IP-based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe

Historically, interconnection in the world of the Internet has been approached significantly differently from interconnection in the fixed Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and the mobile Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN). As fixed and mobile networks evolve to Next Generation Networks (NGNs) based on the Internet Protocol (IP), it becomes increasingly necessary to merge these perspectives in order to achieve a unified and integrated approach to network interconnection. There is a rich history of economic analysis of IP-based and of conventional switched networks that began to converge early in this decade. In 2008, this issue is coming to a boil, as regulators seek to provide regulatory certainty for the build-out of NGNs, even in the face of substantial uncertainties, and even though practical experience with NGNs is still in a very preliminary state. What can we learn from the historical evolution of the theory of interconnection for Internet, NGN, PSTN and PLMN? What issues are "in play" today? What is the appropriate destination in the long term? What nearer term measures are appropriate?interconnection, NGN, Internet Protocol (IP), bill and keep, Calling Party's Network Pays (CPNP), peering, transit.

When good intentions are not enough: sequential entry and competition in the Turkish mobile industry

A decade into the liberalization of the Turkish mobile industry, the sector remains one of the most concentrated in Europe. In this paper we analyze the links between the regulatory environment and competitive outcomes in the Turkish context. We argue that seven years of duopoly incumbency resulted in a significant first-mover advantage. We then focus on the role of the regulatory tools that could potentially restrain the incumbent operators’ first-mover advantage and stimulate competition: national roaming, interconnection regulation, and number portability

Analysis and quantification of the benefits of interconnected distribution system operation

In the UK, the Capacity to Customers (C2C) project is underway to determine the potential benefits of increased interconnection in distribution systems, combined with demand side response technology. Managed contracts with customers, i.e., the agreement that certain loads are interruptible following system faults, allows distribution circuits to be loaded beyond the limits presently required for security of supply. This potentially permits load growth but avoids the cost and environmental impact of conventional network reinforcement. This paper provides the results of electrical system modelling to quantify the benefits of the C2C operation, using actual circuit data and typical load distributions. Based upon simulations of these circuits, it is shown that increased interconnection generally leads to minor improvements in electrical losses and system voltage. By connecting managed (i.e., interruptible) loads, circuits typically can be loaded significantly further than the present practice in the UK—an average increase of 66% for radial operation and 74% for interconnected systems

Average Consensus in the Presence of Delays and Dynamically Changing Directed Graph Topologies

Classical approaches for asymptotic convergence to the global average in a distributed fashion typically assume timely and reliable exchange of information between neighboring components of a given multi-component system. These assumptions are not necessarily valid in practical settings due to varying delays that might affect transmissions at different times, as well as possible changes in the underlying interconnection topology (e.g., due to component mobility). In this work, we propose protocols to overcome these limitations. We first consider a fixed interconnection topology (captured by a - possibly directed - graph) and propose a discrete-time protocol that can reach asymptotic average consensus in a distributed fashion, despite the presence of arbitrary (but bounded) delays in the communication links. The protocol requires that each component has knowledge of the number of its outgoing links (i.e., the number of components to which it sends information). We subsequently extend the protocol to also handle changes in the underlying interconnection topology and describe a variety of rather loose conditions under which the modified protocol allows the components to reach asymptotic average consensus. The proposed algorithms are illustrated via examples.Comment: 37 page

Glass half empty? politics and institutions in the liberalization of the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey

This chapter reviews Turkish experience with reform of the fixed line telecommunications industry. It provides an account of earlier incoherent attempts to privatize the incumbent operator in the absence of any regulatory framework or political consensus. It also describes the regulatory framework emerged in early 2000s and discusses the various political-economic and institutional factors behind its weak implementation, and hence its limited success in promoting competition

Half glass empty? politics & institutions in the liberalization of the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey

This chapter reviews Turkish experience with reform of the fixed line telecommunications industry. It provides an account of earlier incoherent attempts to privatize the incumbent operator in the absence of any regulatory framework or political consensus. It also describes the regulatory framework emerged in early 2000s and discusses the various political-economic and institutional factors behind its weak implementation, and hence its limited success in promoting competition

Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing

Since 1997, the U.S. government has attempted to use the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on telecommunications services as a vehicle for 'exporting' American principles of telecommunications regulation to other nations. The United States took the position in 1997 that the WTO telecommunications agreement requires its signatory nations to follow the practices of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on telecommunications regulatory policy. Subsequently, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has sought to influence, under the implicit threat of trade sanctions, Japan's domestic regulatory policy on the pricing of mandatory competitor access to the unbundled elements of the local network belonging to the operating companies of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT). In this Article, we examine the substantive difficulties of engrafting the FCC's interconnection policy onto the telecommunications marketplace of another nation. For more than five years, many American experts on telecommunications policy have disagreed whether American consumers have benefited from the very FCC policies that the USTR would have Japanese regulators emulate. The USTR's initiative appears to ignore that the transition to costoriented rates for interconnection and retail telecommunications services has been a difficult and unfinished process in the United States; that the cost models used by the FCC to set interconnection prices have significant deficiencies; that actual interconnection prices both within and outside the United States diverge considerably from the estimates of the FCC's cost models; that variations across countries in the prices of inputs have a significant effect on the costs of interconnection; and that, with respect to depreciation in particular, regulators treat this cost differently'and, from an economic perspective, more reasonably'in Japan than in the United States. Such substantive economic considerations suggest why the FCC's policy in this area has generated continuous litigation, including two Supreme Court cases, since 1996 and consequently is too unresolved at this point in the American experience for the United States to force on its trading partners. Next, we ask whether the USTR has the detailed knowledge required to negotiate trade agreements on interconnection pricing. We question the propriety of using the USTR to influence the domestic regulatory policy of another country on a topic as complex as the efficient pricing of mandatory access to unbundled network elements. The USTR's power to formulate trade policy on this subject resides in officials who are unlikely to possess the economic expertise and resources necessary to evaluate the consumer-welfare implications of the policies that they would have Japan and other nations adopt. For these reasons, the USTR cannot credibly make the interconnection pricing policies of another nation a legitimate concern of U.S. trade policy.