The Continuing Quest for Missile Defense: When Lofty Goals Confront Reality

For almost three quarters of a century, the United States has spent billions of dollars and countless person-hours in the pursuit of a national missile defense system that would protect the country from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) carrying nuclear warheads. The system currently in place consists of 44 long-range antiballistic missiles stationed in Alaska and California to protect the United States from a possible nuclear weapon carrying ICBM attack from North Korea. After all this effort, this system is still imperfect, being successful only 10 out of 18 tests. This book will provide an historical description of past efforts in national missile defenses to understand the technical difficulties involved. It will also explain how national security concerns, the evolving international environment, and the complexities of US politics have all affected the story. The book will also describe the current systems in place to protect allies and troops in the field from the threat of shorter range missiles. Finally, the book will describe the current US vision for the future of missile defenses and provide some suggestions for alternative paths.https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books/1142/thumbnail.jp

Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space

Explores what countermeasures China and Russia are likely to take if the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, and what the broader implications for international security will be

Ballistic missile defence: how soon, how significant, and what should Australia's policy be?

Summary: The issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) was a controversial one when US President Reagan first advocated a strategic-level system in the early 1980s. It remains so today. What’s Australia’s interest? We live a long way away from most current ballistic missile arsenals. But the ADF frequently deploys within range of ballistic missile systems, especially in Northeast Asia or the Middle East, and those systems might proliferate more widely in the future. The paper considers the two questions we need to decide. The first is the priority for enhancing the ADF’s own BMD capabilities. The second is whether it makes sense for us to participate in a cooperative arrangement with the US or other partners

Debating Space Security: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

The U.S. position in the debate on space security has been that (1) space-based systems could be developed and used to obtain decisive warghting superiority over an adversary, and (2) these space-based systems, because they might give such an inordinate advantage over any adversary, will be attacked. The Russians and Chinese, in contrast, claim to be threatened by U.S. aspirations in space but deny that they pose a serious threat to U.S. space-based systems. They view the development of advanced military space systems by the United States as evidence of a growing gap of military capabilities limited only by technological--not political--constraints. They argue that U.S. missile defense systems operating in coordination with advanced satellite sensors would weaken their nuclear retaliatory potential. This dissertation argues that the positions held by both of these parties are more extreme than warranted. An analytical evaluation quickly narrows the touted capabilities and assumed vulnerabilities of space systems to a much smaller set of concerns that can be addressed by collaboration. Chapter 2: Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): Is 24/7 Warghter Support Feasible? demonstrates the infeasibility of dramatically increasing U.S. warfighting superiority by using satellites. Chapter 3: What Can be Achieved by Attacking Satellites? makes the case that although U.S. armed forces rely extensively on its satellite infrastructure, that does not immediately make them desirable targets. The functions performed by military satellites are diffused among large constellations with redundancies. Also, some of the functions performed by these satellites can be substituted for by other terrestrial and aerial systems. Chapter 4: The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles demonstrates that anti-satellite (ASAT) intercepts are very complex under realistic conditions and that a potential adversary with space capabilities comparable to China's has very limited capability to use ASATs in a real-world battle scenario. Finally, in order to evaluate the chief concern raised by the Russians and Chinese, chapter 5: Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security simulates a boost-phase missile defense system cued by the advanced Space Tracking and Surveillance (STSS) sensors. It demonstrates that even under best case assumptions, the STSS sensors are not good enough for the boost-phase missile defense system to successfully intercept and destroy an ICBM. Together, these chapters aim to narrow the contentions in the debate on space security thereby fostering the international colloboration and data sharing needed to ensure safe operations in space

High-Powered Microwaves for Boost Phase Intercept

This work details an analysis of using directed high-powered microwave systems as a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles. High-powered microwaves are well suited for this role by adjusting the criteria for adequate missile defense from that of missile destruction to that of missile disablement via electromagnetic upset. Conclusions, however, are highly dependent on key assumptions about a target\u27s electromagnetic vulnerability; further research is necessary to quantify a ballistic missile\u27s actual in-flight response to an applied high-powered microwave

