8 research outputs found

    Empirical Coordination with Channel Feedback and Strictly Causal or Causal Encoding

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    In multi-terminal networks, feedback increases the capacity region and helps communication devices to coordinate. In this article, we deepen the relationship between coordination and feedback by considering a point-to-point scenario with an information source and a noisy channel. Empirical coordination is achievable if the encoder and the decoder can implement sequences of symbols that are jointly typical for a target probability distribution. We investigate the impact of feedback when the encoder has strictly causal or causal observation of the source symbols. For both cases, we characterize the optimal information constraints and we show that feedback improves coordination possibilities. Surprisingly, feedback also reduces the number of auxiliary random variables and simplifies the information constraints. For empirical coordination with strictly causal encoding and feedback, the information constraint does not involve auxiliary random variable anymore.Comment: 5 pages, 6 figures, presented at IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) 201

    Information Design for Strategic Coordination of Autonomous Devices with Non-Aligned Utilities

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    In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network under investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a strategy, knowing in advance the strategy of the encoder. We characterize the encoding and decoding functions that form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize their expected utilities. This problem is closely related to the literature on "Information Design" in Game Theory. We also characterize the set of posterior distributions that are compatible with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the decoder. Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.Comment: IEEE Proc. of the Fifty-fourth Annual Allerton Conference Allerton House, UIUC, Illinois, USA September 27 - 30, 201

    Strong Coordination over Multi-hop Line Networks

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    We analyze the problem of strong coordination over a multi-hop line network in which the node initiating the coordination is a terminal network node. We assume that each node has access to a certain amount of randomness that is local to the node, and that the nodes share some common randomness, which are used together with explicit hop-by-hop communication to achieve strong coordination. We derive the trade-offs among the required rates of communication on the network links, the rates of local randomness available to network nodes, and the rate of common randomness to realize strong coordination. We present an achievable coding scheme built using multiple layers of channel resolvability codes, and establish several settings in which this scheme is proven to offer the best possible trade-offs.Comment: 35 pages, 9 Figures, 4 Tables. A part of this work were published in the 2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, and a part was accepted for publication in the 50th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and System

    State Leakage and Coordination of Actions: Core of the Receiver's Knowledge

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    We revisit the problems of state masking and state amplification through the lens of empirical coordination by considering a state-dependent channel in which the encoder has causal and strictly causal state knowledge. We show that the problem of empirical coordination provides a natural framework in which to jointly study the problems of reliable communication, state masking, and state amplification. We characterize the regions of rate-equivocation-coordination trade-offs for several channel models with causal and strictly causal state knowledge. We introduce the notion of `core of the receiver's knowledge' to capture what the decoder can infer about all the signals involved in the model. We exploit this result to solve a channel state estimation zero-sum game in which the encoder prevents the decoder to estimate the channel state accurately.Comment: preliminary draf

    Joint Empirical Coordination of Source and Channel

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    In a decentralized and self-configuring network, the communication devices are considered as autonomous decision-makers that sense their environment and that implement optimal transmission schemes. It is essential that these autonomous devices cooperate and coordinate their actions, to ensure the reliability of the transmissions and the stability of the network. We study a point-to-point scenario in which the encoder and the decoder implement decentralized policies that are coordinated. The coordination is measured in terms of empirical frequency of symbols of source and channel. The encoder and the decoder perform a coding scheme such that the empirical distribution of the symbols is close to a target joint probability distribution. We characterize the set of achievable target probability distributions for a point-to-point source-channel model, in which the encoder is non-causal and the decoder is strictly causal i.e., it returns an action based on the observation of the past channel outputs. The objectives of the encoder and of the decoder, are captured by some utility function, evaluated with respect to the set of achievable target probability distributions. In this article, we investigate the maximization problem of a utility function that is common to both encoder and decoder. We show that the compression and the transmission of information are particular cases of the empirical coordination.Comment: accepted to IEEE Trans. on I
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