Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games

cooperative games;algorithm

Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games

In this paper the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative fuzzy games is introduced.The classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game.This adjusted algorithm is also a finite algorithm, because the convexity of a fuzzy game implies in each step the existence of a maximal element which corresponds to a crisp coalition.For arbitrary fuzzy games the equal division core is introduced.It turns out that both the equal division core and the egalitariansolution of a convex fuzzy game coincide with the corresponding equal division core and the constrained egalitarian solution, respectively, of the related crisp game.game theory

Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules

Clan game;Big boss game;Core;Decision making;Fuzzy coalition;Fuzzy game;Monotonic allocation rule

Convex Fuzzy Games and Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes

AMS classifications: 90D12; 03E72Convex games;Core;Decisionmaking;Fuzzy coalitions;Fuzzy games;Monotonic allocation schemes;Weber set

Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes

90D12;03E72cooperative games

Edgeworth and Walras equilibria of an arbitrage-free exchange economy

In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with consumption sets which are (possibly) unbounded below. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this result and its proof do not depend on the dimension or the particular structure of the commodity space. In a second part of the paper, we give conditions under which Edgeworth allocations can be decentralized by continuous prices in a finite dimensional and in an infinite dimensional setting. We then show how these results apply to some finance models.Arbitrage-free asset markets; individually rational utility set; Edgeworth equilibria; fuzzy coalitions; fuzzy core; Walras equilibria; quasiequilibria; properness of preferences