Equality Revisited

In legal, political, and philosophical discourse, and indeed in everyday life, equality often plays the role of a normatively significant prescriptive principle, a principle that provides reasons for action. Professor Peters, however, joins Peter Westen and others who argue that the traditional statement of prescriptive equality-equals are entitled to equal treatment--is normatively empty because it is a tautology. Like Professor Westen, Professor Peters notes that this traditional principle translates into a statement of simple redundancy: people entitled to equal treatment are entitled to equal treatment. Unlike Professor Westen, however, Professor Peters discerns a nontautological principle of equality, which claims that one person\u27s treatment in a particular way is a reason in itself for treating another, identically situated person in that way. Nevertheless, Professor Peters argues that this principle, although nontautological, has no more normative content than the traditional expression; either it provides no independent reasons for action, or it is self-contradictory and incoherent. This Article examines the nontautological principle of equality, analyzes its supposed application in a variety of circumstances, and assesses some consequences of the conclusion that prescriptive equality has no normative content for Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence and John Rawls\u27s “egalitarian” political philosophy

Equality Revisited

In legal, political, and philosophical discourse, and indeed in everyday life, equality often plays the role of a normatively significant prescriptive principle, a principle that provides reasons for action. Professor Peters, however, joins Peter Westen and others who argue that the traditional statement of prescriptive equality-equals are entitled to equal treatment--is normatively empty because it is a tautology. Like Professor Westen, Professor Peters notes that this traditional principle translates into a statement of simple redundancy: people entitled to equal treatment are entitled to equal treatment. Unlike Professor Westen, however, Professor Peters discerns a nontautological principle of equality, which claims that one person\u27s treatment in a particular way is a reason in itself for treating another, identically situated person in that way. Nevertheless, Professor Peters argues that this principle, although nontautological, has no more normative content than the traditional expression; either it provides no independent reasons for action, or it is self-contradictory and incoherent. This Article examines the nontautological principle of equality, analyzes its supposed application in a variety of circumstances, and assesses some consequences of the conclusion that prescriptive equality has no normative content for Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence and John Rawls\u27s “egalitarian” political philosophy

Insurance and Equality Revisited

Theorists of the welfare state increasingly recognize that social insurance programs are not well-justified by distributive egalitarianism—meaning concern for equality considered as a pattern in the distribution of some good. However, recent work by several relational egalitarian theorists suggests that these programs may be justified on relational egalitarian grounds. Relational egalitarians hold that the proper object of egalitarian concern is the way that citizens relate to one another. In this paper, I review the problems facing a distributive egalitarian justification for social insurance before considering and rejecting three relational egalitarian justifications. I close by offering a justification for these programs grounded in efficiency, not equality

The Logic of Egalitarian Norms

The Logic of Egalitarian Norms was prompted by a recent article by Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1210 (1997), arguing that the concept of equality is self-contradictory and sometimes leads to absurd results, such as the multiplication of wrongs or wasteful leveling down of social benefits. Peters\u27 view is shared by other recent skeptical commentators who question the value of egalitarian norms or who worry that such norms are often misleading. The article defends egalitarian logic against such skepticism in a wide variety of legal domains

Describing equality

An earlier version of this article was presented to the Historical, International, Normative Theory (HINT) group at the University of Glasgow. I would like to thank the participants on that occasion, and also Richard Arneson, Jonathan Quong, Hillel Steiner, Stephen de Wijze and an anonymous referee for their helpful written comments. Research for the article was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council

Slouching Towards Equality

Drawing on his work in two previous articles, Christopher Peters contends that uncertainty about substantive moral norms cannot justify a presumption of equal treatment. Arguments for equal treatment in the face of uncertainty are types of consequentialist claims; they are not claims of what Peters calls prescriptive equality, that is, for treating likes alike merely because they are alike. Peters contends that the consequentialist case for equal treatment as a response to uncertainty fails in two respects. First, it fails to demonstrate that equal treatment is likely to be a more satisfactory response to moral uncertainty than unequal treatment. Second, it is logically incoherent because it simultaneously relies upon and denies the possibility of confidence in moral judgment. Peters concludes that no valid case can be made for defaulting to equal treatment in the face of moral uncertainty

Two Results about Quantum Messages

We show two results about the relationship between quantum and classical messages. Our first contribution is to show how to replace a quantum message in a one-way communication protocol by a deterministic message, establishing that for all partial Boolean functions $f:\{0,1\}^n\times\{0,1\}^m\to\{0,1\}$ we have $D^{A\to B}(f)\leq O(Q^{A\to B,*}(f)\cdot m)$. This bound was previously known for total functions, while for partial functions this improves on results by Aaronson, in which either a log-factor on the right hand is present, or the left hand side is $R^{A\to B}(f)$, and in which also no entanglement is allowed. In our second contribution we investigate the power of quantum proofs over classical proofs. We give the first example of a scenario, where quantum proofs lead to exponential savings in computing a Boolean function. The previously only known separation between the power of quantum and classical proofs is in a setting where the input is also quantum. We exhibit a partial Boolean function $f$, such that there is a one-way quantum communication protocol receiving a quantum proof (i.e., a protocol of type QMA) that has cost $O(\log n)$ for $f$, whereas every one-way quantum protocol for $f$ receiving a classical proof (protocol of type QCMA) requires communication $\Omega(\sqrt n/\log n)$

JEqualityGen: Generating Equality and Hashing Methods

Manually implementing equals (for object comparisons) and hashCode (for object hashing) methods in large software projects is tedious and error-prone. This is due to many special cases, such as field shadowing, comparison between different types, or cyclic object graphs. Here, we present JEqualityGen, a source code generator that automatically derives implementations of these methods. JEqualityGen proceeds in two states: it first uses source code reflection in MetaAspectJ to generate aspects that contain the method implementations, before it uses weaving on the bytecode level to insert these into the target application. JEqualityGen generates not only correct, but efficient source code that on a typical large-scale Java application exhibits a performance improvement of more than two orders of magnitude in the equality operations generated, compared to an existing system based on runtime reflection. JEqualityGen achieves this by generating runtime profiling code that collects data. This enables it to generate optimised method implementations in a second round