Preventing Supply Chain Vulnerabilities in Java with a Fine-Grained Permission Manager

Integrating third-party packages accelerates modern software engineering, but introduces the risk of software supply chain vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities in applications' dependencies are being exploited worldwide. Often, these exploits leverage features that are present in a package, yet unneeded by an application. Unfortunately, the current generation of permission managers, such as SELinux, Docker containers, and the Java Security Manager, are too coarse-grained to usefully support engineers and operators in mitigating these vulnerabilities. Current approaches offer permissions only at the application's granularity, lumping legitimate operations made by safe packages with illegitimate operations made by exploited packages. This strategy does not reflect modern engineering practice. we need a permission manager capable of distinguishing between actions taken by different packages in an application's supply chain. In this paper, we describe Next-JSM, the first fine-grained ("supply chain aware") permission manager for Java applications. Next-JSM supports permission management at package-level granularity. Next-JSM faces three key challenges: operating on existing JVMs and without access to application or package source code, minimizing performance overhead in applications with many packages, and helping operators manage finer-grained permissions. We show that these challenges can be addressed through bytecode rewriting; appropriate data structures and algorithms; and an expressive permission notation plus automated tooling to establish default permission. In our evaluation, we report that Next-JSM mitigates 11 of the 12 package vulnerabilities we evaluated and incurs an average 2.72% overhead on the Dacapobench benchmark. Qualitatively, we argue that Next-JSM addresses the shortcomings of the (recently deprecated) Java Security Manager (JSM).Comment: 15 pages, 5 figures, 5 table

MUSTI: Dynamic Prevention of Invalid Object Initialization Attacks

Invalid object initialization vulnerabilities have been identified since the 1990’s by a research group at Princeton University. These vulnerabilities are critical since they can be used to totally compromise the security of a Java virtual machine.Recently, such a vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-3289 has been found again in the bytecode verifier of the JVM and affects more than 40 versions of the JVM. In this paper, we present a runtime solution called MUSTIto detect and prevent attacks leveraging this kind of critical vulnerabilities. We optimize MUSTI to have a runtime overhead below 0.5% and a memory overhead below 0.42%. Compared to state-of-the-art, MUSTI is completely automated and does not require to manually annotate the code

MUSTI: Dynamic Prevention of Invalid Object Initialization Attacks

Invalid object initialization vulnerabilities have been identified since the 1990’s by a research group at Princeton University. These vulnerabilities are critical since they can be used to totally compromise the security of a Java virtual machine.Recently, such a vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-3289 has been found again in the bytecode verifier of the JVM and affects more than 40 versions of the JVM. In this paper, we present a runtime solution called MUSTIto detect and prevent attacks leveraging this kind of critical vulnerabilities. We optimize MUSTI to have a runtime overhead below 0.5% and a memory overhead below 0.42%. Compared to state-of-the-art, MUSTI is completely automated and does not require to manually annotate the code