that harms a content provider to favor its rival. Extraction is a toll imposed upon content providers to raise revenue. Neither strategy raises policy concerns that justify implementation of a broad zero-price rule. First, there is no economic exclusion argument that justifies the zero-price rule as a general matter, given existing legal protections against exclusion. A stronger but narrow argument for regulation exists in certain cases in which the output of social producers, such as Wikipedia, competes with ordinary market-produced content. Second, prohibiting direct extraction is undesirable and counterproductive, in part because it induces costly and unregulated indirect extraction. I conclude, therefore, that recent calls for broad-based zero-price regulation are mistaken.

Discriminatory Congestion Pricing of Network Services: A Game Theoretic Approach Using Adverse Selection

The quality of network services deteriorates as network utilization increases beyond a certain point, i.e., congestion externalities. Many researchers have proposed congestion pricing models which internalize congestion externalities. However, most studies are based on a unit pricing which cannot reflect users different congestion sensitivities. The purpose of this paper is to propose a discriminatory congestion pricing model using adverse selection. Our pricing mechanism provides a congestion-sensitive user with a high quality service for a higher price and a congestion-tolerant user with a low quality service for a lower price. Our model allows service providers to better control congestions while maximizing their profits

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Based on an idiosyncratic reading of the literature I propose intermediate (rather than tight or soft) regulation for balancing investment incentives with allocative efficiency and competition objectives. Intermediate regulation is compatible with incentive regulation and helps lengthening the regulatory commitment period necessary for incentives. However, such commitment for the whole time horizon of infrastructure or innovation investments is impossible. The compatibility of incentive regulation and efficient investment is thus in doubt. Incentive regulation for regular infrastructure investments therefore needs periodic updating based on rate-of-return regulation criteria. Innovative infrastructure investments may warrant regulatory holidays, which should be conditioned on strict criteria.

On the Optimal Fixed-Up-To Pricing for Information Services

Fixed-up-to (FUT) pricing allows consumers to purchase a fixed usage amount of an information service for a certain fixed price chosen from a set of options. In this study, we derive an optimal analytical solution for FUT pricing without imposing the strong single-crossing assumption. Further, we illustrate the analytical solution by leveraging mixed integer nonlinear programming to derive an optimal FUT pricing scheme for information services and also investigate when and by how much FUT pricing improves upon commonly used “flat rate” pricing. Our numerical results show that FUT pricing improves the service provider’s profits while enhancing social welfare when consumers face different maximum consumption-level bounds. Notably, in terms of optimal pricing, our numerical results show that the consumers’ maximum consumption-level bounds are more important than their utility functions. Most importantly, our results show that FUT pricing performs better than flat rate pricing under conditions of incomplete information. Finally, we empirically show that it is not necessary to treat over-the-limit rates as a decision variable in terms of optimal FUT pricing since both FUT pricing and three-part tariffs are reasonable approximations of nonlinear pricing in terms of both firm profits and social welfare. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical and practical implications for the design of optimal FUT pricing in terms of enhancing firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Keywords:Pricing, Nonlinear Mixed Integer Programming, Information Services, Fixed-Up-To (FUT) Pricing

Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace

Koyaanisqatsi is a Hopi Indian word that translates into English as 'life out of balance,' 'crazy life,' 'life in turmoil,' 'life disintegrating,' all meanings consistent with indicating 'a way of life which calls for another way of living.” While not wishing to suggest either that the international regime of intellectual property rights protection scientific and technical data and information is “crazy” or that it is “in turmoil”, this paper argues that the persisting drift of institutional change towards towards a stronger, more extensive and globally harmonized system of intellectual property protections during the past two decades has dangerously altered the balance between private rights and the public domain in data and information. In this regard we have embarked upon “a way of life which calls for another way of living.” High access charges imposed by holders of monopoly rights in intellectual property have overall consequences for the conduct of science that are particularly damaging to programs of exploratory research which are recognized to be critical for the sustained growth of knowledge-driven economies. Lack of restraint in privatizing the public domain in data and information has effects similar to those of non- cooperative behaviors among researchers in regard to the sharing of access to raw data-steams and information, or the systematic under- provision the documentation and annotation required to create reliably accurate and up-to-date public database resources. Both can significantly degrade the effectiveness of the research system as a whole. The urgency of working towards a restoration of proper balance between private property rights and the public domain in data and information arises from considerations beyond the need to protect the public knowledge commons upon which the vitality of open science depends. Policy-makers who seek to configure the institutional infrastructure to better accommodate emerging commercial opportunities of the information-intensive “new economy” – in the developed and developing countries alike –therefore have a common interest in reducing the impediments to the future commercial exploitation of peer-to-peer networking technologies which are likely to be posed by ever-more stringent enforcement of intellectual property rights.