Evans Medicine

Newsletter of the Evans Memorial Department of Clinical Research and Preventive Medicine at University Hospital

Evans Medicine

Newsletter of the Evans Memorial Department of Clinical Research and Preventive Medicine at University Hospital

Evans Medicine

Newsletter of the Evans Memorial Department of Clinical Research and Preventive Medicine at University Hospital

Evans Medicine

Newsletter of the Evans Memorial Department of Clinical Research and Preventive Medicine at University Hospital

Evans-Selberg potential on planar domains

We provide explicit formulas of Evans kernels, Evans-Selberg potentials and fundamental metrics on potential-theoretically parabolic planar domains

Gender Equality and Reproductive Decision Making

In Evans, both the U.K. High Court and Court of Appeal upheld Howard Johnston’s right to refuse Natallie Evans access to the stored embryos which represented her only hope of having a child which was genetically her own. In this note, I focus on claims of gender (in)equality in the resolution of Evans. My argument is that such claims are often made all too easily, without full consideration of the problems of advancing them in the context of procreative decision-making, where men and women are inevitably differently situated. I conclude that although equality arguments are not wholly without value in this context, they need be used with extreme care. And, with due caution, I set out an equality argument of my own which was not made in Evans

An assessment of Evans' unified field theory I

Evans developed a classical unified field theory of gravitation and electromagnetism on the background of a spacetime obeying a Riemann-Cartan geometry. This geometry can be characterized by an orthonormal coframe theta and a (metric compatible) Lorentz connection Gamma. These two potentials yield the field strengths torsion T and curvature R. Evans tried to infuse electromagnetic properties into this geometrical framework by putting the coframe theta to be proportional to four extended electromagnetic potentials A; these are assumed to encompass the conventional Maxwellian potential in a suitable limit. The viable Einstein-Cartan(-Sciama-Kibble) theory of gravity was adopted by Evans to describe the gravitational sector of his theory. Including also the results of an accompanying paper by Obukhov and the author, we show that Evans' ansatz for electromagnetism is untenable beyond repair both from a geometrical as well as from a physical point of view. As a consequence, his unified theory is obsolete.Comment: 39 pages of latex, modified because of referee report, mistakes and typos removed, partly reformulated, taken care of M.W.Evans' rebutta

Understanding Evans

This paper is largely exegetical/interpretive. My goal is to demonstrate that some criticisms that have been leveled against the program Gareth Evans constructs in The Varieties of Reference (Evans 1980, henceforth VR) misfire because they are based on misunderstandings of Evans’ position. First I will be discussing three criticisms raised by Tyler Burge (Burge, 2010). The first has to do with Evans’ arguments to the effect that a causal connection between a belief and an object is insufficient for that belief to be about that object. A key part of Evans’ argument is to carefully distinguish considerations relevant to the semantics of language from considerations relevant to the semantics (so to speak) of thought or belief (to make the subsequent discussion easier, I will henceforth use ‘thought’ as a blanket term for the relevant mental states, including belief). I will argue that Burge’s criticisms depend on largely not taking account of Evans’ distinctions. Second, Burge criticizes Evans’ account of ‘informational content’ taking it to be inconsistent. I will show that the inconsistency Burge finds depends entirely on a misreading of the doctrine. Finally, Burge takes Evans to task for a perceived over-intellectualization in a key aspect of his doctrine. Burge incorrectly reads Evans as requiring that the subject holding a belief be engaged in certain overly intellectual endeavors, when in fact Evans is only attributing these endeavors to theorists of such a subject. Next, I turn to two criticisms leveled by John Campbell (Campbell, 1999). I will argue that Campbell’s criticisms are based on misunderstandings – though they do hit at deeper elements of Evans’ doctrine. First, Campbell reads Evans’ account of demonstrative thought as requiring that the subject’s information link to an object allows her to directly locate that object in space. Campbell constructs a case in which one tomato (a) is, because of an angled mirror, incorrectly seen as being at a location that happens to be occupied by an identical tomato (b). Campbell claims that Evans’ doctrines require us to conclude that the subject cannot have a demonstrative thought about the seen tomato (a), though it seems intuitively that such a subject would be able to have a demonstrative thought about that tomato, despite its location is inaccurately seen. I show that Evans’ position in fact allows that the subject can have a demonstrative thought about the causal-source tomato in this case because his account does not require that the location of demonstratively identified objects be immediately accurately assessed. What is crucial is that the subject have the ability to accurately discover the location. Second, Campbell criticizes Evans’ notion of a fundamental level of thought. I show that this criticism hinges on view of the nature and role of the fundamental level of thought that mischaracterizes Evans’ treatment of the notion