Evolutionary Poisson Games for Controlling Large Population Behaviors

Emerging applications in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and (mis)information propagation involve a large population of heterogeneous users or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In this work, we establish an evolutionary Poisson game framework to capture the random, dynamic and heterogeneous interactions of agents in a holistic fashion, and design mechanisms to control their behaviors to achieve a system-wide objective. We use the antivirus protection challenge in cyber security to motivate the framework, where each user in the network can choose whether or not to adopt the software. We introduce the notion of evolutionary Poisson stable equilibrium for the game, and show its existence and uniqueness. Online algorithms are developed using the techniques of stochastic approximation coupled with the population dynamics, and they are shown to converge to the optimal solution of the controller problem. Numerical examples are used to illustrate and corroborate our results

Research on Privacy Paradox in Social Networks Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and Data Mining

In order to obtain social benefits, social networks have started taking benefits from private information of network users. While having increased concerns about the risk of privacy disclosure, users still generally disclosed under high privacy concerns, which directly formed the privacy paradox. The expansion and generalization of privacy paradox indicate that the implementation of privacy protection in social networks is still in a dilemma. Studying and solving the problem of privacy paradox is conducive to ensure the healthy development of social network industry. Based on this, this study has designed a research system that analyzes the privacy paradox of social networks from three dimensions: cause, existence and form. After studying existing research of privacy paradox in social networks, evolutionary game theory is determined to be introduced into the procedure of cause analysis, while data mining is used as a data analysis method for empirical research. Within the whole research process, the evolutionary game model of privacy paradox in social networks is built up first, while the necessary conditions for the generation of privacy paradox is addressed, which is derived from the evolutionary stable strategy. Secondly, the questionnaire survey method is used to collect private data of active users of both Weibo and WeChat. Lastly, Apriori and CHAID algorithm are used to determine the relationship of user privacy concerns, privacy behavior, and other factors, which then confirms the existence of privacy paradox on two social networks and makes a comparison between their forms of privacy paradox in specific. This research systematically makes a useful an in-depth analysis to the privacy paradox in social networks and is meaningful for establishing a hierarchical protection system of users\u27 privacy for enterprises

Information-Theoretic Secure Outsourced Computation in Distributed Systems

Secure multi-party computation (secure MPC) has been established as the de facto paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. One of the earliest secure MPC primitives is the Shamir\u27s secret sharing (SSS) scheme. SSS has many advantages over other popular secure MPC primitives like garbled circuits (GC) -- it provides information-theoretic security guarantee, requires no complex long-integer operations, and often leads to more efficient protocols. Nonetheless, SSS receives less attention in the signal processing community because SSS requires a larger number of honest participants, making it prone to collusion attacks. In this dissertation, I propose an agent-based computing framework using SSS to protect privacy in distributed signal processing. There are three main contributions to this dissertation. First, the proposed computing framework is shown to be significantly more efficient than GC. Second, a novel game-theoretical framework is proposed to analyze different types of collusion attacks. Third, using the proposed game-theoretical framework, specific mechanism designs are developed to deter collusion attacks in a fully distributed manner. Specifically, for a collusion attack with known detectors, I analyze it as games between secret owners and show that the attack can be effectively deterred by an explicit retaliation mechanism. For a general attack without detectors, I expand the scope of the game to include the computing agents and provide deterrence through deceptive collusion requests. The correctness and privacy of the protocols are proved under a covert adversarial model. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of SSS-based protocols and the validity of our mechanism design

From Social Simulation to Integrative System Design

As the recent financial crisis showed, today there is a strong need to gain "ecological perspective" of all relevant interactions in socio-economic-techno-environmental systems. For this, we suggested to set-up a network of Centers for integrative systems design, which shall be able to run all potentially relevant scenarios, identify causality chains, explore feedback and cascading effects for a number of model variants, and determine the reliability of their implications (given the validity of the underlying models). They will be able to detect possible negative side effect of policy decisions, before they occur. The Centers belonging to this network of Integrative Systems Design Centers would be focused on a particular field, but they would be part of an attempt to eventually cover all relevant areas of society and economy and integrate them within a "Living Earth Simulator". The results of all research activities of such Centers would be turned into informative input for political Decision Arenas. For example, Crisis Observatories (for financial instabilities, shortages of resources, environmental change, conflict, spreading of diseases, etc.) would be connected with such Decision Arenas for the purpose of visualization, in order to make complex interdependencies understandable to scientists, decision-makers, and the general public.Comment: 34 pages, Visioneer White Paper, see http://www.visioneer.ethz.c

Mean-Field-Type Games in Engineering

A mean-field-type game is a game in which the instantaneous payoffs and/or the state dynamics functions involve not only the state and the action profile but also the joint distributions of state-action pairs. This article presents some engineering applications of mean-field-type games including road traffic networks, multi-level building evacuation, millimeter wave wireless communications, distributed power networks, virus spread over networks, virtual machine resource management in cloud networks, synchronization of oscillators, energy-efficient buildings, online meeting and mobile crowdsensing.Comment: 84 pages, 24 figures, 183 references. to appear in AIMS 201