How Income Contingent Loans could affect Return to Higher Education: a microsimulation of the French Case

The paper assesses the implementation of income contingent loan schemes for higher education (ICL) in an institutional context characterized by two main features: (i) a former tuition free system and (ii) a great heterogeneity in tertiary education’s diplomas quality and cost, which impacts the individual career paths. In this particular case, ICL implementation leads to a trade-off between increasing ‘career’ equity in terms of collective public spending versus individual gains and widening low education traps by reducing the economic incentives to pursue a tertiary education curriculum. Based on a dynamic microsimulation model we propose an ex ante evaluation of the enlargement of low education traps induced by the implementation of different ICL designs in France. We conclude that the risk of low education traps’ enlargement remains very small.higher education;income contingent loan; microsimulation;

The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure

This paper presents evidence on systematic changes in the pricing and financial structure of 124 large management buyouts completed between 1980 and 1989. We find that over tine (1) prices increased relative to current cash flows with no accompanying decrease in risk or increase in projected future cash flows; (2) required bank principal repayments accelerated, leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt obligations; (3) private subordinated debt was replaced by public debt while the use of strip-financing techniques declined; and (4) management teams invested a smaller fraction of their net worth in post-buyout equity. These patterns of buyout prices and structures suggest that based on ex ante data, one could have expected lower returns and more frequent financial distress in later buyouts. Preliminary post-buyout evidence is consistent with this interpretation.

How Useful Are Banks' Earnings-At-Risk And Economic Value Of Equity-At-Risk Public Disclosures?

This paper examines the information content and the usefulness of banks' interest rate risk public disclosures. ALM managers use Earnings at Risk ( EAR ) and Economic Value of Equity at Risk ( EVEAR ) as measures of the dollar amount of potential loss to net interest income and common shareholders' equity as a result of unforeseen interest rate changes. These two interest rate risk management metrics are now recognized benchmarks for measuring interest rate risk exposure, and its potential impact on a bank's financial position. At the explicit request of regulators, financial analysts and competitive pressures, more commercial banks are now reporting EAR and EVEAR numbers in their annual financial reports. To examine preliminary evidence on the information content of such public disclosures, we composed a sample of some of North America's largest commercial banks. The Canadian peer group is based on Canada's seven largest banks, and the U.S. peer group is composed of twelve of its largest banks. In particular, we investigate if "ex ante" EAR and EVEAR numbers help regulators, financial analysts and investors to explain the subsequent variability of commercial banks' net interest income and net income over time

The Informational Content Of The VaR Measures Associated With The Trading Activities Of Canadian Banks

This paper examines the informational content and the usefulness of Canadian banks' market risk public disclosures. Risk managers use Value at Risk (VAR) as a measure of the dollar amount of a large potential loss to a bank's trading income and common shareholders' equity as a result of extreme and low-probability market price changes. Five different VAR metrics (high, low, range of estimates, average and end-of-period values) are now published and recognized benchmarks for measuring market risk exposure, and its potential impact on a bank's financial position. At the explicit request of regulators, financial analysts and competitive pressures, most large commercial banks in North America are now reporting the five forms of VAR numbers described above in their quarterly and annual financial reports. To examine preliminary evidence on the informational content of such public financial disclosures, we composed a sample of seven of Canada's largest commercial banks. In particular, we investigate if "ex ante" VAR numbers help financial analysts, investors, and regulators to explain the subsequent variability of commercial banks' trading income and of their ratio of market value to book value of common shareholders' equity over time

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive

We examine the pervasive view that “equity is expensive,” which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. Any desirable public subsidies to banks’ activities should be given directly and not in ways that encourage leverage. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support. We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions, including lending, taking deposits and issuing money-like securities. To the contrary, better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal, and, viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy.capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, too big to fail, systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel.

Do Welfare Asset Limits Affect Household Saving? Evidence from Welfare Reform

In this paper, we use household-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine the impact of new saving incentives that were implemented as part of the overhaul of U.S. welfare policy during the mid-1990s on the saving of households at risk of entering welfare. The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program devolved responsibility of program rules to the states, and many states have responded by relaxing liquid asset and vehicle-equity limits that determine program eligibility, and by introducing time limits on benefit receipt. According to the recent theoretical work and statements made by public officials, such policies are predicted to increase total savings for those households who have a large ex-ante probability of welfare receipt such as female-headed households with children. We follow a sample of female heads with children from 1994 to 2001 and find that in both absolute terms, and relative to comparison groups of male heads and female heads without children, there has been no impact of welfare policy changes on the saving of at-risk households.

Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting

Executive equity compensation in the United States is evolving. At the turn of the millennium, stock options dominated the equity pay landscape, accounting for over half of the aggregate ex ante value of senior executive pay at large public companies, while restricted stock and similar compensation accounted for only about ten percent. Beginning in 2006, stock grants have displaced options as the single largest component of senior executive compensation at these firms. Accompanying this shift has been increased variation among companies in their relative emphasis on stock and options in equity pay packages. Both phenomena provide an opportunity for a rich exploration of executive pay contracting focusing specifically on equity pay design. Such an exploration is timely given the current focus in Washington on the relationship between equity compensation and corporate risk taking. This Article begins that exploration and hag two primary aims. First, it describes the evolution in executive equity pay practices and the current equity compensation landscape. Second, it considers the extent to which this evolution and the current use of stock and option pay can be explained as a function of efficient contracting (and what efficient contracting means in this context). The analysis reveals several features of the executive equity pay landscape that suggest limitations on efficient compensation contracting. First, although directionally consistent with changes in the conventional economic determinants of equity pay design, the dramatic shift over the last decade from very heavy reliance on options to a more balanced emphasis on stock and options suggests that option expensing, option taint, and/or increased perceptions of option risk played leading roles. Second, the trimodal distribution of the mix of stock and options being granted in recent years suggests that optimizing incentives is not the sole consideration of issuing firms. Third, the extent to which the same mix of stock and options is granted to the various member of the executive suite suggests that individual optimization is quite limited

Fast or Accurate? Governing Conflicting Goals in Highly Autonomous Vehicles

The tremendous excitement around the deployment of autonomous vehicles (AVs) comes from their purported promise. In addition to decreasing accidents, AVs are projected to usher in a new era of equity in human autonomy by providing affordable, accessible, and widespread mobility for disabled, elderly, and low-income populations. However, to realize this promise, it is necessary to ensure that AVs are safe for deployment, and to contend with the risks AV technology poses, which threaten to eclipse its benefits. In this Article, we focus on an aspect of AV engineering currently unexamined in the legal literature, but with critical implications for safety, accountability, liability, and power. Specifically, we explain how understanding the fundamental engineering trade-off between accuracy and speed in AVs is critical for policymakers to regulate the uncertainty and risk inherent in AV systems. We discuss how understanding the trade-off will help create tools that will enable policymakers to assess how the trade-off is being implemented. Such tools will facilitate opportunities for developing concrete, ex ante AV safety standards and conclusive mechanisms for ex post determination of accountability after accidents occur. This will shift the balance of power from manufacturers to the public by facilitating effective regulation, reducing barriers to tort recovery, and ensuring that public values like safety and accountability are appropriately balanced.Comment: Vol. 20, pp. 249-27

The Social Value of Mortality Risk Reduction: VSL vs. The Social Welfare Function Approach

We examine how different welfarist frameworks evaluate the social value of mortality risk reduction. These frameworks include classical, distributively unweighted cost–benefit analysis—i.e., the “value per statistical life” (VSL) approach—and various social welfare functions (SWFs). The SWFs are either utilitarian or prioritarian, applied to policy choice under risk in either an “ex post” or “ex ante” manner. We examine the conditions on individual utility and on the SWF under which these frameworks display sensitivity to wealth and to baseline risk. Moreover, we discuss whether these frameworks satisfy related properties that have received some attention in the literature, namely equal value of risk reduction, preference for risk equity, and catastrophe aversion. We show that the particular manner in which VSL ranks risk-reduction measures is not necessarily shared by other welfarist frameworks

Evaluating The Effectiveness of Terrorism Risk Financing Solutions

The 9/11 attacks in the United States, as well as other attacks in different parts of the world, raise important questions related to the economic impact of terrorism. What are the most effective ways for a country to recover from these economic losses? Who should pay for the costs of future large-scale attacks? To address these two questions, we propose five principles to evaluate alternative programs. We first discuss how a federal insurance program with mandatory coverage and a laissez faire free-market approach for providing private insurance will fare relative to these principles. We conclude that neither solution is likely to be feasible here in the United States given the millions of firms at risk and the current structure of insurance regulation. We then evaluate how well the U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), a public-private program to cover commercial enterprises against foreign terrorism on U.S. soil, meets the five principles. In particular, we show that TRIA has had a positive effect on availability of terrorism coverage and also has significantly contributed to reducing insurance premiums. TRIA is scheduled to terminate at the end of the year, but pending legislation would extend the program for fifteen years after December 31 (HR. 2761). In this paper, we show that such a long-term extension might have important impacts on the market. This could increase the take-up rate, as prices might be even lower than they are today. We show also, however, that if TRIA were extended for a long period of time in its current form, some insurers could "game" the program by collecting ex ante a large amount of premiums for terrorism insurance, while being financially responsible for only a small portion of the claims ex post. The general taxpayer and the general commercial policyholder (whether or not covered against terrorism) would absorb the residual insured losses. This raises major equity issues inherent in the design of the program.