Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (review revised 2019)

Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of Wittgenstein (since updated in my more recent writings). Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

JonDoyleExtending Mechanics to Minds: The Mechanical Foundations of Psychology and Economics2006Cambridge University Press

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Review of I Am A Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007)

Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of Wittgenstein (since updated in my more recent writings). Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

The Physics of Preference: Unravelling Imprecision of Human Preferences through Magnetisation Dynamics

Paradoxical decision-making behaviours such as preference reversal often arise from imprecise or noisy human preferences. Harnessing the physical principle of magnetisation reversal in ferromagnetic nanostructures, we developed a model that closely reflects human decision-making dynamics. Tested against a spectrum of psychological data, our model adeptly captures the complexities inherent in individual choices. This blend of physics and psychology paves the way for fresh perspectives on understanding the imprecision of human decision-making processes, extending the reach of the current classical and quantum physical models of human behaviour and decision-making

Stephen Jay Kline on systems, or physics, complex systems, and the gap between.

At the end of his life, Stephen Jay Kline, longtime professor of mechanical engineering at Stanford University, completed a book on how to address complex systems. The title of the book is 'Conceptual Foundations of Multi-Disciplinary Thinking' (1995), but the topic of the book is systems. Kline first establishes certain limits that are characteristic of our conscious minds. Kline then establishes a complexity measure for systems and uses that complexity measure to develop a hierarchy of systems. Kline then argues that our minds, due to their characteristic limitations, are unable to model the complex systems in that hierarchy. Computers are of no help to us here. Our attempts at modeling these complex systems are based on the way we successfully model some simple systems, in particular, 'inert, naturally-occurring' objects and processes, such as what is the focus of physics. But complex systems overwhelm such attempts. As a result, the best we can do in working with these complex systems is to use a heuristic, what Kline calls the 'Guideline for Complex Systems.' Kline documents the problems that have developed due to 'oversimple' system models and from the inappropriate application of a system model from one domain to another. One prominent such problem is the Procrustean attempt to make the disciplines that deal with complex systems be 'physics-like.' Physics deals with simple systems, not complex ones, using Kline's complexity measure. The models that physics has developed are inappropriate for complex systems. Kline documents a number of the wasteful and dangerous fallacies of this type

The Unreasonable Success of Quantum Probability I: Quantum Measurements as Uniform Fluctuations

We introduce a 'uniform tension-reduction' (UTR) model, which allows to represent the probabilities associated with an arbitrary measurement situation and use it to explain the emergence of quantum probabilities (the Born rule) as 'uniform' fluctuations on this measurement situation. The model exploits the geometry of simplexes to represent the states, in a way that the measurement probabilities can be derived as the 'Lebesgue measure' of suitably defined convex subregions of the simplexes. We consider a very simple and evocative physical realization of the abstract model, using a material point particle which is acted upon by elastic membranes, which by breaking and collapsing produce the different possible outcomes. This easy to visualize mechanical realization allows one to gain considerable insight into the possible hidden structure of an arbitrary measurement process. We also show that the UTR-model can be further generalized into a 'general tension-reduction' (GTR) model, describing conditions of lack of knowledge generated by 'non-uniform' fluctuations. In this ampler framework, particularly suitable to describe experiments in cognitive science, we define and motivate a notion of 'universal measurement', describing the most general possible condition of lack of knowledge in a measurement, emphasizing that the uniform fluctuations characterizing quantum measurements can also be understood as an average over all possible forms of non-uniform fluctuations which can be actualized in a measurement context. This means that the Born rule of quantum mechanics can be understood as a first order approximation of a more general non-uniform theory, thus explaining part of the great success of quantum probability in the description of different domains of reality. This is the first part of a two-part article.Comment: 50 pages, 10 figure

Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John Searle (2008) (review revised 2019)

Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

The Epistemology of Simulation, Computation and Dynamics in Economics Ennobling Synergies, Enfeebling 'Perfection'

Lehtinen and Kuorikoski ([73]) question, provocatively, whether, in the context of Computing the Perfect Model, economists avoid - even positively abhor - reliance on simulation. We disagree with the mildly qualified affirmative answer given by them, whilst agreeing with some of the issues they raise. However there are many economic theoretic, mathematical (primarily recursion theoretic and constructive) - and even some philosophical and epistemological - infelicities in their descriptions, definitions and analysis. These are pointed out, and corrected; for, if not, the issues they raise may be submerged and subverted by emphasis just on the unfortunate, but essential, errors and misrepresentationsSimulation, Computation, Computable, Analysis, Dynamics, Proof, Algorithm