Tacit Representations and Artificial Intelligence: Hidden Lessons from an Embodied Perspective on Cognition

In this paper, I explore how an embodied perspective on cognition might inform research on artificial intelligence. Many embodied cognition theorists object to the central role that representations play on the traditional view of cognition. Based on these objections, it may seem that the lesson from embodied cognition is that AI should abandon representation as a central component of intelligence. However, I argue that the lesson from embodied cognition is actually that AI research should shift its focus from how to utilize explicit representations to how to create and use tacit representations. To develop this suggestion, I provide an overview of the commitments of the classical view and distinguish three critiques of the role that representations play in that view. I provide further exploration and defense of Daniel Dennett’s distinction between explicit and tacit representations. I argue that we should understand the embodied cognition approach using a framework that includes tacit representations. Given this perspective, I will explore some AI research areas that may be recommended by an embodied perspective on cognition

On the Role of AI in the Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Cognitive Sciences

This paper supports the view that the ongoing shift from orthodox to embodied-embedded cognitive science has been significantly influenced by the experimental results generated by AI research. Recently, there has also been a noticeable shift toward enactivism, a paradigm which radicalizes the embodied-embedded approach by placing autonomous agency and lived subjectivity at the heart of cognitive science. Some first steps toward a clarification of the relationship of AI to this further shift are outlined. It is concluded that the success of enactivism in establishing itself as a mainstream cognitive science research program will depend less on progress made in AI research and more on the development of a phenomenological pragmatics

Building machines that learn and think about morality

Lake et al. propose three criteria which, they argue, will bring artificial intelligence (AI) systems closer to human cognitive abilities. In this paper, we explore the application of these criteria to a particular domain of human cognition: our capacity for moral reasoning. In doing so, we explore a set of considerations relevant to the development of AI moral decision-making. Our main focus is on the relation between dual-process accounts of moral reasoning and model-free/model-based forms of machine learning. We also discuss how work in embodied and situated cognition could provide a valu- able perspective on future research

Integrative Biological Simulation, Neuropsychology, and AI Safety

We describe a biologically-inspired research agenda with parallel tracks aimed at AI and AI safety. The bottom-up component consists of building a sequence of biophysically realistic simulations of simple organisms such as the nematode $Caenorhabditis$ $elegans$, the fruit fly $Drosophila$ $melanogaster$, and the zebrafish $Danio$ $rerio$ to serve as platforms for research into AI algorithms and system architectures. The top-down component consists of an approach to value alignment that grounds AI goal structures in neuropsychology, broadly considered. Our belief is that parallel pursuit of these tracks will inform the development of value-aligned AI systems that have been inspired by embodied organisms with sensorimotor integration. An important set of side benefits is that the research trajectories we describe here are grounded in long-standing intellectual traditions within existing research communities and funding structures. In addition, these research programs overlap with significant contemporary themes in the biological and psychological sciences such as data/model integration and reproducibility.Comment: 5 page

Scalable Co-Optimization of Morphology and Control in Embodied Machines

Evolution sculpts both the body plans and nervous systems of agents together over time. In contrast, in AI and robotics, a robot's body plan is usually designed by hand, and control policies are then optimized for that fixed design. The task of simultaneously co-optimizing the morphology and controller of an embodied robot has remained a challenge. In psychology, the theory of embodied cognition posits that behavior arises from a close coupling between body plan and sensorimotor control, which suggests why co-optimizing these two subsystems is so difficult: most evolutionary changes to morphology tend to adversely impact sensorimotor control, leading to an overall decrease in behavioral performance. Here, we further examine this hypothesis and demonstrate a technique for "morphological innovation protection", which temporarily reduces selection pressure on recently morphologically-changed individuals, thus enabling evolution some time to "readapt" to the new morphology with subsequent control policy mutations. We show the potential for this method to avoid local optima and converge to similar highly fit morphologies across widely varying initial conditions, while sustaining fitness improvements further into optimization. While this technique is admittedly only the first of many steps that must be taken to achieve scalable optimization of embodied machines, we hope that theoretical insight into the cause of evolutionary stagnation in current methods will help to enable the automation of robot design and behavioral training -- while simultaneously providing a testbed to investigate the theory of embodied cognition