3 research outputs found
Towards Strengthening Deep Learning-based Side Channel Attacks with Mixup
In recent years, various deep learning techniques have been exploited in side
channel attacks, with the anticipation of obtaining more appreciable attack
results. Most of them concentrate on improving network architectures or putting
forward novel algorithms, assuming that there are adequate profiling traces
available to train an appropriate neural network. However, in practical
scenarios, profiling traces are probably insufficient, which makes the network
learn deficiently and compromises attack performance.
In this paper, we investigate a kind of data augmentation technique, called
mixup, and first propose to exploit it in deep-learning based side channel
attacks, for the purpose of expanding the profiling set and facilitating the
chances of mounting a successful attack. We perform Correlation Power Analysis
for generated traces and original traces, and discover that there exists
consistency between them regarding leakage information. Our experiments show
that mixup is truly capable of enhancing attack performance especially for
insufficient profiling traces. Specifically, when the size of the training set
is decreased to 30% of the original set, mixup can significantly reduce
acquired attacking traces. We test three mixup parameter values and conclude
that generally all of them can bring about improvements. Besides, we compare
three leakage models and unexpectedly find that least significant bit model,
which is less frequently used in previous works, actually surpasses prevalent
identity model and hamming weight model in terms of attack results
Deep Learning Method for Power Side-Channel Analysis on Chip Leakages
Power side channel analysis signal analysis is automated using deep learning. Signal processing and cryptanalytic techniques are necessary components of power side channel analysis. Chip leakages can be found using a classification approach called deep learning. In addition to this, we do this so that the deep learning network can automatically tackle signal processing difficulties such as re-alignment and noise reduction. We were able to break minimally protected Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), as well as masking-countermeasure AES and protected elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). These results demonstrate that the attacker knowledge required for side channel analysis, which had previously placed a significant emphasis on human abilities, is decreasing. This research will appeal to individuals with a technical background who have an interest in deep learning, side channel analysis, and security