Revenue raising taxes : general equilibrium evaluation of alternative taxation in U.S. petroleum industries

Should the United States increase taxes and tariffs in the energy sector to reduce its federal deficit? This paper uses a twelve sector general equilibrium model to estimate the fiscal effects, and the effects on welfare and employment, of : (i) a 25 percent import tax on imported crude petroleum oil; (ii) a 15 percent excise tax on petroleum products; and (iii) a combination of the two. The excise tax would be the most efficient revenue raising instrument. The 25 percent import tariff would raise US$7.3 billion, while the 15 percent excise tax would raise US$35 billion. Moreover, each dollar raised through a tariff would come at a loss of 25 cents in welfare. Each dollar raised through an excise tax would come at a loss of only one cent in welfare. Acombination of excise taxes, subsidies, and import tariffs would be the least costly way (in terms of welfare) to raise US$20 billion. The optimal tax structure would involve a tariff and a small subsidy on petroleum products to counteract the distortion induced by a tax on oil - the most important input for petroleum products.Economic Theory&Research,Oil Refining&Gas Industry,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Energy and Environment,Environmental Economics&Policies

Wine tax reform: The impact of introducing a volumetric excise tax for wine

In addition to the GST, alcohol sold in Australia is subject to excise tax. Although both beer and spirits are subject to a volumetric excise tax, wine is subject to an additional value added tax known as the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET). The recent Henry tax review recommended substantial changes to Australian alcohol taxation policy. Here, the implications for the wine industry of the Henry tax review recommendations are explored using a computable general equilibrium model. The results show that: (i) replacement of the WET with a revenue neutral volumetric excise tax would have a small negative impact on the wine industry; (ii) removal of the WET rebate would have a substantial negative impact on small wineries; and (iii) applying a uniform alcohol tax equal to the packaged beer excise rate across all alcoholic beverages would have a notable negative impact on the wine industry.wine, alcohol taxation, general equilibrium modelling, Demand and Price Analysis, Health Economics and Policy, R13, H23,

Did the Single Market Cause Competition in Excise Taxes? Evidence from EU Countries

The introduction of the Single Market resulted in a switch from destination to origin-based taxation of cross-border transactions by individuals. The theory of commodity tax competition predicts that this change should give rise to excise tax competition and thus intensify strategic interaction in the setting of excise taxes. In this paper, we provide an empirical test of this prediction using a panel data set of 12 EU countries over the period 1987-2004. We find that for all excise duties that we consider (still and sparkling wine, beer, ethyl alcohol, and cigarettes), strategic interaction between countries significantly increased after 1993, consistently with the theoretical prediction. Indeed, for all these products except for cigarettes, there is no evidence of strategic interaction prior to 1993, so our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the single market caused tax competition. For beer and ethyl alcohol, there is evidence that the minimum taxes, also introduced in 1993, have intensified strategic interaction.tax competition ; excise taxes ; cross-border shopping

Overview of the Federal Tax System

The major sources of federal tax revenue are individual income taxes, Social Security and other payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, excise taxes, and estate and gift taxes. This report describes the federal tax structure, provides some statistics on the tax system as a whole, and presents analysis of selected tax concepts

Comparison of Georgia's Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Excise Tax Rates - Brief

This brief provides a detailed comparison of excise tax rates across the United States. FRC Brief 19

Tax Competition under Minimum Rates: The Case of European Diesel Excises

This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors’ tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10 percent higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3 percent. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries.Diesel excise, strategic tax setting, minimum rates, European Union

Asymmetric Competition in the Setting of Diesel Excise Taxes in EU Countries

This paper tests new implications of the asymmetric tax competition model on diesel excise taxes in the European Union (EU). I extend the standard tax competition model by replacing the unit demand assumption with iso-elastic demand. As a result, not only the level of the equilibrium tax but also the slope of the tax reaction function depends positively on the size of the country. The new implication is testable on panel data in first differences, and it is tested on a panel of 16 European countries. The results provide strong evidence for strategic interaction in the setting of diesel excises and confirm the effect of country size on the response to tax changes in neighboring countries. Strategic interaction between EU countries intensified in the mid 1990s and drove small European countries to set lower diesel tax rates. These results explain why the EU's minimum tax policy has failed to harmonize diesel tax rates across member states.tax competition, minimum tax, asymmetric regions, diesel excise, European Union

Excise Taxes, Consumer Demand, Over-Shifting, and Tax Revenue

This paper examines over-shifting in excise taxes, using the constant elasticity demand function under monopolistic competition. We apply the solution for price from this model to previous studies to obtain estimated price elasticities of demand. We also derive the excise tax, which maximizes tax revenue under this formulation, resulting in a revenue-maximizing tax-price ratio based upon the price elasticity. The model is applied to some previous experience regarding excise tax increases for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes. Our study offers structural insights behind empirical research that finds over-shifting. The model can also be used to help construct excise tax policy

Incidence and Salience of Alcohol Taxes: Do Consumers Overreact?

We use a unique, geocoded micro data set of retail prices to estimate the incidence of alcohol taxation. We estimate the pass-through of alcohol taxation employing both standard ordinary least squares (OLS) and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), using the abrupt change in excise tax occurring at state borders for identification. Our results show that sales and excise taxes on alcohol have different effects on final consumer price. Our estimates suggest that while 40 percent to 50 percent of sales taxes are passed on to consumers, excise taxes have a negative pass-through rate. Negative rates of pass-through on the excise portion of the alcohol tax are likely the result of consumers overreacting to the tax compared to how they would react to a general price increase, or that the alcohol tax is quite salient for consumers. This effect is particularly strong in areas near state borders when using the RDD estimation strategy

Litigation and the Political Clout of the Tobacco Companies: Cigarette Taxes, Prices, and the Master Settlement Agreement

The goal of our empirical analysis is to assess whether the changes in cigarette excise taxes and cigarette prices can be attributed to litigation brought by the states and the resulting settlements, holding other factors constant. Using pre-post as well as state excise taxes on beer as controls, the evidence provides support for the view that litigation changes the political equilibrium: state cigarette excise taxes were approximately $0.10 higher in the post-MSA period. For tobacco prices, the increases are attributable to the method the settlement used to structure payments as well as the market structure of the cigarette industry.Master Settlement Agreement, excise tax, tobacco