Efficiency in the Trust Game: an Experimental Study of Preplay Contracting

We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of a simple mechanism designed to increase cooperation and efficiency in the trust game. In the equilibrium of the standard trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would have kept all of the returns from investment. Our mechanism adds a preplay escrow stage, in which the allocator places an amount (possibly zero) into escrow, to be forfeited if he keeps the proceeds of investment for himself. In the experiment, we vary the amounts that can be put into escrow. Our baseline treatment has no escrow. In a second treatment, only low escrow choices are possible, so the equilibrium is unaffected. In our third treatment, there is an escrow amount high enough that, in equilibrium, investment and sharing of the proceeds will occur. Two additional treatments mirror our second and third, except that in these, the escrow amount is randomly chosen and imposed on the allocator. We find that the high escrow amount, when chosen, does lead to the predicted efficient result. Contrary to the equilibrium prediction, we also find substantial investment in both the baseline and “low-escrow” treatments, leading to markedly higher efficiency than predicted (albeit well below that when the high amount is chosen). Over time, however, cooperation and efficiency after low or zero escrow amounts decline. We find only weak evidence for “crowding-out”, which predicts that given a low or zero amount placed into escrow in non-baseline treatments, investment and efficiency would actually be lower than in the baseline. We also find that initially, investment is more likely after allocators place the maximum possible amount into escrow – as if this action by allocators is being (mistakenly) read by investors as a signal that allocators plan to share. All of these results are seen when escrow choices are imposed as well as when they are voluntary.experiment, trust game, incentives, signal, crowding out

Escrow: A large-scale web vulnerability assessment tool

The reliance on Web applications has increased rapidly over the years. At the same time, the quantity and impact of application security vulnerabilities have grown as well. Amongst these vulnerabilities, SQL Injection has been classified as the most common, dangerous and prevalent web application flaw. In this paper, we propose Escrow, a large-scale SQL Injection detection tool with an exploitation module that is light-weight, fast and platform-independent. Escrow uses a custom search implementation together with a static code analysis module to find potential target web applications. Additionally, it provides a simple to use graphical user interface (GUI) to navigate through a vulnerable remote database. Escrow is implementation-agnostic, i.e. It can perform analysis on any web application regardless of the server-side implementation (PHP, ASP, etc.). Using our tool, we discovered that it is indeed possible to identify and exploit at least 100 databases per 100 minutes, without prior knowledge of their underlying implementation. We observed that for each query sent, we can scan and detect dozens of vulnerable web applications in a short space of time, while providing a means for exploitation. Finally, we provide recommendations for developers to defend against SQL injection and emphasise the need for proactive assessment and defensive coding practices

Finding Safety in Numbers with Secure Allegation Escrows

For fear of retribution, the victim of a crime may be willing to report it only if other victims of the same perpetrator also step forward. Common examples include 1) identifying oneself as the victim of sexual harassment, especially by a person in a position of authority or 2) accusing an influential politician, an authoritarian government, or ones own employer of corruption. To handle such situations, legal literature has proposed the concept of an allegation escrow: a neutral third-party that collects allegations anonymously, matches them against each other, and de-anonymizes allegers only after de-anonymity thresholds (in terms of number of co-allegers), pre-specified by the allegers, are reached. An allegation escrow can be realized as a single trusted third party; however, this party must be trusted to keep the identity of the alleger and content of the allegation private. To address this problem, this paper introduces Secure Allegation Escrows (SAE, pronounced "say"). A SAE is a group of parties with independent interests and motives, acting jointly as an escrow for collecting allegations from individuals, matching the allegations, and de-anonymizing the allegations when designated thresholds are reached. By design, SAEs provide a very strong property: No less than a majority of parties constituting a SAE can de-anonymize or disclose the content of an allegation without a sufficient number of matching allegations (even in collusion with any number of other allegers). Once a sufficient number of matching allegations exist, the join escrow discloses the allegation with the allegers' identities. We describe how SAEs can be constructed using a novel authentication protocol and a novel allegation matching and bucketing algorithm, provide formal proofs of the security of our constructions, and evaluate a prototype implementation, demonstrating feasibility in practice.Comment: To appear in NDSS 2020. New version includes improvements to writing and proof. The protocol is unchange

A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification

The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and assets. There are important cases, however, where negotiations of these agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data, because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approach can be applied, however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figure

Quantum Bit Escrow

Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive - {\em quantum bit escrow}. In this primitive Alice commits to a bit $b$ to Bob. The commitment is {\em binding} in the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal the bit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having a good probability of being detected cheating. The commitment is {\em sealing} in the sense that if Bob learns information about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to prove he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good probability. Rigorously proving the correctness of quantum cryptographic protocols has proved to be a difficult task. We develop techniques to prove quantitative statements about the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow protocol. A related primitive we construct is a quantum biased coin flipping protocol where no player can control the game, i.e., even an all-powerful cheating player must lose with some constant probability, which stands in sharp contrast to the classical world where such protocols are impossible.Comment: 10 pages. To appear in STOC 2000 (Proceedings of the Thirty Second Annual ACM Symposium on Theory Of Computing.

ASPECTS REGARDING ESCROW SERVICES IN ROMANIA, AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF E-COMMERCE ACTIVITY

E-commerce has appeared and developed along with the Internet. Online buyers and sellers can become fraud victims. Escrow Services reduce the number of fraud cases and guarantees online transactions. In Romania, those services are only just beginning to act, as the cyber fraud phenomenon is present in our country in the same rates as worldwide.escrow, e-commerce, cyber - fraud, escrow accounts, legislation, online auctions

Policy and Practice Brief: Supporting the Employment Outcomes of SSI and SSDI Beneficiaries in Section 8 or Subsidized Housing; A Model of Policy Supporting Effective Employment Practice

This brief provides an overview of the Family Self-Sufficiency Program administered by Housing and Urban Development. Comparisons and contrasts between Family Self- Sufficiency, and the Ticket to Work and Benefits Planning are drawn as is a template for combining these important employment resources to affect successful employment outcomes