4,247 research outputs found
Lagrange Coded Computing: Optimal Design for Resiliency, Security and Privacy
We consider a scenario involving computations over a massive dataset stored
distributedly across multiple workers, which is at the core of distributed
learning algorithms. We propose Lagrange Coded Computing (LCC), a new framework
to simultaneously provide (1) resiliency against stragglers that may prolong
computations; (2) security against Byzantine (or malicious) workers that
deliberately modify the computation for their benefit; and (3)
(information-theoretic) privacy of the dataset amidst possible collusion of
workers. LCC, which leverages the well-known Lagrange polynomial to create
computation redundancy in a novel coded form across workers, can be applied to
any computation scenario in which the function of interest is an arbitrary
multivariate polynomial of the input dataset, hence covering many computations
of interest in machine learning. LCC significantly generalizes prior works to
go beyond linear computations. It also enables secure and private computing in
distributed settings, improving the computation and communication efficiency of
the state-of-the-art. Furthermore, we prove the optimality of LCC by showing
that it achieves the optimal tradeoff between resiliency, security, and
privacy, i.e., in terms of tolerating the maximum number of stragglers and
adversaries, and providing data privacy against the maximum number of colluding
workers. Finally, we show via experiments on Amazon EC2 that LCC speeds up the
conventional uncoded implementation of distributed least-squares linear
regression by up to , and also achieves a
- speedup over the state-of-the-art straggler
mitigation strategies
A Machine-Checked Formalization of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model
Most approaches to the formal analyses of cryptographic protocols make the perfect cryptography assumption, i.e. the hypothese that there is no way to obtain knowledge about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Ideally, one would prefer to rely on a weaker hypothesis on the computational cost of gaining information about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Such a view is permitted by the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model which provide non-standard computational models in which one may reason about the computational cost of breaking a cryptographic scheme. Using the proof assistant Coq, we provide a machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Mode
- ā¦