7,648 research outputs found
The (in)finite horizon open-loop Nash LQ Game: An application to EMU
game theory;Nash equilibrium;EMS
Partial Information Differential Games for Mean-Field SDEs
This paper is concerned with non-zero sum differential games of mean-field
stochastic differential equations with partial information and convex control
domain. First, applying the classical convex variations, we obtain stochastic
maximum principle for Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, under additional
assumptions, verification theorem for Nash equilibrium points is also derived.
Finally, as an application, a linear quadratic example is discussed. The unique
Nash equilibrium point is represented in a feedback form of not only the
optimal filtering but also expected value of the system state, throughout the
solutions of the Riccati equations.Comment: 7 page
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy
We generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other playersâ policies are ineffective with respect to the dynamic target variables shared with that player; or no Nash Feedback Equilibrium can exist, unless they all share target values for those variables. We extend those results to the case where there are also non-dynamic targets, to show that policy effectiveness (a Nash equilibrium) can continue to exist if some players satisfy the Golden Rule but target values differ between players in the non-dynamic targets. We demonstrate the practical importance of these results by showing how policy effectiveness (a policy equilibrium) can appear or disappear with small variations in the expectations process or policy rule in a widely used model of monetary policy.Policy games, Policy ineffectiveness, Static controllability, Existence of equilibria, Nash feedback equilibrium
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