105 research outputs found
Embedding Non-Ground Logic Programs into Autoepistemic Logic for Knowledge Base Combination
In the context of the Semantic Web, several approaches to the combination of
ontologies, given in terms of theories of classical first-order logic and rule
bases, have been proposed. They either cast rules into classical logic or limit
the interaction between rules and ontologies. Autoepistemic logic (AEL) is an
attractive formalism which allows to overcome these limitations, by serving as
a uniform host language to embed ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs
into it. For the latter, so far only the propositional setting has been
considered. In this paper, we present three embeddings of normal and three
embeddings of disjunctive non-ground logic programs under the stable model
semantics into first-order AEL. While the embeddings all correspond with
respect to objective ground atoms, differences arise when considering
non-atomic formulas and combinations with first-order theories. We compare the
embeddings with respect to stable expansions and autoepistemic consequences,
considering the embeddings by themselves, as well as combinations with
classical theories. Our results reveal differences and correspondences of the
embeddings and provide useful guidance in the choice of a particular embedding
for knowledge combination.Comment: 52 pages, submitte
Reasoning about Minimal Belief and Negation as Failure
We investigate the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of
MBNF, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure introduced by
Lifschitz, which can be considered as a unifying framework for several
nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic,
circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming. We characterize the
complexity and provide algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF. In
particular, we show that entailment in propositional MBNF lies at the third
level of the polynomial hierarchy, hence it is harder than reasoning in all the
above mentioned propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We also
prove the exact correspondence between negation as failure in MBNF and negative
introspection in Moore's autoepistemic logic
The Gödel and the Splitting Translations
When the new research area of logic programming and non-monotonic reasoning emerged at the end of the 1980s, it focused notably on the study of mathematical relations between different non-monotonic formalisms, especially between the semantics of stable models and various non-monotonic modal logics. Given the many and varied embeddings of stable models into systems of modal logic, the modal interpretation of logic programming connectives and rules became the dominant view until well into the new century. Recently, modal interpretations are once again receiving attention in the context of hybrid theories that combine reasoning with non-monotonic rules and ontologies or external knowledge bases. In this talk I explain how familiar embeddings of stable models into modal logics can be seen as special cases of two translations that are very well-known in non-classical logic. They are, first, the translation used by Godel in 1933 to em- ¨ bed Heyting’s intuitionistic logic H into a modal provability logic equivalent to Lewis’s S4; second, the splitting translation, known since the mid-1970s, that allows one to embed extensions of S4 into extensions of the non-reflexive logic, K4. By composing the two translations one can obtain (Goldblatt, 1978) an adequate provability interpretation of H within the Goedel-Loeb logic GL, the system shown by Solovay (1976) to capture precisely the provability predicate of Peano Arithmetic. These two translations and their composition not only apply to monotonic logics extending H and S4, they also apply in several relevant cases to non-monotonic logics built upon such extensions, including equilibrium logic, non-monotonic S4F and autoepistemic logic. The embeddings obtained are not merely faithful and modular, they are based on fully recursive translations applicable to arbitrary logical formulas. Besides providing a uniform picture of some older results in LPNMR, the translations yield a perspective from which some new logics of belief emerge in a natural wa
On embedding default logic into Moore's autoepistemic logic
AbstractRecently Gottlob proved [2] that there does not exist a faithful modular translation of default logic into autoepistemic logic, and presented a non-modular translation. Gottlob's translation, however, is indirect (it uses “nonmonotonic logic N” as an intermediate point), quite complex and exploits sophisticated encoding of proof theory in autoepistemic formulas. We provide a simpler and more intuitive (non-modular) direct translation. In addition, our argument is purely model-theoretic
Super Logic Programs
The Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Belief (AELB) is a powerful
nonmonotic formalism introduced by Teodor Przymusinski in 1994. In this paper,
we specialize it to a class of theories called `super logic programs'. We argue
that these programs form a natural generalization of standard logic programs.
In particular, they allow disjunctions and default negation of arbibrary
positive objective formulas.
Our main results are two new and powerful characterizations of the static
semant ics of these programs, one syntactic, and one model-theoretic. The
syntactic fixed point characterization is much simpler than the fixed point
construction of the static semantics for arbitrary AELB theories. The
model-theoretic characterization via Kripke models allows one to construct
finite representations of the inherently infinite static expansions.
Both characterizations can be used as the basis of algorithms for query
answering under the static semantics. We describe a query-answering interpreter
for super programs which we developed based on the model-theoretic
characterization and which is available on the web.Comment: 47 pages, revised version of the paper submitted 10/200
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