Guidance and control for defense systems against ballistic threats

A defense system against ballistic threat is a very complex system from the engineering point of view. It involves different kinds of subsystems and, at the same time, it presents very strict requirements. Technology evolution drives the need of constantly upgrading system’s capabilities. The guidance and control fields are two of the areas with the best progress possibilities. This thesis deals with the guidance and control problems involved in a defense system against ballistic threats. This study was undertaken by analyzing the mission of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Trajectory reconstruction from radar and satellite measurements was carried out with an estimation algorithm for nonlinear systems. Knowing the trajectory is a prerequisite for intercepting the ballistic missile. Interception takes place thanks to a dedicated tactical missile. The guidance and control of this missile were also studied in this work. Particular attention was paid on the estimation of engagement’s variables inside the homing loop. Interceptor missiles are usually equipped with a seeker that provides the angle under which the interceptor sees its target. This single measurement does not guarantee the observability of the variables required by advanced guidance laws such as APN, OGL, or differential games-based laws. A new guidance strategy was proposed, that solves the bad observability problems and returns satisfactory engagement performances. The thesis is concluded by a study of the interceptor most suitable aerodynamic configuration in order to implement the proposed strategy, and by the relative autopilot design. The autopilot implements the lateral acceleration commands from the guidance system. The design was carried out with linear control techniques, considering requirements on the rising time, actuators maximum effort, and response to a bang-bang guidance command. The analysis of the proposed solutions was carried on by means of numerical simulations, developed for each single case-study

China\u27s Nuclear Force Modernization

Relations between Washington and Beijing improved swiftly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, especially in comparison to the nadir that had been reached during the April 2001 EP-3 incident. This new tide of cooperation has included counterterrorism initiatives, regional partnership in such complex situations as Afghanistan and North Korea, and even some modest agreement on the importance of maintaining the status quo with respect to Taiwan\u27s status.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1023/thumbnail.jp

The US ballistic missile defence policy in the Baltic and Nordic regions

This article examines the implications of the deployment of the US ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in the Baltic and Nordic regions. These implications are to be considered to ensure Russia's military security. Using the structural-functional method, the authors analyse the internal structure of the US BMD in Europe, stages of its implementation, and its influence on the military equilibrium in the region. Being similar to other regional missile defence systems of the Pentagon, BMD in Europe increases the offensive capabilities of the US armed forces and its allies and in doing so, it stops performing a purely defensive mission declared by Washington. It is stressed that the deployment of mobile sea- and land-based BMD elements in the Baltic Sea region and Nordic countries will inevitably destabilize the strategic situation and may lead to a new round of arms race in the region. The efficacy of BMD in Europe is evaluated from the perspective of military technology. The system’s potential threats to Russia's military security and its armed forces are assessed. The article considers measures to enhance national security that could be taken by Russia provided the US plans to deploy BMD in Europe are fully implemented

Defenses in Dispute: The Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics of the First Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate

Since the dawn of the missile age in the mid-1940s, policymakers have grappled with the question of whether and how to defend against ballistic missiles. The saga of the rise of the United States’ first anti-ballistic missile system, known initially as Sentinel and later as Safeguard, and its subsequent demise after the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, has been well cataloged by historians and strategic thinkers. Although many scholars present the story of this ABM system as the logical and inexorable consequence of the acceptance of deterrence theory and mutual vulnerability by the U.S and the Soviet Union, I argue it was instead the product of a remarkably dynamic and contingent process. The combination of intense interagency and intercabinet debates on ABM, synthesized with the peculiar domestic politics of the arms race, help explain this complex story. Examining disputes within the executive branch in the context of foreign policy and domestic politics can help shed light on this process and how this resolution came about, making extensive use of publicly available and declassified documents

Vladivostok and beyond: SALT I and the propects for SALT II

Journal ArticleThe tortuously constricted boundaries within which the Vladivostok agreement can be considered as an advance toward the goal of arms reduction and stability remind us once again that technology unconstrained by law inexorably limits that arena within which we enjoy the capacity to control our own future