Equitable voting rules

May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.Comment: 43 pages, 5 figure

Equitable Voting Rules

A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem (1952), providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions

Most Equitable Voting Rules

In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR impossibility -- there is no voting rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability (always choosing one winner) -- holds even in the simple setting of two alternatives and two agents. How to design voting rules that optimally satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability remains an open question. We address the optimal design question for a wide range of preferences and decisions that include ranked lists and committees. Our conceptual contribution is a novel and strong notion of most equitable refinements that optimally preserves anonymity and neutrality for any irresolute rule that satisfies the two axioms. Our technical contributions are twofold. First, we characterize the conditions for the ANR impossibility to hold under general settings, especially when the number of agents is large. Second, we propose the most-favorable-permutation (MFP) tie-breaking to compute a most equitable refinement and design a polynomial-time algorithm to compute MFP when agents' preferences are full rankings

Equitable Voting Rules

A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem (1952), providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions

Voting Rules that are Unbiased but not Transitive-Symmetric

We explore the relation between two natural symmetry properties of voting rules. The first is transitive-symmetry – the property of invariance to a transitive permutation group – while the second is the "unbiased" property of every voter having the same influence for all i.i.d. probability measures. We show that these properties are distinct by two constructions – one probabilistic, one explicit – of rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric

Symmetric reduced form voting

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex-ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules

Essays on Social Learning and Social Choice

This dissertation contains three essays, two which contribute to the study of social learning (Chapters 1 and 2) and one which contributes to the study of social choice (Chapter 3). In Chapter 1, I introduce a fully rational model of social learning on networks with endogenous action timing. I show that the structure of the network can play an important role in the aggregation of information. When the social network contains high-degree vertices, agents can be arbitrarily likely to make good choices. In contrast, when the social network is linear, there is a bound on how likely agents are to make good choices which holds regardless of how patient they are. The main contribution of this chapter is the identification of a novel mechanism through which strategic behavior can substantially impede the flow of information through a social network. In Chapter 2, co-authored with Vadim Martynov and Omer Tamuz, we study the asymptotic rate at which the probability of taking the correct action converges to 1 in the classical sequential learning model with unbounded signals. We provide a characterization of the asymptotic law of motion of the public belief, and we use this characterization to show that convergence occurs more slowly than when agents directly observe private signals, and that the expected time until the last incorrect action can be finite or infinite. In Chapter 3, co-authored with Laurent Bartholdi, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, and Leeat Yariv, we introduce equitability as a less stringent alternative to symmetry for modeling egalitarianism in voting rules. We then use techniques from group theory to show that equitable voting rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but they cannot be smaller than the square root of the population size.</p