27 research outputs found
Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical
secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics
to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and
circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the
current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system,
respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the
instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy
amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information
leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security
Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange
system is based on the Fluctuation-Dissipation-Theorem of classical statistical
physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to
the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak,
which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that the
unconditional (information theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the
industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the
information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic
(cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or
capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively
eliminate the leak.Comment: Accepted for publication in the journal: Informatio
Transient Attacks against the VMG-KLJN Secure Key Exchanger
The security vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz, and Gingl (VMG)
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key exchanger, as presented in the
publication "Nature, Science Report 5 (2015) 13653," has been exposed to
transient attacks. Recently an effective defense protocol was introduced (Appl.
Phys. Lett. 122 (2023) 143503) to counteract mean-square voltage-based (or
mean-square current-based) transient attacks targeted at the ideal KLJN
framework.
In the present study, this same mitigation methodology has been employed to
fortify the security of the VMG-KLJN key exchanger. It is worth noting that the
protective measures need to be separately implemented for the HL and LH
scenarios. This conceptual framework is corroborated through computer
simulations, demonstrating that the application of this defensive technique
substantially mitigates information leakage to a point of insignificance