A Potential Game Approach for Information-Maximizing Cooperative Planning of Sensor Networks

This paper presents a potential game approach for distributed cooperative selection of informative sensors, when the goal is to maximize the mutual information between the measurement variables and the quantities of interest. It is proved that a local utility function defined by the conditional mutual information of an agent conditioned on the other agents' sensing decisions leads to a potential game with the global potential being the original mutual information of the cooperative planning problem. The joint strategy fictitious play method is then applied to obtain a distributed solution that provably converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Two numerical examples on simplified weather forecasting and range-only target tracking verify convergence and performance characteristics of the proposed game-theoretic approach.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, submitted to IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technolog

Potential Game-Based Non-Myopic Sensor Network Planning for Multi-Target Tracking

This paper presents a potential game-based method for non-myopic planning of mobile sensor networks in the context of target tracking. The planning objective is to select the sequence of sensing points over more than one future time steps to maximize information about the target states. This multi-step lookahead scheme is studied to overcome getting trapped at local information maximum when there are gaps in sensing coverage due to constraints on the sensor platform mobility or limitations in sensing capabilities. However, the long-term planning becomes computationally intractable as the length of planing horizon increases. This work develops a gametheoretic approach to address the computational challenges. The main contributions of this paper are twofold: (a) to formulate a non-myopic planning problem for tracking multiple targets into a potential game, the size of which linearly increases as the number of planning steps (b) to design a learning algorithm exploiting the joint strategy fictitious play and dynamic programming, which overcomes the gaps in sensing coverage. Numerical examples of multi-target tracking demonstrate that the proposed method gives better estimation performance than myopic planning and is computationally tractable.Comment: Copyright 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other work

Efficient sensor network planning method using approximate potential game

This paper addresses information-based sensing point selection from a set of possible sensing locations, which determines a set of measurement points maximizing the mutual information between the sensor measurements and the variables of interest. A potential game approach has been applied to addressing distributed implementation of decision making for cooperative sensor planning. When a sensor network involves a large number of sensing agents, the local utility function for a sensing agent is hard to compute, because the local utility function depends on the other agents' decisions while each sensing agent is inherently faced with limitations in both its communication and computational capabilities. Accordingly, a local utility function for each agent should be approximated to accommodate limitations in information gathering and processing. We propose an approximation method for a local utility function using only a portion of the decisions of other agents. The part of the decisions that each agent considers is called the neighboring set for the agent. The error induced by the approximation is also analyzed, and to keep the error small we propose a neighbor selection algorithm that chooses the neighbor set for each agent in a greedy way. The selection algorithm is based on the correlation information between one agent's measurement selection and the other agents' selections. Futhermore, we show that a game with an approximate local utility function has an $\epsilon$-equilibrium and the set of the equilibria include the Nash equilibrium of the original potential game. We demonstrate the validity of our approximation method through two numerical examples on simplified weather forecasting and multi-target tracking.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figures, submitted to IJDSN(International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 1 Efficient Targeting of Sensor Networks for Large-Scale Systems

This paper proposes an efficient approach to an observation targeting problem that is complicated by a combinatorial number of targeting choices and the large dimension of the system state, when the goal is to minimize the uncertainty in some quantities of interest. The primary improvements in the efficiency are obtained by computing the impact of each possible measurement choice on the uncertainty reduction backwards. This backward method provides an equivalent solution to a traditional forward approach under some standard assumptions, while removing the requirement of calculating a combinatorial number of covariance updates. A key contribution of this paper is to prove that the backward approach operates never slower than the forward approach, and that it works significantly faster than the forward one for ensemble-based representations. The primary benefits are shown on a simplified weather problem using the Lorenz-95 model. I