Error judicial

Se analiza el error judicial desde la perspectiva de la justicia internacional, mediante el método contrastante de las resoluciones de organismos internacionales e instrumentos internacionales en el sistema universal de los derechos humanos y en el ámbito regional de la Unión Europea y del sistema interamericano de los derechos humanos. Asimismo, se estudian los elementos del error judicial como el sujeto pasivo del derecho, la sentencia firme y el error. Finalmente se estudia la indemnización por error judicial.Judicial error is analyzed from the perspective of international justice through the contrasting method of the resolutions of international organizations and international instruments in the universal system of human rights and in the regional scope of the European Union and the inter-American system of rights humans. It also examines the elements of judicial error as the subject of the law, the final judgment and error. Finally, compensation is assessed for judicial erro

Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence

The standard economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type-II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, loss-aversion, or differential sensitivity to procedural fairness, type-I errors can have a larger effect on deterrence than type-II errors. We test these predictions with an experiment where participants make a decision on whether to steal from other individuals, being subject to different probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that both types of judicial errors have a large and significant impact on deterrence, but these effects are not symmetric. An increase in the probability of type-I errors has a larger negative impact on deterrence than an equivalent increase in the probability of type-II errors. This asymmetry is largely explained by risk aversion and, to a lesser extent, type-I error aversion.Judicial errors, criminal procedure, procedural fairness, experimental economics, law and economics, crime, deterrence

La responsabilidad del estado por error judicial en la administración de justicia: un estudio sobre la justificación y admisión del error judicial

Artículo de investigaciónEl presupuesto de nuestra investigación, así como su connotación y guía, es poder implementar el sistema judicial errante, en acogida a la necesidad de resarcir perjuicios a aquellos ciudadanos en los cual se afecta con el error; donde los fundamentos de la responsabilidad en cuanto a su estructura, equipara la explicación exacta de los requerimientos para poder hablar de error judicial. Concepto que debe ser explicado a través de la realidad actual de nuestro sistema, con la búsqueda de ejemplos, perfectamente relacionados a los conceptos básicos de la responsabilidad y el error, nos permitirá, dar una respuesta a la justificación del error judicial y la admisión del mismo en un sistema judicial, no como un fundamento absolutista, por el contrario como una evolución temática y necesaria del sistema judicial, en pro de la satisfacción y preserva de los derechos de los ciudadanos.PregradoAbogad

Criminal Law – Miscarriages of justice: putting errors right

Richard Alexander (Rowe & Maw; IALS Research officer) looks at miscarriages of justice In English criminal law and the remedies for righting judicial error through new evidence and the work of the criminal cases review commission. Published in Amicus Curiae - Journal of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and its Society for Advanced Legal Studies. The Journal is produced by the Society for Advanced Legal Studies at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London

A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error

The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members only commit one type of error. If the probability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are better than those of individual members. In binary decision situations, however, two types of error may occur, the probabilities of which are independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem. Under this generalization, situations exists in which the probability of error is greater than 0.5 but the jury decision generates a higher expected welfare than an individual decision. Conversely, even if the probability of error is lower than 0.5 it is possible that individual decisions are superior.Group decisions, judicial, imperfect decision-making

Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game With Impartial Justice

In many European countries, a majority of employees are hired under very protective labor contracts that restrict the ability of the employer to dismiss them. In particular, employees can take to courts the firm's layoff motive. This paper analyses the interaction between firms, employees and the labor judicial system specific to South European countries. If judges' error margin increases when the judicial system is subject to congestion, the game presents multiple equilibria which differ in the frequency of workers abusively fired for personal motives. Policy implications can be inferred.EPL; Labor judges; Firing costs; Layoff motive; Multiple equilibria

Legal versus Normative Incentives under Judicial Error

We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria. In particular, there are high stigma-high evidentiary standard regimes versus low stigma-low standard ones. We argue that this may explain some of the differences between common law and civil law regarding the notions of fault or negligence. Our analysis also provides an explanation for trends currently observed in civil-law systems, in particular the weakening of evidentiary requirements in tort cases.Social interactions, socio-legal multiplier, stigma, judicial error, evidentiary standard

Análisis crítico del error judicial en Chile

78 p.trabajo aborda un análisis crítico de la institución del error judicial En Chile, estableciendo su origen analizando, su regulación constitucional y su Desarrollo jurisprudencial que esta institución ha tenido a lo largo de su vigencia. Asimismo, se hace mención a la forma que el derecho comparado desarrolla el tema, y estableciendo las situaciones que pueden servir para la concepción de Una nueva manera de abordar el tema en nuestro derecho. Finalmente los objetivos centrales de este trabajo son, analizar la institución , Establecer sus problemas y establecer puntos que puedan orientar su Replanteamiento jurídico nacional

Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof

We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher but somewhat imprecise standard may be interpreted as reflecting a tradeoff between providing incentives and avoiding judicial error per se. In our model, the optimal judicial system has rules resembling those in the common law when providing incentives is paramount. When greater weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civilian features.Standard of proof, burden of proof, common law, civil law, evidentiary rules

The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities

The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem.Group decisions, judicial, imperfect decision-making,