2 research outputs found
Energy Contract Settlements through Automated Negotiation in Residential Cooperatives
This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation strategy for
settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative
(REC) considering heterogeneous prosumer preferences. The heterogeneity arises
from prosumers' evaluation of energy contracts through multiple societal and
environmental criteria and the prosumers' private preferences over those
criteria. The prosumers engage in bilateral negotiations with peers to mutually
agree on periodical energy contracts/loans that consist of an energy volume to
be exchanged at that period and the return time of the exchanged energy. The
prosumers keep an ordered preference profile of possible energy contracts by
evaluating the contracts from their own valuations on the entailed criteria,
and iteratively offer the peers contracts until an agreement is formed. A
prosumer embeds the valuations into a utility function that further considers
uncertainties imposed by demand and generation profiles. Empirical evaluation
on real demand, generation and storage profiles illustrates that the proposed
negotiation based strategy is able to increase the system efficiency (measured
by utilitarian social welfare) and fairness (measured by Nash social welfare)
over a baseline strategy and an individual flexibility control strategy. We
thus elicit system benefits from P2P flexibility exchange already with few
agents and without central coordination, providing a simple yet flexible and
effective paradigm that may complement existing markets.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, accepted in IEEE SGComm 201
Automated peer-to-peer negotiation for energy contract settlements in residential cooperatives
This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer negotiation
strategy for settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential
Energy Cooperative considering heterogeneity prosumer preferences. The
heterogeneity arises from prosumers' evaluation of energy contracts
through multiple societal and environmental criteria and the prosumers'
private preferences over those criteria. The prosumers engage in
bilateral negotiations with peers to mutually agree on periodical energy
contracts/loans consisting of the energy volume to be exchanged at that
period and the return time of the exchanged energy. The negotiating
prosumers navigate through a common negotiation domain consisting of
potential energy contracts and evaluate those contracts from their
valuations on the entailed criteria against a utility function that is
robust against generation and demand uncertainty. From the repeated
interactions, a prosumer gradually learns about the compatibility of its
peers in reaching energy contracts that are closer to Nash solutions.
Empirical evaluation on real demand, generation and storage profiles β
in multiple system scales β illustrates that the proposed negotiation
based strategy can increase the system efficiency (measured by
utilitarian social welfare) and fairness (measured by Nash social
welfare) over a baseline strategy and an individual flexibility control
strategy representing the status quo strategy. We thus elicit system
benefits from peer-to-peer flexibility exchange already without any
central coordination and market operator, providing a simple yet
flexible and effective paradigm that complements existing markets